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The research field of experimental economics applies choice situations in a 
controlled environment in order to investigate the validity of economic theories and 
market mechanisms. The application of experimental methods basically comprises 
lab experiments in which participants are confronted with economic decisions. In 
this context, theories of individual decision making are particularly focused on 
experimental economics and behavioral data from experiments provide inferences 
on the verification of theoretical assumptions. But inferences toward a theoretical 
model of individual decision making can only be provided, if the experiment is 
designed according to the constraints of the investigated model. Otherwise 
theoretical conclusions might be misleading. In this respect, the methodology of 
experiments has to attract interest since the experimental background is supposed 
to influence the decision making behavior of individuals in an experiment, as for 
instance the instructional framing, the amount of choice task or monetary 
incentives. 
In general, theoretical models of individual decision making describe single choice 
problems which are independently considered from other decisions. As a 
consequence, such an assumption constrains experimental procedures with 
multiple choice tasks, which therefore have to ensure that each choice task is 
evaluated independently by a subject. This can be achieved by implementing a 
distinct incentive structure such that participants of an experiment are disposed to 
evaluate a choice task independently from others. In this context, incentive 
structures represent an important methodological aspect in experimental 
economics. The role of incentives as a methodological constraint was discussed by 




is considered as a fundamental paradigm for lab experiments in economics and 
proposes a direct conjunction between experimental choice tasks and financial 
rewards of participants. Incentive structures are usually reflected by monetary 
reward functions which induce an economic environment and further motivate the 
subjects to respond seriously according to their underlying monetary preferences. 
Monetary reward functions can be implemented as incentive compatible with 
reference to a distinct theory of individual decision making in a way that an 
individual gains most, if he or she decides according to the rationale of the 
underlying theory. In this respect, a theoretical independence of each choice task in 
multiple choice task experiments can be achieved. 
Basically, monetary reward functions in multiple choice task experiments can be 
designed in relation to a realization of a certain amount of choice tasks. Three 
general possibilities of choice task realization can be distinguished: (1) no choice 
task is realized; (2) one randomly chosen choice task is realized; (3) all choice tasks 
are realized. The suitability of these different characteristics of monetary reward 
functions depends on the research question of the experiment and its underlying 
theoretical assumptions. In general, a monetary reward function has to provide 
incentive compatibility in relation to an underlying decision model. Such a 
requirement ensures the theoretical suitability of the monetary reward function. 
Moreover, a theoretical suitability may further be achieved by different types of 
reward functions which are supposed to result in the same behavior of a decision 
maker who decides according to the rationale of the underlying decision model. 
However, theoretical suitability does not warrant coherent behavior. Therefore, an 
empirical suitability of incentive structures has to be taken into account when 
analyzing the impact of incentives on the individual decision making behavior. 
In this respect, a methodological debate on the suitability of monetary reward 
functions has been started in the research field of experimental economics. Payoff 
mechanisms, which reflect monetary reward functions in experiments, have to be 
examined in relation to individual decision making behavior in multiple choice task 
experiments. According to Smith (1976, 1982), economic experiments have to 
provide a salient reward structure and therefore have to be related to the 
experimental choice task. Since then, the concept of incentive compatibility has 
been a fundamental part of experimental economic research. Incentivizing subjects 
in economic experiments has been widely discussed (see Smith and Walker, 1993; 
Jenkins et al., 1998; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Bonner et al., 2000) and there is a 
general consensus that experiments addressing an economic question have to be 
incentivized. Thus far, the discussion has been focused on a general application of 




mechanisms had to comply with a theoretical suitability for a given experimental 
design. 
More recently, this debate has been reflated by a study of Cox et al. (2011) in which 
different payoff mechanisms applied in multiple choice task experiments were 
investigated with reference to a single choice task experiment. Aside from a 
theoretical suitability of payoff mechanisms, this study investigated behavioral 
differences evoked by different payoff mechanisms from an empirical perspective. 
Cox et al. (2011) considered a single choice task experiment as a baseline for 
independent decision making. Several payoff mechanisms, which are usually 
applied in multiple choice task experiments, were analyzed in their behavioral 
differences according to the single choice task experiment. As a consequence, 
differences could be ascribed to the characteristic of the underlying payoff 
mechanism. Hence, the suitability of a payoff mechanism is referred to descriptive 
evidence, indicating distorting influences of an underlying incentive structure. 
The present work contributes to the methodological debate on the suitability of 
payoff mechanisms in multiple choice task experiments by approaching this topic 
from a neuroscientific perspective. The general research question of this work aims 
for identifying neural differences in the evaluation process of decision making 
induced by different incentive structures. In this context, neuroimaging techniques 
can provide implications for the source of behavioral effects related to an applied 
incentive structure. This work uses the electroencephalography (EEG) as a 
neuroimaging method for investigating event-related brain potentials during 
decision making. The intention of this work is to provide neural inferences on the 
applicability of payoff mechanisms and explanations for potential behavioral biases 
between different payoff mechanisms. For this purpose, the present work focuses 
on the neurological construct of cognitive control and its related processing which 
can be assumed to be involved during decision making. In this respect, a model of 
conflict monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2001) is applied to establish a relationship 
between the cognitive process of decision making and the observed EEG data. In 
particular, the level of conflict, indicated by the appearance of event-related brain 
potentials, toward a distinct choice task situation is used as an indicator for the 
characteristic of the decision evaluation process and its underlying goal system. 
The current work investigates three basic payoff mechanisms that are commonly 
used in experimental economics. A first comparison analyzes the flat-rate payoff 
mechanism and the random payoff mechanism with reference to the influence of 
monetary incentives on individual choice behavior. The flat-rate payoff mechanism 
rewards subjects solely for participating in the experiment. For that reason, no 
choice task is realized for the participants and all decision consequences are 




to one randomly chosen decision and decision consequences are for real. Potential 
differences in the individual choice behavior between both payoff procedures are 
labeled as the hypothetical bias. This behavioral effect is investigated in an EEG 
paradigm with reference to the aforementioned level of conflict in the evaluation 
process of the choice task. 
A second comparison of payoff mechanisms follows up the first EEG study and 
analyzes the random payoff mechanisms in contrast to the averaged payoff 
mechanism. The averaged payoff mechanism rewards subjects according to the 
average outcome of all decisions in an experiment. Hence, the averaged payoff 
mechanism realizes every decision of a multiple choice task experiment. Behavioral 
differences in the individual choice behavior between these two payoff procedures 
refer to a potential formation of portfolio choices when all decisions are realized. 
This behavioral effect is named as the portfolio effect. Consequently, the portfolio 
effect arises from a non-independent evaluation of a choice task. Therefore, neural 
processes of conflict monitoring are investigated in a second EEG study with 
reference to the independence of decision making. 
The analysis of both EEG studies concerning conflict monitoring provides additional 
implications for a general suitability of these payoff mechanisms since the level of 
conflict indicates the characteristic of the evaluated choice task as well as the 
impact of a distinct incentive structure on the decision making process. For 
example, neural evidence for a non-independent evaluation of choice tasks would 
imply that such a payoff mechanism cannot be used for experiments on individual 
choice behavior. 
Besides the main focus on processes of conflict monitoring, the present work 
considers further analyses that are of interest for a general review of the decision 
making process. The two EEG studies are additionally analyzed regarding an 
attentional resource allocation process for categorizing stimulus events of the 
experimental choice tasks. In this respect, the characteristic of a stimulus 
categorization process is described in relation to specific stimulus attributes of 
distinct choice alternatives. The analysis provides further clarifications on the neural 
processing of individual decision making behavior under risk. 
In addition, the processing of risk is focused in more detail on another EEG study 
that addresses the perception of risk in utility assessment methods. In that study, a 
utility assessment method with risky decisions is compared to a utility assessment 
method without risky decisions. The study follows up an EEG study of Heldmann et 
al. (2009) and discusses the presence of risk in relation to its influence on neural 




Moreover, the characteristics of EEG experiments generally entail the methodical 
constraint that a serious amount of repeated stimulus trials have to be presented to 
the subjects in order to reveal the tiny electrophysiological signals of the event-
related brain potentials. As a consequence, every EEG study provides a huge 
amount of decisions, which allows for a detailed revision of the individual choice 
behavior regarding its consistency. According to Butler and Loomes (1988), 
individuals in experiments on risky decision making tend to have a range of 
imprecise choices for which they are unsure about their preferred choice behavior. 
These intervals of imprecision are typically arranged around a switching point, or 
indifference point respectively, for which the subject changes his or her preference 
from one choice alternative to another. As a result of the concentrated data of 
choice behavior, the behavioral results of an EEG experiment are used for analyzing 
ranges of indifference in risky decision making. Hence, in addition to the 
neuroeconomic analysis of the EEG studies, this work further provides an analysis of 
behavioral data with reference to indifference intervals. 
The aforementioned topics will be discussed separately in the subsequent chapters 
of this work. Each of these topics will be processed in a paper style format 
comprising a particular introduction, the material and methods, the results, and a 
corresponding discussion. Before that, a general introduction to the economic and 
neurological background will be provided in the preceding chapters. These 
foregoing chapters aim at affording the basic knowledge that is necessary for 
understanding the applied methods, concepts and terms in the subsequent studies. 
In particular, the proceeding of this work is structured as follows: 
The subsequent chapters 2 and 3 will describe the economic background of this 
work. Chapter 2 will introduce the theoretical principles of modeling individual 
decision making behavior under risk as well as the methodology of experiments 
addressing the measurement of risk attitudes. The theoretical principles will provide 
a basis for chapter 3 in which the concept of incentive compatibility and its relation 
to payoff procedures in experimental economics will be motivated. Chapter 3 will 
clarify the influence of incentive structures on the risk behavior of individuals and 
will discuss behavioral implications for the application of different payoff 
procedures. 
In chapter 4, an introduction to the EEG technique will be provided. This chapter 
will describe the experimental methodology of EEG experiments that was applied in 
the subsequent studies of this work. Chapter 5 will introduce the construct of 
cognitive control with reference to conflict monitoring. Neural processes in relation 





The subsequent chapters 6 and 7 will comprise the two EEG studies with reference 
to the different application of payoff mechanisms. Chapter 6 will focus on the 
behavioral effect of the hypothetical bias, comparing a hypothetical and a real 
lottery choice paradigm. Chapter 7 will address the portfolio effect in payoff 
procedures between a randomly selected realization of one choice and an averaged 
realization of all choices. 
In chapter 8, a further analysis of an EEG study concerning the perception of risk in 
riskless and risky utility assessment methods will be provided. This chapter will 
focus on response conflicts in risky choice task experiments which allows for an 
analysis of the subjective relevance of risk. Chapter 9 will discuss an additional 
analysis of the behavioral data concerning the hypothetical bias with reference to 
indifference intervals. Finally, the findings of this work will be summarized and 
concluded in chapter 10. 




2 Theoretical and methodological principles 
The methodology of experiments in economics basically serves as a tool for 
investigating theoretical assumptions according to a predefined model of individual 
decision making. The present chapter introduces the basic theories for modeling 
individual decision making behavior under risk and describes the methodological 
approach for investigating individual decision making under risk in experimental 
economics. In particular, this chapter defines the concepts and terms that are 
necessary for understanding the research approach in this work. With regard to a 
verification of incentive structures in experiments, a review of individual decision 
making behavior is basically related to a theoretical assumption. In this context, the 
supposition that a distinct incentive structure induces an incentive related behavior 
usually refers to a theoretical conception of how decision making is processed by an 
individual. For that reason, two basic theories of individual decision making are 
introduced in this section: Expected Utility Theory as a normative decision making 
model and Prospect Theory as a descriptive decision making model. The theoretical 
assumptions of both models will be revisited in the subsequent discussion on 
incentive structures. This chapter will also provide an introduction to the 
experimental paradigm that is applied in this work for analyzing individual decision 
making behavior under risk.  
2.1 Modeling individual decision making behavior 
In everyday life, people are frequently confronted with situations where a decision 
is needed. Making the best decision for oneself is probably one of the most 
challenging disputes in life. Decision making basically concerns every human and 
2 Theoretical and methodological principles 
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has therefore been investigated in many different fields of research, as for instance 
in philosophy, social science, psychology, and particularly, in economics as well. 
Researchers attempt to explain the process of how humans reach a decision and 
which determinants are relevant for a distinct choice. The process of decision 
making can be described as a cognitive ability of evaluating predetermined choice 
options and their related consequences, which finally results in a decision for a 
particular option. In this process, it can be assumed that the resulting choice 
reflects the most favored decision for the decision maker. Furthermore, if a 
particular choice is not arbitrary, then the decision process can be ascribed to a 
specific heuristic in the value system of an individual. Identifying the value system 
with its heuristics for decision making and estimating behavioral outcomes of 
decision making is focused in decision theory. The field of decision theory 
comprehends normative and descriptive approaches, which enable an analytic 
comparison of choice situations with regard to an optimal prediction of choices and 
choice behavior. In particular, choice situations that are reflected by uncertain 
consequences are of basic interest in decision theory. In this context, individual 
decision making is relevant in economic choice situations which are frequently 
reflected by uncertain outcome consequences. Several models of decision making 
have been developed for describing individual decision making behavior in 
economics. The overall foundation of basically all decision theory models with 
respect to economic decisions is the construct of maximizing the utility of an 
individual for a given decision situation. This deductive construct can be ascribed to 
the presumption that a final decision reflects the most favored choice alternative in 
a predefined value system of an individual. According to the construct of 
maximizing utility outcomes, individual decision making behavior could be 
estimated if a decision maker obeys a rationale with regard to his or her value 
system. Based on the utility concept, the most prominent model of decision making 
was developed, the Expected Utility Theory. 
2.2 Expected Utility Theory 
The preceding foundation of Expected Utility Theory (EUT) relies on the general 
decision criterion of evaluating uncertain decision alternatives according to their 
expected values. Expected value of a decision results from an accumulation of 
decision outcomes weighted in proportion to their probability of occurrence. The 
expected value criterion indicates that a decision maker has to choose the 
alternative with the highest expected value. This decision criterion provides an 
objective choice for the best alternative. However, in 1713 the mathematician 
Nicolas Bernoulli articulated a paradox which falsified the logic of this decision rule. 
He formulated a lottery with an infinite expected value and showed that people 
2 Theoretical and methodological principles 
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were not willing to pay an infinite price for participating in this lottery. This is known 
as the St. Petersburg Paradox. An explanation of this paradox is even today still 
ambiguous and not completely solved (see Neugebauer, 2010). 
With reference to the St. Petersburg Paradox, Daniel Bernoulli (1738) expanded the 
expected value criterion concerning a mathematical function which converts values 
of decision outcomes into utility for the decision maker. By the use of utility 
functions, a first description of the term ‘risk aversion’ was performed which 
signifies that the utility of a risky alternative is smaller than the utility of a riskless 
alternative even though the expected values of both alternatives are equal. Risk 
aversion assumes that an individual has a preference for avoiding risky outcomes, 
seeking instead for a certainness in his or her decision. As a result, a decision maker 
decides on the best alternative according to the expected value in utility and the 
utility of risky outcomes is reflected by risk aversion. 
In this respect, the utility function further integrates several essential conceptions 
concerning the valuation of goods. For positive outcomes, the utility function is 
monotonically increasing, which reflects the view that receiving more of a good 
yields higher utility for an individual than receiving less. Moreover, the utility 
function has a diminishing marginal utility which reflects the view that an increase 
in utility for receiving an additional unit of a good diminishes in relation to its 
quantity. Consequently, the utility function according to these conceptions has a 
concave shape. This concavity of the utility function further reflects the concept of 
risk aversion since a comparison of a risky choice alternative and a riskless choice 
alternative with equal expected values would result in a smaller expected utility for 
the risky choice alternative due to the concave functional form. Hence, risk aversion 
can be modeled through the shape of the utility function, and different degrees of 
risk aversion are captured by in the curvature of the utility function. 
The preceding description of expected utility was revisited and enhanced by John 
von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944/1947). They enunciated the Expected 
Utility Theory for decision making under risk and implemented the expected utility 
concept on an axiomatic basis. The Expected Utility Theory is based on four axioms 
which define a rational decision maker: completeness, transitivity, independence 
and continuity. 
Completeness postulates that an individual has predefined preferences according to 
a given set of choice alternatives and can specify between any two alternatives 𝐴 
and 𝐵 whether he prefers alternative 𝐴 to alternative 𝐵 (𝐴 ≻ 𝐵) or alternative 𝐵 to 
𝐴 (𝐴 ≺ 𝐵) or whether he is indifferent between 𝐴 and 𝐵 (𝐴 ∼ 𝐵). 
2 Theoretical and methodological principles 
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Transitivity postulates that an individual is consistent in his or her decision, which 
denotes that for any of the alternatives 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝐶, for which the individual has the 
preferences 𝐴 ≻ 𝐵 and 𝐵 ≻ 𝐶, the individual must also prefer 𝐴 to 𝐶 (𝐴 ≻ 𝐶). 
Independence postulates that the order of preferences of two alternatives 𝐴 and 𝐵 
persists even though a third alternative 𝐶 is combined with 𝐴 and 𝐵. Hence, if 
𝐴 ≻ 𝐵 then 𝑡 ⋅ 𝐴 + (1 − 𝑡) ⋅ 𝐶 ≻ 𝑡 ⋅ 𝐵 + (1 − 𝑡) ⋅ 𝐶 with 𝑡 ∈ (  0,1] . 
Continuity postulates that for any of the three alternatives 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝐶 with the 
preference order 𝐴 ≻ 𝐵 and 𝐵 ≻ 𝐶 there must be a combination of 𝐴 and 𝐶 which 
yields to indifference with 𝐵. Thus, there exists a probability 𝑝 ∈ (  0,1]  such that 
𝐵 ∼ 𝑝 ⋅ 𝐴 + (1 − 𝑝) ⋅ 𝐶. 
If an individual complies with these four axioms, then he reflects a rational decision 
maker. The rational decision maker will choose an alternative that yields the highest 
expected utility with reference to his or her utility function. Thus, a risky alternative 
𝐴 is evaluated according to its utility 𝑢(𝑥𝑖) of the decision consequence 𝑥𝑖  and the 
corresponding probabilities 𝑝𝑖 as 𝐸�𝑢(𝐴)� = ∑ 𝑝𝑖 ⋅ 𝑢(𝑥𝑖)𝑁𝑖=1 . 
The Expected Utility Theory describes a normative approach for defining individual 
behavior in risky decision making and still serves as the normative benchmark. 
However, the descriptive validity of EUT has widely been reviewed through the 
methodology of experimental economics. Experiments on the axioms of EUT have 
revealed several inconsistencies. The paradox of Allais (1952) was one of the 
earliest evidences that provided a distortion of the independence axiom of EUT and 
is known as the common consequence effect. Allais has shown that preferences of 
people for a given two gamble choice set can change by integrating a third 
alternative which reflects a violation of the independence axiom. Further violations 
of EUT, for example the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961) or the preference reversal 
phenomenon (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971), were detected over the next decades. 
Hence, the Expected Utility Theory could not perfectly describe the behavior of 
individual decision making for specific choice situations. For that reason, several 
adjustments (e.g. Rank-dependent Expected Utility by Quiggin [1982, 1993]) and 
alternative ‘non-EU’ theories (e.g. Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky 
[1979]) were developed. Most notably, the Prospect Theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) provided a reasonable approach for explaining several 
inconsistencies of EUT and the enhancement to Cumulative Prospect Theory 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) constitutes the most established alternative to EUT.  
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2.3 Prospect Theory 
In contrast to the normative approach of EUT, Prospect Theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) represents a descriptive model based on empirical findings. Prospect 
Theory intends to describe real behavior in individual decision making rather than 
determining the ‘optimal’ solution of a rational decision making as proposed in EUT. 
Basically, both models rely on the concept of expected utility but, Prospect Theory 
additionally integrates biasing psychological aspects into the decision making 
process. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) separate the decision making process into 
an editing phase and an evaluation phase. The editing phase represents a first stage 
in the decision making process. In the editing phase a decision is prepared according 
to specific heuristics. This preceding process reduces complexity for the decision 
maker and allows for an isolated comparison of the prospect. Furthermore, 
outcomes are defined as potential gains or losses relative to an individual reference 
point which corresponds to a present asset situation of the decision maker. 
Subsequently, the evaluation phase determines the expected utility of a current 
prospect through a transformation of outcomes into a utility value and a 
transformation of probabilities into a probability weight. Contrary to EUT, Prospect 
Theory relies on two functional transformations, a value function 𝑣(𝑥)  that 
determines a utility value similar to EUT and, additionally, a probability weighting 
function 𝑤(𝑝). Hence, a risky prospect 𝐴 is evaluated according to its utility value 
𝑣(𝑥𝑖) of the decision consequence 𝑥𝑖  and the corresponding probability weight 
𝑤(𝑝𝑖) of the probability 𝑝𝑖 as 𝐸�𝑢(𝐴)� = ∑ 𝑤(𝑝𝑖) ⋅ 𝑣(𝑥𝑖)𝑁𝑖=1 . 
The value function 𝑣(𝑥) has a similar concave functional form as the utility function 
𝑢(𝑥) in EUT but solely for the region of potential gains. Hence, potential gains in 
Prospect Theory are also reflected by risk aversion. In contrast, potential losses are 
presumed to be reflected by risk seeking behavior, indicating an avoidance of 
realizing a certain loss. Consequently, the value function in the region of potential 
losses has a convex functional form. A value function according to Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) is presented in Figure 1. The reversion of risk attitudes in relation to 
the reference point is mentioned as the reflection effect. But again, the shape of 
the utility function indicates a distinct risk attitude of an individual toward a risky 
decision. In addition, Prospect Theory values the absolute amount in utility for a 
loss as higher than for a gain. This represents the psychological conception that 
losses loom larger than gains and is described as loss aversion. As a consequence, 
the value function in the region of losses has a steeper functional form than in the 
region of gains.  




Figure 1: Value function in Prospect Theory (cp. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
The probability weighting function 𝑤(𝑝) relies on the behavioral observation that 
small probabilities are apparently overweight by individuals while moderate as well 
as large probabilities are underweight. Such a non-linear transformation of 
probabilities influences the decision of an individual differently and yields different 
evaluations of risky outcomes as compared to those derived from EUT. The 
enhancement of Prospect Theory to Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992) proposed a probability weighting function with an inverse S-
shaped functional form (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Functional form of probability weighting (cp. Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) 
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Cumulative Prospect Theory was developed to eliminate some inconsistencies of 
Prospect Theory with reference to prospects with more than two outcome 
consequences. However, it relates to the same basic principle. Prospect Theory and 
Cumulative Prospect Theory have been applied to explain several violations of EUT, 
for example the Allais Paradox. Both are assumed to describe a better prediction of 
individual decision making behavior. However, even Cumulative Prospect Theory 
has its shortcomings and cannot provide a stable approximation of individual 
decision making behavior. 
2.4 Measuring risk attitudes 
According to the previously introduced theories of decision making under risk, the 
attitude to risk is supposed to have an essential influence on the decision making 
process. Risk attitudes, or risk preferences respectively, of individuals about the 
presence of risk are an integrated part of these theories and are determined by the 
characteristics of utility functions. Apart from theoretical differences in those 
models concerning the process of decision making, the concept of risk attitudes is a 
fundamental similarity. Hence, determining risk attitudes through experimental and 
empirical investigations reflects a basic principle for understanding individual 
decision making behavior and further enables a deductive estimation of utility 
functions. In this context, experiments on risk attitudes reflect a reference method 
in experimental economics and are used in the present work as a tool for analyzing 
incentive mechanisms with regard to their applicability. Therefore, this section will 
provide an overview of the methodological approach for measuring risk attitudes of 
individuals.  
2.4.1 Characteristics of risk attitudes 
In economic decision making situations, decision consequences are commonly not 
certain. The decision maker is faced with a situation in which potential 
consequences are uncertain events. Thus, the decision maker is confronted with a 
discrete type of uncertainty in his or her decision. The type of uncertainty regarding 
decision consequences can be distinguished between an a priori known probability 
of occurrence and an unknown probability. Frank H. Knight (1921) was the first who 
differentiated the uncertainty of consequences concerning an a priori probability of 
occurrence. He defined the term ‘risk’ for a measurable uncertainty (probability is 
known) and the term ‘uncertainty’ for an immeasurable uncertainty (probability is 
unknown). With respect to this differentiation, risk attitudes are commonly 
determined for decisions with predefined probabilities and can therefore be 
ascribed to decision making under risk. 
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In general, risk attitudes are differentiated with regard to an objective reflection of 
the decision situation and its riskiness. An objective reflection of the decision 
situation is apparently the expected value criterion which reflects the mean 
outcome of a choice alternative. Furthermore, the riskiness of a choice alternative 
can be characterized by its variance. A higher variance reflects a higher degree of 
risk related to the expected value of a choice alternative and can therefore be 
ascribed as ‘more risky’ compared to a ‘less risky’ choice alternative with a smaller 
variance. According to these attributes of a risky choice alternative, risk attitudes 
are basically categorized as risk averse, risk neutral and risk seeking attitudes. 
Individuals who prefer a less risky choice alternative over a more risky choice 
alternative, although the more risky alternative has a higher expected value, are 
labeled as risk averse. In contrast, individuals who prefer a more risky alternative 
over a less risky alternative, although the more risky alternative has a lower 
expected value, are labeled as risk seeking. Individuals who have no distinct 
preference toward a comparison of risk in choice alternatives are labeled as risk 
neutral. Risk neutral individuals are supposed to decide solely according to the 
expected value of the decision alternatives. Hence, for risk neutral decision makers, 
the expected utility converges to the expected value. 
The differentiation of risk attitudes is an essential variable in all models concerning 
decision making under risk. On an individual level, a prediction of choice behavior 
cannot be made without knowing the risk attitude of the decision maker. For this 
reason, the measurement of risk attitudes through behavioral experiments provides 
significant knowledge for modeling decision making behavior. Therefore, different 
approaches for measuring risk attitudes have been emerged in experimental 
economics 
2.4.2 The gamble choice approach for eliciting risk attitudes 
Approaches for eliciting risk attitudes typically involve gamble choices between 
alternatives which differ in terms of their probability of occurrence and their level of 
outcome. Farquhar (1984) introduced several gambling choice paradigms for 
eliciting risk attitudes and assessing utility functions in particular. According to 
Farquhar (1984), a gamble choice (lottery) can be defined as follows: 
Every possible decision consequence can be assigned to a level 𝑥 in an attribute set 
𝑋, which represents a subset of real numbers for the occurrence of possible levels 
of a single attribute. Moreover, decisions are considered as lotteries, or gambles 
respectively, over finite sets of outcomes, that is decision consequences, from the 
subset 𝑋. A decision alternative is defined as a lottery 𝐿 which assigns probabilities 
𝑝1,𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑚, at which 0 ≤ 𝑝𝑖 ≤ 1 and ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑖=1 = 1, to outcomes 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑚 in the 
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attribute set  𝑋 resulting in a set {𝑥𝑖:𝑝𝑖}𝑖=1𝑚 . The collection of all lotteries over 𝑋 is 
denoted as ℒ. 
Most elicitation methods use a binary lottery choice paradigm for which a lottery 
has at most two outcomes in 𝑋. For a lottery 𝐿 with two outcomes 𝑥,𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 and a 
given probability 𝑝, the outcome  𝑥  is realized with the probability  𝑝 and the 
outcome  𝑦 with the probability 1 − 𝑝. Such a binary lottery can be denoted by [𝑥,𝑝, 𝑦]. Additionally, a lottery choice with only one outcome consequence 𝑠 ∈ 𝑋, 
hence 𝑝 = 1, reflects a sure outcome and is denoted simply as outcome  𝑠 without 
indicating a probability. 
Furthermore, lotteries in ℒ are compared by an individual decision maker through a 
preference relation 𝑅 which has ≻ (is preferred over), ∼ (is indifferent to), or ≺ (is 
not preferred over) as relations. Hence, a comparison of a binary lottery with the 
outcomes 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋  and the probability 𝑝 and a second binary lottery with the 
outcomes 𝑤, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 and the probability 𝑞 can be expressed as [𝑥,𝑝,𝑦]𝑅[𝑤, 𝑞, 𝑧]. 
Determining the preference relation for two lotteries provides information about 
the risk attitude of a subject. The determined preference relation allows for a 
comparison of the decision concerning the level of risk, that is the variance, and the 
expected outcome. Hence, it is possible to determine whether the choice reflects 
risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking behavior. Furthermore, applying a sequence 
of lottery choices to a subject in which one parameter is varied among an otherwise 
constant gamble choice set enables an observation of a potential change in the 
preference for a choice alternative. 
For example, a decision problem with a binary lottery [100, .5,0]  as choice 
alternative A and a sure choice 𝑠 as choice alternative B is presented to a subject. 
The sure outcome 𝑠 is varied within the two outcomes of the binary lottery. Now, 
assuming that the subject has a preference for the binary lottery in case of 𝑠 = 5 
and a preference for the sure outcome in case of 𝑠 = 95. Here, a determination of 
risk attitudes according to these two observations is not possible. But given these 
observations, there has to be a value of 𝑠 within 5 and 95 for which the preference 
changes from one alternative to the other. Thus, there is a point at which the 
preference relation between both alternatives is ‘indifferent’ (∼). This indifference 
point in relation to the expected value directly indicates the risk attitude of a 
subject for the given decision problem. Alternative A reflects a risky decision for the 
subject since the outcome of A is unsure. Alternative B reflects a less risky, in this 
case ‘riskless’, decision since its outcome is known for sure. Comparing the 
expected outcomes of both alternatives, a decision for alternative B with an amount 
of 𝑠 smaller than the expected outcome of the binary lottery reflects risk averse 
behavior. In contrast, a decision for alternative A with an amount of 𝑠 higher than 
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the expected outcome of the binary lottery would reflect risk seeking behavior. In 
this respect, the determination of the indifference point further specifies the 
intensity of the underlying risk attitude. A greater difference between the 
indifference point of an individual compared to the expected value of the risky 
alternative indicates a higher degree of risk averse or risk seeking behavior. This 
allows for a comparison of risk preferences of different individuals. Thus, 
determining the point at which a subject is indifferent between two lotteries is an 
essential objective of methods for eliciting risk attitudes. 
According to the concept of expected utility (Bernoulli, 1738/1954), the indifference 
point would indicate that both alternatives have obviously the same utility for the 
decision maker. A preference relation for one of the two alternatives would 
therefore indicate that such a preferred alternative has a higher utility for the 
decision maker. Thus, the measurement of risk attitudes and preferences for 
particular alternatives can directly be related to the utility concept. In this context, 
outcome consequences are converted into utility through a utility function 𝑢(𝑥). On 
the basis of the axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944/1947), risk 
attitudes in Expected Utility Theory are expressed by the shape of the utility 
function 𝑢(𝑥), while choice alternatives are evaluated through the expected utility 
𝐸�𝑢(𝑥)� of a given prospect. Hence, risk averse behavior is described by a concave 
utility function, risk seeking behavior by a convex utility function and risk neutral 
behavior by a linear utility function. Consequently, methods for eliciting risk 
attitudes are particularly utilized for determining utility functions. 
The approach of a single comparison of two gambles as a decision problem is the 
basic similarity in the majority of the methods for measuring risk attitudes. 
Differences refer to the parameters that are manipulated (variation of outcomes or 
probabilities) and whether two binary lotteries are compared, labeled as paired 
gamble methods, or one binary lottery is compared to a sure outcome, labeled as 
standard gamble methods (cp. Farquhar, 1984). Standard gamble methods provide 
a baseline comparison of risk attitudes toward a sure choice, whereas paired 
gamble methods allow for a direct comparison of different levels of risk.  
2.4.3 The certainty equivalent method 
A paradigm for a standard gamble method is the certainty equivalent method (CE 
method) which has already been introduced in the example before. The CE method 
determines a point of indifference between a binary lottery [𝑥,𝑝,𝑦] and a sure 
outcome 𝑠, resulting in [𝑥,𝑝,𝑦] ∼ 𝑠. The binary lottery is predefined and kept 
constant, whereas the sure outcome 𝑠  is the parameter which has to be 
determined. Moreover, the determined value of a sure outcome at which the 
subject has an indifferent preference relation is labeled as ‘certainty equivalent’ 
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(CE). The determination of the certainty equivalent in comparison with the 
expected value (EV) of the lottery defines the risk attitude. A subject is deemed to 
be (1) risk averse if 𝐶𝐸 < 𝐸𝑉, (2) risk neutral if 𝐶𝐸 = 𝐸𝑉 or (3) risk seeking if 
𝐶𝐸 > 𝐸𝑉. A common sequence procedure is to present monotonically increasing 
amounts of 𝑠 so that a subject can account for a switching point from a choice for 
the lottery to a choice for the sure outcome.  
2.4.4 The Holt-Laury procedure 
A paradigm for a paired gamble method is the Holt-Laury procedure enunciated by 
Holt and Laury (2002). At present, this method is widely applied in experimental 
economics for measuring risk attitudes among two risky gambles. The Holt-Laury 
procedure comprises a list of 10 lottery choice sets with two binary lotteries each. 
The lottery outcomes are kept constant and the probability of occurrence is varied 
across the choice sets. The two lotteries in each choice set are characterized by a 
less risky lottery [𝑥,𝑝,𝑦] (option A) and a more risky lottery [𝑤, 𝑞, 𝑧] (option B), 
specified by 𝑥 < 𝑤, 𝑦 > 𝑧 and 𝑝 = 𝑞. For each lottery choice set a preference 
relation is indicated by the subject, [𝑥,𝑝, 𝑦]𝑅[𝑤, 𝑞, 𝑧] respectively. In the first choice 
set, the probability 𝑝 is 0.1 and increases to 1 within the subsequent choice sets 
with a step size of 0.1 (see Figure 3). Hence, a subject should prefer option A in the 
first choice set and should definitely prefer option B in the last choice set since both 
lotteries involve sure events and the outcome of option B is higher (𝑥 < 𝑤). The 
number of choices for the less risky alternative, or the switching point from one 
alternative to another respectively, classifies the risk attitudes of subjects. As a 
consequence, it can be implied that the more choices for the less risky lottery are 
indicated by a subject the more risk averse the behavior of the subject is. 
 
Figure 3: Multiple lottery choice list according to Holt and Laury (2002, p. 1645, Table 1) 




3 Incentive structures in experimental 
economics 
In this chapter, an introduction to the methods of experimental economics will be 
presented. The focus is put on the reliability and validation of experimental payoff 
procedures which are the methodical backbone of experimental economics. Payoff 
mechanisms incentivize subjects in an experiment for a given experimental task and 
are supposed to have a significant impact on the results of experimental studies. For 
that reason, in experiments with reference to a revision of theoretical assumptions, 
an application of a distinct payoff mechanism has to be reviewed with regard to its 
validity for the underlying theoretical model. Hence, in experimental economics it is 
necessary that a payoff mechanism is incentive compatible for a distinct theory. But 
aside from the theoretical necessity of incentive compatibility, payoff mechanisms 
should further provide an incentive for a truthful response of subjects. Behavioral 
results of an experiment could still be valid, although incentive compatibility is not 
provided by an applied payoff mechanism. In this comparison, a methodological 
question about the applicability of payoff mechanisms arises, which will be 
discussed in the subsequent sections. 
As for now, this chapter starts by reviewing the general motivation structure of 
subjects in experiments and its potential impact on task performance. Next, the 
concept of incentive compatibility will be introduced with reference to an 
application in economic experiments. In this context, it will be discussed whether 
incentive structures ensure truthful responses, and what would more likely provoke 
a truthful response in experiments. Especially the need for independent responses 
in experiments with a multiple choice task design yields several uncertainties as 
regards the reliability of the subjects’ responses. These uncertainties will be 
3 Incentive structures in experimental economics 
 
19 
discussed with reference to the design of payoff mechanisms. Therefore, an 
introduction to payoff mechanisms used in multiple choice task experiments will be 
provided followed by a general discussion about the applicability of these payoff 
mechanisms. 
3.1 The impact of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on 
task performance 
In general, behavioral experiments with individuals in a laboratory are accompanied 
by the fact that the subjects have to perform a certain task which requires them to 
make either physical or cognitive efforts. In order to ensure that subjects are willing 
to make an appropriate effort for a given task, the experimenter must think about 
the motivational structure of subjects (cp. Lee, 2007). When subjects are 
participating in an experiment, they should generally have an intrinsic motivation 
for performing an experimental task (see Deci, 1975), which means that subjects 
are self-motivated without extrinsic incentives. However, most subjects do also 
expect a compensation for participating in an experiment. Subjects are willing to be 
rewarded for their effort, which reflects an extrinsic motivation. The question 
emerges whether the effort is influenced by extrinsic motivation which, as a 
consequence, would result in a different task performance. Task performance is the 
behavioral outcome of a subject in an experiment and can rely on the accuracy of a 
judgment, the rate of success or the closeness to an optimal solution but also on 
the elicitation of truthful responses in a choice task. Concerning a truthful response, 
there is no obvious inducement for lying when subjects are not motivated by an 
extrinsic incentive. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), subjects seem to 
have no specific reason for concealing their true preferences in experiments. 
However, a purely intrinsic motivation might not be a reliable basis for verifying 
experimental results, and the influence of extrinsic motivation on task performance, 
like financial incentives, has to be taken into account. 
Financial incentives as an extrinsic motivation are broadly applied in experimental 
economics and have therefore been investigated with reference to task 
performance. In this comparison, an improvement of task performance is not 
always achieved and depends on the type of a task, the task complexity, and the 
payoff mechanism. However, the variance in behavior is supposed to be reduced by 
financial incentives (see for example Smith and Walker, 1993; Jenkins et al., 1998; 
Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Bonner et al., 2000). Furthermore, it is presumed that 
subjects expand their mental effort on the task in contrast to hypothetical task 
situations (Smith and Walker, 1993; Wilcox, 1993; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). In 
this context, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) described a ‘capital-labor-production’ 
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framework which suggests that the performance of a subject is a function of 
cognitive abilities and cognitive effort. Financial incentives are presumed to induce 
more cognitive effort for performing a task, which could improve the performance. 
In contrast, a critique against extrinsic incentives is remarked by some psychologists 
who argue that extrinsic motivation can also induce a conflict for subjects, resulting 
in different performance outcomes since extrinsic motivation could remain in 
contrast to an intrinsic motivation (Lepper et al., 1973; Deci and Ryan, 1987). 
However, providing extrinsic incentives for subjects in economic experiments is not 
only a question of motivation but rather a methodical aspect since an economic 
decision is usually affected by financial consequences. A financial incentive 
structure coinciding with the task performance is therefore more than an adequate 
extension for rewarding subjects for their participation. Such a conjunction ensures 
the reliability of experimental results, as it enables the experimenter to emulate an 
economic environment. In this respect, the concept of incentive compatibility is 
applied to financial incentives in economic experiments. 
3.2 Financial incentives and incentive compatibility 
The concept of incentive compatibility formally introduced by Leonid Hurwicz 
(1972) is a constraint in the theory of economic systems. Incentive compatibility is 
reflected by mechanisms applied to individuals in an economic system. Such 
incentive compatible mechanisms are designed to constrain individual self-
interested behavior in order to achieve a desirable outcome. In economic systems, 
incentive compatibility induces individual behavior, which is consistent with a 
normative prediction or performance criterion (e.g. Nash equilibrium, Pareto-
efficiency). Hence, incentive compatibility is constantly related to a specific 
theoretical prediction and has to be considered coherently to the underlying theory. 
In this context, applying incentive compatible mechanisms in experiments allows for 
a revision of behavioral assumption in decision theory. 
In experimental economics, Vernon L. Smith (1982) has enunciated conditions for 
microeconomic experiments. Amongst others, he composed a condition of 
‘saliency’ which is based on incentive compatibility. The ‘salience condition’ 
suggests a monetary reward function depending on the responses of a subject. 
Aside from a general motivational relevance, monetary rewards are characterized 
by a monotonic utility for an individual and are concerned to have a neutral value 
for a subject (Smith, 1976). In addition, such a reward function has to provide a 
significant relevance on the utility of the subject, which is articulated by Smith 
(1982) as the precept of dominance. It implies that the rewards have to be 
sufficiently large regarding the effort that has to be put on the task and the time 
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that has to be spent in the experiment. If these two criterions are implemented, 
then a monetary reward function reflects an appropriate procedure for applying an 
incentive compatible mechanism in an economic experiment. 
Furthermore, the specification of monetary reward functions is expressed in the 
type of a payoff mechanism applied to the participants in an experiment. A payoff 
mechanism defines the outcome for a subject by determining the relevance set of 
decisions and the exchange rate of decision consequences. With respect to this 
procedure, a payoff mechanism is labeled as ‘incentive compatible’, if the payoff 
mechanism ensures that the ‘best-response’ of a subject leads to a previously 
predicted behavior of a distinct theory. Therefore, incentive compatibility with 
regard to a theoretical assumption enables researchers to investigate the suitability 
of theoretical models. 
In experimental practice, most researchers use the term ‘incentive compatible’ with 
reference to the Expected Utility Theory, which is the most prominent and most 
applied normative decision theory. Behavioral experiments on EUT and its axioms 
are often the baseline for analyzing a behavioral effect. Most payoff mechanisms 
are designed to be incentive compatible in relation to EUT. An additional basic 
purpose of incentive compatible payoff mechanisms is to elicit truthful responses 
according to the individual risk attitudes of subjects. But a verification of truthful 
responses cannot directly be provided by incentive compatibility. A general 
evidence that the behavior of a subject in a distinct payoff mechanism environment 
is driven by the given incentive structure is not possible. However, payoff 
mechanisms should be incentive compatible in order to preclude biasing effects due 
to an absence of a standardized incentive structure, but incentive compatibility 
does not warrant true behavioral responses. 
A recent study by Cox et al. (2011) investigated several payoff mechanisms 
according to theoretical predictions, behavioral biases and mutual comparability. 
The authors raise two types of questions concerning the evaluation of payoff 
mechanisms: “(a) Are any of the mechanisms behaviorally unbiased under 
conditions in which they are theoretically incentive compatible? (b) Do they provide 
usable data under conditions in which they are not theoretically incentive 
compatible?” (Cox et al., 2011, p. 31) Both questions contribute to the discussion of 
incentive compatible payoff mechanisms from two points of view: (1) an incentive 
compatible payoff mechanism does not warrant unbiased behavior and (2) a non-
incentive compatible payoff mechanism can also be appropriate for eliciting true 
behavior. The key question is: What are truthful responses in a lab experiment?  
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3.3 Inferences on truthful responses in lab 
experiments 
First of all, behavioral observations in lab experiments should finally be valid to real 
world behavior. Such an implication is probably the most important conclusion that 
has to be drawn from experimental results, but it is also the weakest one. Lab 
experiments are characterized by an artificially designed and controlled 
environment, attended by limitations, constraints, and a simplification of economic 
situations. Hence, the observed behavior is limited to the experimental setting and 
a deduction to real world behavior has to be drawn with care. For this reason, a 
new research area in experimental economics has emerged over the last decades, 
namely field experiments (see Harrison and List, 2004; List, 2007; Levitt and List, 
2009).  
However, lab experiments can inform researchers about general characteristics of 
individual decision making behavior and are therefore appropriate indicators for 
real behavior. Furthermore, lab experiments can provide evidence against or 
implications for a theory since an observation in an experiment is nonetheless an 
outcome of individual decision making. According to theoretical models of 
individual decision making, experiments are typically focusing on distinct 
assumptions which are isolated from other potential influences. In this context, one 
purpose of incentive compatible payoff mechanisms is to ensure an independence 
of choices among a series of different choice settings because individual decision 
making theories are usually modeling single choice situations. As a consequence, 
the experimental baseline of modeling individual choice behavior is a single choice 
task decision for which a truthful response according to a realization of the decision 
consequences can be assumed. 
Hence, an inference from single choice task experiments to real behavior is 
probably the most reasonable one. The behavioral results of incentivized one task 
experiments are therefore a reference for all kind of payoff mechanisms. But single 
choice experiments are limited in their expressiveness since only between-subjects 
analyses are possible. Furthermore, it is rather common practice in experimental 
economics to conduct experiments with more than one choice task for a subject. 
For this reason, it is worthwhile to establish payoff mechanisms for multiple choice 
task experiments which evoke an equivalent behavior according to an independent 
decision making of a single choice task. 
Relating to the study of Cox et al. (2011), a comparison of multiple choice task 
payoff mechanisms with a single choice task experiment revealed several 
differences in choice behavior, which the authors attribute to different kinds of 
3 Incentive structures in experimental economics 
 
23 
cross task contamination effects. The study of Cox et al. (2011) illustrates that a 
general review on methodical aspects of payoff mechanisms even for well 
established incentive compatible payoff mechanisms has to be further investigated. 
The findings of this study will subsequently be revisited and further discussed in 
more detail. But before that an introduction to payoff mechanisms in multiple 
choice task experiments as used in this work has to be considered. 
3.4 Payoff mechanisms 
As mentioned before, payoff mechanisms reflect the implementation of an extrinsic 
incentive structure for performing an experimental task. Payoff mechanisms reward 
a subject for participating in an experiment and, moreover, are supposed to ensure 
a significant effort on task performance by the subject. The design of a payoff 
mechanism is often related to the purpose of the experimental study and the 
necessity for an appropriate incentive structure. In single choice task experiments, 
the design alternatives for a payoff mechanism are straightforward. Here, the 
experimenter has the possibility to reward the subjects directly related to their 
decisions or to pay a predetermined amount that is independent from the decision. 
The first option would obviously induce real consequences for the subject, whereas 
the latter would not. If there is no apparent reason against a direct reward, the 
payoff mechanism should depend on the decision since incentive compatibility is 
provided for all kinds of decision theory models (cp. Cox et al., 2011). Apparent 
reasons against a direct reward could be unaffordable outcomes, consequences of 
moral conflicts (e.g. choices related to health economics) or losses.  
However, single choice task experiments are not a general application in 
experimental economics. The majority of experimental studies comprise multiple 
choice tasks. According to methods for eliciting risk preferences, sequences of 
gamble choices are part of the methodological approach. Furthermore, multiple 
choice task experiments are appropriate for testing the consistency of choices and 
allows for a broader data analysis of individual decision making. But the application 
of multiple choice tasks raises the problem of repeated decisions that might 
influence each other. In view of repetition, the subject is not faced with a single 
decision and the perception of a single decision problem could be changing in the 
presence of further decision problems. This would violate the desirable result of 
independent decision making. Aside from a potential non-independent evaluation 
of the given choice tasks, further influences may also emerge. For example, 
repetition could accustom a subject to the decision environment, resulting in a kind 
of learning even in case of absent feedback or resulting in an appearance of 
boredom to the decision task (see Lee, 2007). 
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Thus, financial incentives in multiple choice task experiments may play a more 
crucial role since a considerable amount of potential influence can distort the 
behavioral results in these experiments. In the next section, a brief introduction to 
the most widely applied payoff mechanisms in multiple choice task experiments will 
be presented. The payoff mechanisms are considered with reference to an 
independent evaluation of a single choice task in a multiple choice task 
environment and its consequences on risk attitudes.  
3.4.1 The flat-rate payoff mechanism 
The flat-rate payoff mechanism rewards a subject by paying out a predetermined 
amount of money which is not related to the performance in the experiment. The 
payoff is independent from all performed decisions of the experiment and solely 
represents a compensation for participation. This implies that all decisions are 
hypothetical. The flat-rate payoff mechanism is not incentive compatible for any 
theoretical assumption based on the utility concept, as the outcome consequences 
have no influence on the utility of a subject. According to Smith (1982), the salience 
condition for a reward structure is not satisfied, which allows for influences of other 
variables. However, there is a lack of evidence that influences of other variables are 
identifiable and assignable to the choice task, and subjects have no obvious motive 
for disguising their real choice preference (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). As a 
consequence, if subjects are aware of their true risk preferences in an individual 
choice situation and if they have no motivation for lying, then the flat-rate payoff 
mechanism could provide behavioral results similar to a single choice task 
experiment, although this mechanism is not incentive compatible.  
3.4.2 The random payoff mechanism 
The random payoff mechanism is probably the most frequently applied payoff 
mechanism in multiple choice task experiments when analyzing individual decision 
making behavior. At the end of an experiment, one out of all decisions a subject has 
performed is selected randomly. Subsequently, the randomly selected decision is 
realized according to its consequences, thereby determining the final reward for the 
subject. The procedure ensures a direct relationship between the reward and the 
choice task for the subject. Hence, the salience condition (Smith, 1982) is satisfied 
and the outcome consequences influence the utility of a subject. Furthermore, the 
random payoff mechanism is incentive compatible under EUT, if the independence 
axiom is satisfied by the decision maker. Moreover, the random payoff mechanism 
is also incentive compatible for non-EU theories (e.g. Cumulative Prospect Theory 
by Tversky and Kahneman [1992]) if the isolation hypothesis (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) holds for a decision maker (cp. Cox et al., 2011). Thus, a subject to 
whom the random payoff mechanism is applied has theoretically no incentives to 
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deviate from his or her true preference. A deviation from a truthful response would 
cause losses in utility. As long as a subject follows conditional rationality, the ‘best-
response’ is an independent response from other choices in every choice task. As a 
result, the random payoff mechanism is supposed to induce independent choice 
behavior and should therefore be comparable to choice behavior of a single choice 
task experiment. 
3.4.3 The averaged payoff mechanism 
In contrast to the random payoff mechanism, the averaged payoff mechanism 
includes all decisions of a subject such that every realized decision outcome 
contributes proportionately to the final reward. At the end of an experiment, all 
decisions are realized independently and the averaged outcome value determines 
the final reward. The averaged payoff mechanism refers to several approaches for 
realizing all decisions in an experiment. For example, in market experiments, it is 
common to realize every decision in accumulation. Furthermore, approaches for 
realizing all decisions could also differ in the time of realization or in their 
independence of occurrence. In this context, there exist approaches that realize 
every decision sequentially after a completed choice task and also that realize all 
decision corresponding to one random outcome state (cp. Cox et al., 2011). 
The averaged payoff mechanism satisfies the salience condition according to Smith 
(1982) and results in an influence on the subjects’ utility. However, the averaged 
payoff mechanism has its shortcoming when providing incentive compatibility. 
Assuming that the independence axiom of EUT holds, the averaged payoff 
mechanism is only incentive compatible in case of risk neutrality as a result of a 
reduction of risk across all choices. This is mentioned as the portfolio effect, 
indicating that a portfolio of risky choices reduces the variance. Thus, the certainty 
equivalent of a risk averse and a risk seeking expected utility maximizer would be 
shifted toward the expected value of the risky outcomes, if choice portfolios are 
composed. Furthermore, the averaged payoff mechanism is only incentive 
compatible for non-EU theories, if the isolation hypothesis is satisfied (cp. Cox et al., 
2011). As a consequence, if the assumption holds that subjects are isolating each 
decision, then the averaged payoff mechanism is applicable for revealing choice 
behavior according to a single choice task experiment. 
3.4.4 Discussion on the suitability of payoff mechanisms 
Comparing the above described types of payoff procedures according to their 
theoretical application of an independent choice task evaluation, the most 
appropriate payoff mechanism for providing truthful responses is apparently the 
random payoff mechanism. Several studies addressing the suitability of the random 
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payoff mechanism (e.g. Starmer and Sugden, 1991; Cubitt et al., 1998; Hey and Lee, 
2005) have shown that the random payoff mechanism provides an independent 
evaluation of choice task in multiple choice task experiments. These findings give 
strong support for a standard application of the random payoff mechanism in 
experiments on individual decision making. But more recently, some critique (see 
Cox et al., 2011; Harrison and Swarthout, 2012) came up on the use of the random 
payoff mechanism when subjects have non-expected utility preferences. Cox et al. 
(2011) argue that the random payoff mechanism may fail to be incentive 
compatible, if subjects behaved according to the reduction of the compound 
lotteries axiom (Holt, 1986). In this case, different choice tasks are evaluated 
simultaneously by the subject and the isolation of a single choice task is not given. 
The results of the study revealed behavioral differences between similar choices of 
a one task experiment and an experiment which applied the random payoff 
mechanism. Cox and colleagues attribute this result to a cross task contamination 
effect which is not directly assignable to a reduction of compound lotteries but 
violates the isolation hypothesis. Another potential weakness of the random payoff 
mechanism is the fact that, based on an increase in the number of decision trials, 
the probability of selecting a particular decision decreases. Thus, the importance of 
a single choice task is reduced and possibly neglected, if a distinct amount of 
decision trials is attained. Wilcox (1993) suggested that the probability of a decision 
being selected needs to be sufficiently large for subjects in order to exert an 
appropriate effort for performing the given task. Under this assumption, the 
incentive compatibility might fail inferentially, if the effort on the task performance 
was dissociated from the incentive structure.  
With respect to the averaged payoff mechanism, the assumption concerning 
incentive compatibility is much more susceptible since this mechanism is 
theoretically not applicable on expected utility maximizers who are risk averse or 
risk seeking. However, assuming that a subject’s behavior is liable to the isolation 
hypothesis, the averaged payoff mechanism yields the same results as the random 
payoff mechanism. A study by Laury (2006) investigated differences between a 
random payoff procedure and an accumulated payoff procedure for small payoffs. 
Laury (2006) could not confirm behavioral differences for small payoffs. Hence, a 
potential portfolio effect might not be traceable for small payoffs since the degree 
of risk aversion in small payoff treatments is usually not far from risk neutrality. 
However, a study by Selten et al. (1999) investigated an accumulated payoff 
mechanism with reference to an induced risk neutral choice behavior. They did not 
find that risk neutrality was induced by paying out all decisions. This finding would 
negate the presence of the portfolio effect in multiple choice task experiments. In 
contrast, the study of Cox et al. (2011) reported differences between an 
accumulated payoff procedure and a single choice task treatment, indicating the 
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presence of a portfolio effect. Interestingly, this divergence appears to be similar to 
the cross task contamination effect revealed for the random payoff mechanism. As 
a result, both mechanisms do not warrant the isolation hypothesis in this study. But 
an absence of behavioral differences between both payoff mechanisms could 
indicate that choice tasks are evaluated similarly. 
The flat-rate payoff mechanism does not provide an appropriate incentive structure 
for examining individual decision making behavior in experimental economics, 
because the behavioral results are based on hypothetical decisions and cannot be 
verified concerning a deductive reliability. However, Camerer and Hogarth (1999) 
reviewed several experimental studies concerning financial incentives and reported 
that an improvement of performance through financial incentives can be achieved 
in judgment and routine tasks, but an effect in market experiments and gamble 
choice tasks remains negligible. Consequently, hypothetical results in experiments 
on individual decision making do provide implications on real behavior, but 
researchers have to be aware of a hypothetical bias. Differences between 
hypothetical and real choice tasks has been confirmed for high payoffs. Holt and 
Laury (2002) have shown that differences in risk attitudes occur in high-stakes 
payoff treatments, whereas for low-stakes payoffs there are no differences 
apparent. Holt and Laury (2002) attributed this deviation in risk attitudes to an 
incentive effect, because high-stakes payoffs provide higher incentives for a subject 
than low-stakes payoff. This further implies that the evaluation process of high 
payoff choices differ between hypothetical and real decisions. 
In summary, a theoretical prediction of how payoff mechanisms are affecting the 
behavior of subjects in gamble choice tasks is essential for verifying experimental 
results. But, an application of a theoretically appropriate payoff mechanism does 
not ensure a faultless methodological framework. Researchers in experimental 
economics have considered theoretical and empirical approaches for identifying the 
‘true’ payoff mechanism, but the evidence is ambiguous and a suitable solution 
remains absent. 
On that account, this work contributes to the topic by investigating the evaluation 
process itself through a neurological approach. Aside from theoretical assumptions, 
payoff mechanisms and incentive structures are presumed to induce motivations 
for exerting mental effort on a given task. If so, different levels of mental effort 
influence cognitive processes in the brain. In addition to behavioral results, 
neurological observations can provide further clarifications on the processing of 
incentive structures. Hence, the suitability of payoff mechanisms is investigated by 
focusing the decision making process regarding its underlying neural mechanism 
through the use of the EEG technique.  




4 Introduction to the EEG technique 
This chapter is to a great extent based on the book of Steven J. Luck (2005) “An 
Introduction to the Event-related Potential Technique” and on the book chapter 
“Event-related Brain Potentials” by Fabiani, Gratton, and Coles in “Handbook of 
Psychophysiology” edited by Cacioppo, Tassinary, and Berntson (2000). In this 
chapter, a brief introduction to the EEG technique will be presented in order to call 
attention to the specific characteristics of EEG experiments and their advantages 
and disadvantages. The purpose of introducing the general principles of EEG is to 
provide clarifications on how the EEG technique has to be applied, what kinds of 
signals are measured and how the EEG data have to be processed in order to be 
able to draw conclusions. 
4.1 The EEG and event-related potentials 
The technique of measuring brain activity on the human scalp was first described by 
Hans Berger (1929), who placed electrodes on the scalp of subjects in a series of 
experiments. By amplifying the electrical signals and plotting the changes of voltage 
over time, he found that these signals are related to the activity of the brain. Berger 
concluded that this activity refers to a huge amount of different activities of neural 
sources that are mounted up on the surface of the scalp. The 
electroencephalography (EEG) as a research method was invented.  
During the next decades, the findings of Berger (1929) were investigated in more 
detail. It was found that a distinct pattern of the EEG signals could be obtained, if 
the waveforms were averaged upon an amount of distinct motor, sensory or 
cognitive events. The conclusion was drawn that the averaging time locked to 
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similar events extracts a specific neural response-related to the presentation of 
these events. This characteristic pattern is normally covered from the overall EEG 
oscillation, reflecting the huge amount of simultaneously activated neural sources. 
By assuming that the overlaying background EEG oscillation reflects a randomly 
distributed error term converging to zero, the background noise diminishes by 
averaging and a specific neural response time locked to a distinct event can be 
extracted. This resulting signal pattern is mentioned as event-related potential 
(ERP), a term introduced by Herb Vaughan (1969). Event-related potentials are 
meant to occur in preparation for or in response to a discrete event. A further 
clarification of what an ERP is, is specified by Steven J. Luck (2005, p. 59) as “[s]calp-
recorded neural activity that is generated in a given neuroanatomical module when 
a specific computational operation is performed.” 
Event-related potentials can be defined by three characteristics: (1) the time at 
which ERPs occur in relation to the event (latency), (2) the type of deflection of the 
ERP amplitude (polarity), and (3) the maximum position on the scalp (location). 
Hence, ERPs can be described as a function of voltage, time, and location. On the 
basis of these three characteristics, the labeling of the most ERP components can be 
ascribed to these attributes. ERP components denoted with an ‘N’ are related to a 
negative peak deflection and a denotation with ‘P’ refers to a positive peak 
deflection. The prefix letter is followed by a number that indicates either the 
position of the peak or the latency of its appearance. For example, an ERP 
component labeled as ‘P300’ refers to a positive peak at about 300 milliseconds 
(ms) after stimulus onset. Interestingly, a component labeled as ‘P3’ reflects the 
same P300 component but in this case refers to the third positive peak of the ERP 
waveform after stimulus onset. In many cases, the number labels reflecting the 
latency are equal to the number labels reflecting the peak position (e.g. N1 = N100, 
P1 = P100, N2 = N200, P3 = P300). Due to the fact that the latency of some 
components varies according to the stimulus type, the labeling with reference to 
the peak position is used more frequently. Furthermore, some labels directly refer 
to the occurrence of the ERP component in relation to an experimental condition or 
response (e.g. ERN = error-related negativity, MMN = mismatch negativity). 
Moreover, an event-related potential can be evoked by endogenous and exogenous 
factors. An exogenously evoked ERP is directly related to a reaction on the character 
of a stimulus. Thus, the occurrence of the ERP is obligatorily modulated by different 
shapes of a stimulus (e.g. the intensity of an acoustic tone) and can therefore be 
ascribed as a stimulus sensor. Such exogenously evoked potentials are typically so 
called ‘early components’, occurring within 100 ms after stimulus presentation, and 
are assumed to represent the sensory processing of an external signal in the brain. 
Endogenously evoked ERPs are generally related to internal processes, as for 
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example information processing, and can further occur in the absence of an 
external stimulus. These potentials generally occur after 300 ms and reflect 
evaluative brain processes that require cognitive capacities. Hence, endogenously 
evoked potentials are of great interest when examining cognitive functions in the 
brain. Some ERP components, like several negativities between 100 ms and 300 ms, 
cannot directly be assigned to such a categorization and are considered as 
mesogenous. 
Figure 4, adopted from Luck (2005, p. 8, fig. 1.1), briefly demonstrates how event-
related potentials are derived from an EEG experiment. The figure depicts the 
process of extracting event-related potentials for two stimulus types in an EEG 
experiment. Part A illustrates the experimental setup, indicating a subject in front of 
a computer screen. Stimuli are presented for the subject on the screen, while brain 
activity is recorded simultaneously through an electrode placed on the scalp of the 
subject. Part B of the figure shows the spontaneous EEG waveform recorded at the 
Pz electrode. The time ranges at which a distinct stimulus type (‘X’ or ‘O’) was 
presented are marked in the timeline. These time epochs are extracted from the 
spontaneous EEG (see part C on the left-hand side) and further averaged according 
to ‘X’ or ‘O’ stimulus trials. The result of the averaging is presented in part C on the 
right-hand side. According to both stimulus types, two different illustrations of the 
event-related potentials at the Pz electrode are presented. Here, it is worth 
mentioning that event-related potentials are commonly displayed upside-down, 
namely negative deflections are placed upward and positive deflections downward.  
  
Figure 4: Procedure of ERP extraction (cp. Luck, 2005, p. 8, fig. 1.1) 
4.2 The neural source of ERPs 
Although the understanding of what ERPs are reflecting is prevalent, the 
identification of the neural sources remains challenging. ERPs are generally 
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assumed to reflect the cumulative activity of postsynaptic potentials of a large 
number of neurons which are synchronously activated (see Allison et al., 1986). 
Since the electrical activity of a single neuron is very small, the EEG recording from 
the scalp returns an integrated activity of a large number of neurons. Thus, it is only 
possible to record a subset of the brain activity from the scalp in which single 
neuron signals are frequently overlaid from other sources. A direct localization of 
the neural source of an EEG signal is not possible since the recorded activity refers 
to a potentially indefinite number of neural generators that are activated 
simultaneously. Furthermore, each neural generator varies in amplitude, 
orientation of the electric field and the location in the brain. Hence, a source 
localization through an inverse deduction of the recorded activity from each 
electrode lacks in providing a unique solution. Nonetheless, researchers have tried 
to localize ERP components in the brain through invasive and noninvasive 
approaches. The invasive approach tries to deduce the source of an ERP either by 
placing electrodes directly into the brain of humans or animals or by analyzing 
lesion data. Noninvasive approaches usually draw conclusions by performing 
specific source analysis algorithms or combine ERP results with other neuroimaging 
techniques which have a higher spatial resolution (e.g. functional magnetic 
resonance imaging). 
4.3 Advantages and disadvantages of the EEG 
technique 
As mentioned before, EEG recordings can provide detailed information about the 
change of voltage distribution on the scalp over a certain time period. Eliciting 
event-related potentials in relation to an experimental paradigm allows for an 
observation of differences in brain activity over time. This is potentially the most 
powerful advantage of the EEG technique. Furthermore, ERPs can additionally 
provide information about stimulus processing in the absence of a behavioral 
response. The EEG technique is able to discover processes which are not observable 
in behavioral data. 
With respect to other neuroimaging techniques, EEG with its very high temporal 
resolution is therefore suitable for a temporal analysis of information processing in 
the brain. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission 
tomography (PET) have a considerably smaller temporal resolution, which limits 
conclusions concerning the temporal relationship of brain functions. In contrast, the 
EEG technique performs quite poorly in locating the source of a neural process. As 
discussed before, source localization through EEG information is only possible by 
approximation algorithms. In this comparison, fMRI and PET outperforms EEGs, 
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because of the very high spatial resolution. These techniques are therefore suitable 
for locating neural sources. 
A general disadvantage of all neuroimaging techniques is the lack of interpretation. 
With reference to the EEG technique, the knowledge of an ERP component and its 
functional relationship to brain processes has been derived from a huge amount of 
EEG studies addressing detailed questions on stimulus processing or information 
processing. Thus, all further findings and conclusions are based on previous 
deductions. Consequently, a direct functional significance is not that explicit as 
behavioral evidence would draw. Furthermore, in every EEG experiment, a large 
number of stimulus trials are necessary in order to reveal the very small signal 
occurrence of an ERP. As a consequence, in relation to experiments addressing 
economic questions, only multiple choice task experiments are possible. 
4.4 ERP analysis 
In this part, a short overview regarding the procedure of the ERP analysis will be 
presented. Here, the main purpose is to provide a basic understanding of EEG data 
analysis. Subsequently, different steps of deriving event-related potentials and main 
issues of processing EEG data are discussed. 
4.4.1 EEG recording 
The brain activity on the scalp of humans is usually recorded with an electrode cap, 
containing a number of electrodes placed according to a standardized, conventional 
normalization. This normalization ensures that standardized electrode positions are 
recording the same scalp area over different experiments. As a result, a 
standardized electrode placement allows for a comparability of experimental 
results. One standardized electrode position convention is the International 10-20 
system (Jasper, 1958) in which 29 electrode positions are placed according to a 
relative distance to each other. This system has also several expanded versions (see 
Nuwer, 1987) for which one example is the 10-10 system with 61 electrode 
positions introduced by Chatrian et al. (1985). According to the standardized 
electrode positions, single electrodes are further labeled based on unified 
denotations. The denotation follows across the basic labeling of scalp areas which 
are in general frontal, central, parietal, occipital, and temporal electrode sites. Such 
a general fragmentation of the scalp area is presented in Figure 5 for an electrode 
cap with 61 electrode positions. 




Figure 5: Example of an electrode placement with 61 electrode positions 
adopted from Kamarajan et al. (2010, p. 579, fig. 8) 
During the EEG recording, the analog EEG signals are passed to an amplifying and 
filtering system and subsequently converted to digital signals by sampling them at a 
high frequency of at least 100 Hz. The EEG recordings in this work are sampled on a 
frequency of 250 Hz. 
4.4.2 Artifacts and artifact rejection 
Artifacts are one of the main error sources in the analysis of ERPs. The electrical 
signals recorded at the electrodes are influenced by sources that are not located in 
the brain. Eye movements, eye blinks, activity from muscles in the head or neck as 
well as heart beats, or the pulse respectively, are sources of electrical activity that 
can interfere with the small EEG activity. For that reason, it is important to apply 
measures for avoiding artifact-based biases in the data. First of all, a careful 
experimental setup accompanied by an instruction of the subject for a clean data 
recording is probably the most important issue in this context. Subsequently, in the 
procedure of data analysis, the EEG data have to be checked for samples with 
artifacts. Artifacts can either be discarded from the sample or filtered from the 
data. Furthermore, several EEG data correction algorithms exist (see Gratton et al., 
1998; Joyce et al., 2004) which can be applied in order to adjust artifacts. 
4.4.3 Averaging and filtering 
As mentioned in the preceding section, deriving ERP components from the 
background EEG is achieved by averaging an amount of samples time-locked to 
repeating events. The small ERP signals are uncovered from the background EEG by 
reducing the signal-to-noise ratio. The background EEG noise is assumed to be 
randomly distributed among each sample so that the error term of the noise 
converges to zero by averaging a high amount of samples. The signal-to-noise ratio 
will increase by the square root of the number of included trials for averaging. In 
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order to achieve an appropriate signal-to-noise ratio, it is common to integrate at 
least 20 stimulus trials for averaging ERPs in one ‘bin’. In this context, a ‘bin’ 
denotes a distinct collection of stimulus trials that is arranged for the ERP analysis. 
Moreover, an enhancement of the signal-to-noise ratio can be realized through a 
further filtering of the derived ERP data. For example, endogenous ERP components 
typically have a frequency range from 0.5 Hz to 20 Hz, which allows for filtering 
noise with a frequency different from the target signal. For example, muscle activity 
that occurs in a frequency spectrum of around 70 Hz. This is achieved by applying a 
low pass or a high pass filter to the ERP data. But filtering should be handled with 
care since an ERP component will be distorted, if frequencies of interests are 
excluded. Thus, applying the right filter depends on the band pass in which the 
investigated ERP component is located. 
4.4.4 Statistical analysis 
During statistical analysis, a huge amount of non-independent data must be 
handled. Aside from an identification of significant differences in the data, the main 
purpose is to reduce the experiment-wise error. The experiment-wise error 
increases the more statistical tests are performed. With a large number of tests it is 
consequently more likely to observe a p-value smaller than 0.05. The standard 
approach in ERP data analysis is to perform repeated measures analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs). Repeated measures ANOVAs are able to identify main effects and further 
factor interactions in a crossed factorial design, integrating plenty of non-
independent observations. For analyzing an ERP component, a group of electrodes 
around the scalp location of an ERP is used, because using electrode sites that are 
absent from the component location or in presence of another component may add 
noise to the analysis and can bias the results. The voltage at the electrode sites of 
the ERP component is analyzed within a certain time range, indicating the average 
peak amplitude. In case of significant main effects or further interactions revealed 
by an ANOVA, a final verification of the uncovered effects can be provided by 
performing electrode-based t-tests. 
In this work, the statistical results of the performed ANOVAs will be reported with 
the degrees of freedom, the F-values, and the corresponding p-values. These values 
will always be indicated as Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. Furthermore, equivalent 
information will also be provided for the electrode-based t-tests where the 
corresponding T-values will be reported. 
4 Introduction to the EEG technique 
 
35 
4.5 A selection of ERP components 
In this section, a brief overview on the key ERP components concerned with this 
work will be given. The occurrence of ERPs is always related to underlying brain 
processes which are activated by the presence or absence of a distinct stimulus or 
response based on the experimental task. ERPs can be assorted into motor-driven, 
sensory and cognitive ERP components. Additionally, ERPs are investigated 
concerning the type of a stimulus (stimulus-locked) or concerning the type of a 
response (response-locked). This review particularly introduces ERP components 
related to cognitive functions since ERP components that are reflecting cognitive 
processes are of major interest in this work. Subsequently, two stimulus-locked ERP 
components, the P300 and the N200, and one response-locked ERP, the ERN, will be 
introduced. 
4.5.1 The P300 
The P300 component is probably the most frequently investigated endogenously 
evoked ERP component because of its very robust occurrence. In general, the P300 
represents a group of positive deflections peaking at about 300 to 450 ms stimulus 
onset with a central-parietal scalp maximum. Although the P300 has been widely 
investigated, there is still no clear consensus about its underlying neural or cognitive 
processes. It is assumed that the P300 results from multiple activated neural 
sources located in different cortical and subcortical areas (see Johnson, 1986, 1988, 
1993; McCarthy et al., 1997). The P300 component can be distinguished between a 
more frontal peaking P3a and a parietal P3b component (Squires et al., 1975). 
The P3a component is assumed to appear in case of novel stimuli presentation and 
is therefore also labeled as ‘novelty P3’. In a study of Courchesne et al. (1975), it 
was found that a more frontally located P300 component is elicited when 
unexpected stimuli or from the experimental task deviating stimuli are presented to 
the subjects. The appearance of the P3a diminishes when the same stimulus is 
presented several times. Fabiani and Friedman (1995) suggested that the 
occurrence of the novelty P3 is related to an orienting function with regard to the 
original task goal. However, it still remains open whether the P3a and the P3b 
subcomponent belong to the same component (Pritchard, 1981) or whether they 
reflect different components (Donchin and Coles, 1988). 
The P3b component in particular has been considered as being the ‘classic P300’, 
and up to now its functional significance has not been undoubtedly resolved. The 
P300 was found to be sensitive to a subjective stimulus probability (Duncan-
Johnson and Donchin, 1977; Squires et al., 1976). The amplitude of the P300 
increases for task-defined stimuli that have a smaller probability of occurrence. 
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Donchin (1979) presumed that the P300 modulation is reflected by stimulus 
evaluation and categorization processes. Furthermore, Donchin (1981) stated that 
the P300 could reflect a ‘context updating’ process regarding the experimental task. 
Such a process is assumed to be related to the updating of an environmental model 
or of the context in working memory, which would influence the current decision 
making process as well as the processing of future events. Although this context 
updating hypothesis is widely spread and accepted, the model has not been 
doubtlessly verified and some researchers have proposed alternative hypotheses of 
the functional significance of the P300 (see Desmedt, 1980; Rösler, 1983; Verleger, 
1988). More recently, Verleger et al. (2005) suggested a mediating process between 
a perceptual stimulus analysis and a response initiation that is reflected by the P3b 
component. Moreover, Kok (2001) proposed that the P300 reflects an event 
categorization process indicated by smaller P300 amplitudes for stimuli that are 
difficult to discriminate. In this context, the P300 represents a process that 
evaluates a stimulus according to a match or a mismatch of an internal 
representation of a specific category. Furthermore, in a study of Isreal et al. (1980) 
it was found that P300 amplitudes are larger for tasks in which the subjects put 
more effort, which was considered to reflect a measurement of resource allocation. 
In summary, the P3b component can be related to evaluative processes of stimulus 
categorization or response selection and execution (see Luck, 1998). 
With reference to this work, an analysis of the P300, the P3b subcomponent 
respectively, is appropriate for investigating the evaluation processes of different 
types of stimuli. Stimuli in lottery choice tasks concerning the elicitation of risk 
attitudes can be differentiated by the degree of risk. Different levels of risk may 
lead to different resource allocation processes during decision making. 
Furthermore, stimuli of similar choice tasks may be perceived differently by the 
subjects in case of different incentive structures. Hence, the underlying payoff 
mechanism of an experimental choice task can lead to a stimulus categorization 
process that is different from other payoff mechanisms. 
4.5.2 The N200 
The N200 component is an ERP component characterized by a negative maximum 
peaking at about 200 to 350 ms after stimulus presentation at fronto-central 
electrode sites. The functional significance of the N200 differs according to the 
experimental manipulation. Therefore, the N200 can be differentiated by three 
types: (1) an anterior located N2a component elicited for task-irrelevant but 
mismatched auditory stimuli, (2) an N2b component that is located at fronto-central 
electrode sites elicited for response conflicts and response inhibition, and (3) an 
N2pc component with a posterior scalp distribution elicited for attended visual 
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stimuli selection. All three subcomponents are assumed to have different neural 
source generators. 
The N2a component is labeled as ‘mismatch negativity’ (MMN), because its 
modulation is generated by the presentation of a diverging auditory stimulus in a 
sequence of frequently presented auditory stimuli (see Näätänen, 1992). The 
occurrence of the auditory stimuli is task irrelevant for the subject so that the 
modulation of the N200 in relation to these stimuli is assumed to reflect an 
environmental mismatch detector. The mismatch negativity was firstly described by 
Näätänen et al. (1978) and is presumably generated in auditory cortical brain areas. 
The N2b component refers to the type of N200 that is observable in experiments 
regarding the incongruity of stimuli (Gehring et al., 1992; Wendt et al., 2007) in 
which larger N200 amplitude are elicited for incongruent stimuli in contrast to 
congruent stimuli. It is assumed that incongruent stimuli evoke higher action 
control conflicts for a subject. Furthermore, these N200 amplitudes are also 
increased in response inhibition task (Pfefferbaum et al., 1985), indicating that the 
N200 is sensitive to response control. This type of N200 is believed to be involved in 
a conflict monitoring system and is therefore a part of cognitive control functions 
(see Folstein and van Petten, 2008). A study by van Veen and Carter (2002a) found 
the location of the neural source in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). 
The N2pc component, named by Luck and Hillyard (1994), is supposed to reflect 
attention to a visual target stimulus among a group of non-targets (Luck et al., 
1997). The N2pc component appears to be posterior and located in contralateral 
relation to the target stimulus. A contralateral effect implies that a visual target 
stimulus on the right-hand side evokes an N2pc on the left-hand brain hemisphere. 
It is presumed that the neural source generator of this component is located in the 
visual cortex. 
An analysis of the N200 component in this work is referred to the N2b 
subcomponent. The N2b subcomponent and its relation to cognitive control 
functions is an appropriate component for investigating the decision making 
process with the EEG technique. This subcomponent provides information about 
the level of conflict during decision making. An analysis of different levels of conflict 
evoked by different incentive structures allows for inferences on the characteristics 
of distinct payoff mechanisms in multiple choice task experiments. For that reason, 
the modulation of the N200 in relation to cognitive control functions is an essential 
part of this work and will therefore be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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4.5.3 The ERN 
The error-related negativity (ERN) is a response-locked ERP component. The ERN 
was first described by Falkenstein et al. (1990) and Gehring et al. (1993) as a 
negative deflection at fronto-central electrode sites peaking around 50-100 ms after 
an erroneous response has been occurred. Based on these findings, the ERN is 
supposed to reflect an error detecting process. However, further research (e.g. 
Botvinick et al., 2004; van Veen et al., 2004) has suggested that the neural 
mechanisms underlying the ERN cannot only be described as a pure error detection 
mechanism. Moreover, it is assumed that the ERN refers to a more general system 
that is monitoring responses and response conflicts between intended and 
performed responses. In addition, a study of Hajcak et al. (2005) proposed that the 
ERN component could further be related to a motivational significance of a task. 
Furthermore, an ERN-like negative potential was also observed for giving negative 
feedback stimuli followed by an incorrect response (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002) 
as well as for observing someone else making an error (van Schie et al., 2004). 
These findings strengthen the hypothesis that the ERN reflects a process of error 
monitoring. Since the neural source of the ERN was also found to be located in the 
ACC (Dehaene et al., 1994; van Veen and Carter, 2002a), it is proposed that the ERN 
and the N200 refer to the same neural process that can be assigned to a conflict 
monitoring system. 
The ERN component, as an indicator for response conflicts, is also appropriate for 
analyzing cognitive control functions in connection with decision making. An 
analysis of this component can provide inferences on the correctness of decisions. 
Different levels of response conflicts would indicate the relevance and importance 
of decisions when error-like choices are detected by the subjects. In this context, 
the presence of risk in lottery choice tasks can be investigated with reference to 
such error-like choices. Comparing risky and riskless choice task situations would 
allow for an analysis of the impact of risk on response conflicts.  




5 The N200 and cognitive control 
The present chapter introduces the N200 component as an appropriate indicator 
for investigating individual decision making behavior with reference to differences 
in neural information processing. The decision making process can be ascribed to 
the cognitive abilities of individuals and to neural functions of cognitive control in 
particular. Therefore, components that are reflecting processes of cognitive control 
during decision making are of interest for analyzing individual decision making 
behavior in a neurological approach. This chapter describes how the N200 
component is related to processes of cognitive control and conflict monitoring. For 
that reason, a model of conflict monitoring is introduced with reference to the 
latent construct of cognitive control. A brief overview on how conflicts are induced 
in neuroimaging studies will be provided. Results of studies on the N200 in relation 
to these paradigms will be described. Consequently, the N200 will be discussed in 
conjunction to the model of conflict monitoring. 
5.1 Cognitive control and the conflict monitoring 
hypothesis 
Human beings have created the ability to adapt their behavior to varying 
environmental demands in a most flexible manner. Aside from automatic or routine 
processes of life regulation, humans are able to detect and to evaluate 
environmental relationships and to identify appropriate approaches for solving a 
problem. Performing mental operations is one key attribute of human behavior. The 
capability of adapting and adjusting behavior in relation to an internal goal and 
implementing a task strategy accordingly refers to a cluster of cognitive processes 
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which is commonly described as ‘cognitive control’. In cognitive neuroscience, the 
latent construct ‘cognitive control’ is used to describe the mechanisms of 
information processing and decision making in the human brain. Several 
researchers have enunciated approaches for modeling these processes of cognitive 
control (see Norman and Shallice, 1980; Schneider and Detweiler, 1987; Baddeley 
and Della Sala, 1996; Meyer and Kieras, 1997). 
Botvinick et al. (2001) propose a model of conflict monitoring regarding the 
occurrence of behavioral conflicts. They argue that information processing is 
attended by a function called ‘conflict monitoring’. Botvinick and colleagues 
describe a system which is sensitive to the occurrence of conflicts and which can be 
attributed to an evaluative component during information processing. Such an 
evaluative component is supposed to assess current demands and to result in an 
adjustment of executive processes. During information processing in which control 
is required, it can be implied that a demand for higher control is indicated by a 
higher level of conflict. Thus, the occurrence of conflicts is directly linked to 
processes of cognitive control. The hypothesis regarding conflict monitoring 
postulates (Botvinick et al., 2001, p. 625) that “[t]he conflict monitoring system first 
evaluates current levels of conflict, then passes this information on to centers 
responsible for control, triggering them to adjust the strength of their influence on 
processing.” Furthermore, it is presumed that such a function of conflict monitoring 
is located in the frontal lobe of the human brain and that the anterior cingulate 
cortex in particular plays a key role in this process. The ACC is considered to map a 
regulative system which is responsible for resolving a conflict rather than simply 
detecting a conflict. It is assumed that the ACC activation reflects a last-minute 
conflict resolution in a two stage control system for which a general anticipation of 
demanding activities already exists. In order to emphasize these assumptions, the 
work of Botvinick et al. (2001) discusses several studies regarding the ACC and its 
connection to cognitive processes, which will be considered later in this chapter. 
Before that, the question of how processes of cognitive control in relation to 
potential response conflicts are identified and investigated in neuroimaging studies 
needs to be discussed. Experiments on conflicts in information processing are 
typically designed through interference tasks or response inhibition tasks in which a 
conflict for a subject is usually induced through incongruities between stimuli and 
prepotent responses. These paradigms are expected to evoke errors by the subjects 
and should therefore reveal brain areas or components of brain potentials related 
to response conflicts. In the next section, a brief introduction to the mainly used 
paradigms concerning these experiments will be given. 
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5.2 Experimental paradigms on response conflicts 
Go/No-Go task 
In the go/no-go task, subjects are instructed to give a response on a certain stimulus 
but to inhibit a response when another, different stimulus is presented. A correct 
response will be given, if the go-stimulus is responded and the no-go-stimulus is 
not. A prepotent response is induced through a more frequent presentation of the 
go-stimulus. If a no-go trial is followed by a go trial, a higher control conflict for the 
subject is expected, resulting in higher response time rates. The go/no-go task is 
used to measure stimulus attention and response control. 
Eriksen flanker task 
The Eriksen flanker task is similar to the go/no-go task and also refers to the 
category of response inhibition task. The task was developed by Eriksen and Eriksen 
(1974) and requests a subject to respond to a central letter of a sequence of five or 
seven letters. The central letter reflects the target stimulus whereas the other 
letters are non-targets. Non-targets are either equal to the target (e.g. HHHHH), 
which represents a congruent stimulus trial, or unequal to the target (e.g. SSHSS), 
which represents an incongruent stimulus trial. In this context, it is worth 
mentioning that targets and non-targets are not only restricted to letters but also to 
other types of signals or symbols, for example the direction of arrows (e.g. <<><<). 
However, for the incongruent stimulus trials, a higher response conflict is expected, 
which generally results in higher response times and increased error rates. 
Stroop task 
The Stroop task refers to the Stroop effect described by John Ridley Stroop (1935). 
He reported that the response times for naming a written color will be higher, if the 
ink color of the word is different to the name of the color. This interference task is 
widely used in experimental psychology when stimulus and response conflicts are 
investigated. Once again, the incongruence of the color name and the color ink 
obviously evokes a higher conflict, resulting in higher reaction times and increased 
error rates. 
5.3 N200 modulations in response inhibition tasks 
The role of the N200 component in Eriksen flanker and go/no-go experiments has 
been broadly investigated in the past decades. The N200 appears to be sensitive to 
response control when task conflicts are higher. In general, larger N200 amplitudes 
are revealed for incongruent or incompatible stimuli trials, indicating a higher action 
control conflict for the subjects. 
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In go/no-go tasks the N200 amplitude is larger for no-go trials and in case of 
withholding a prepotent response (see Pfefferbaum et al., 1985; Bruin and Wijers, 
2002). A study by Jodo and Kayama (1992) showed that the no-go N200 was also 
increased when time pressure was applied. Furthermore, Falkenstein et al. (1999) 
elicited a larger N200 amplitude in no-go trials for subjects with smaller false alarm 
rates. These results previously implied that the N200 is connected with processes of 
response inhibition. However, further findings of other studies suggest that this 
interpretation has to be differentiated in more detail. A study of Bruin et al. (2001) 
investigated the N200 in relation to response priming and found an absence of the 
N200 modulation for this process. As a result, they conclude that the N200 
modulation cannot be related to response inhibition. In addition, Nieuwenhuis et al. 
(2003) reported an apparent N200 for low-frequency no-go trials as well as for low-
frequency go trials. Such a finding would further reject the implication that the 
N200 is modulated by a pure response inhibition process. Nieuwenhuis et al. (2003) 
presumed that an arising conflict between a response inhibition and a response 
execution could be responsible for the N200 modulation in go/no-go tasks. This 
supposition implicitly associates the N200 modulation in go/no-go tasks to conflict 
processing and therefore to a process related to cognitive control. Moreover, a 
direct link to the conflict monitoring hypothesis of Botvinick et al. (2001) was 
further drawn in the study of Donkers and van Boxtel (2004) in which the authors 
argued that the N200 in go/no-go tasks is reflected by conflict monitoring and not 
by response inhibition. 
In Eriksen flanker tasks, apparent N200 amplitudes can be observed for incongruent 
flankers in contrast to congruent flankers (see Gehring et al., 1992; Yeung et al., 
2004; Wendt et al., 2007), indicating that processes of response control are 
reflected by the N200 component. In a flanker study of Kopp et al. (1996) it is found 
that the N200 is largest for treatment conditions in which the conflict is highest. 
This finding suggests that the N200 modulation is not only driven by response 
control but also influenced by evaluative conflicts regarding a response execution. 
Additionally, Yeung et al. (2004) reported that the N200 is modulated on correct 
response trials, indicating a more general conflict monitoring process. The 
assumption that the N200 is modulated by a response conflict was further 
enhanced in the flanker study of Wendt et al. (2007) in which an influence on the 
N200 was also observed for stimulus conflicts. Hence, the findings of these studies 
suggest that the modulation of the N200 in interference tasks can be related to 
conflict processing for which the N200 component seems to be an indicator for the 
level of conflict. The N200 component in conjunction with a potential conflict 
monitoring system will be discussed next. 
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5.4 The N200 as an integrated part of a conflict 
monitoring system 
A broad review of N200 studies concerning the influence of cognitive control 
processes on the N200 modulation was given by Folstein and van Petten (2008), 
where the authors contributed to the discussion of whether the N200 component 
reflects processes of conflict monitoring. Based on reviews of previous studies, 
Folstein and van Petten (2008) identified a control-related N200 subcomponent 
which is related to cognitive control mechanisms like response inhibition, response 
conflict, and error monitoring. The authors discussed potential relationships of the 
control-related N200 to functions of the anterior cingulate cortex and concluded 
that the control-related N200 reflects processes regarding cognitive control and 
that the component can be ascribed to a more complex conflict monitoring system. 
Hence, the N200 component can be assumed to be part of the conflict monitoring 
system as suggested by Botvinick et al. (2001) in which the ACC represents a 
regulative system responsible for conflict resolution. 
In this respect, a dipole source localization performed by van Veen and Carter 
(2002a) in fact detected the source of the N200 component in the anterior cingulate 
cortex. Additionally, several investigations (see Kopp et al., 1996; van Veen and 
Carter, 2002a; van Veen and Carter, 2002b) have shown that the stimulus-locked 
N200 and the response-locked error-related negativity (ERN) represent the same 
cortical mechanism and that both components are associated with the anterior 
cingulate cortex (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Dipole source localization of the N200 (top) and the ERN (bottom) in the anterior cingulate cortex 
as detected by van Veen and Carter (2002a, p. 579, fig. 3) 
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Van Veen and Carter (2002a) suggested that this relationship in combination with 
the characteristic of the ACC to be sensitive to the occurrence of conflicts reflects a 
conflict monitor during information processing. Hence, both ERP components are 
apparently reflecting similar processes of monitoring conflicts but at different 
points in time during the decision making process. Consequently, the connection of 
the control-related N200 with the ACC requires a brief review on the function of the 
ACC and its role regarding cognitive control and conflict monitoring in particular. 
5.5 The anterior cingulate cortex and conflict 
monitoring 
The model of conflict monitoring by Botvinick et al. (2001) suggests that the 
anterior cingulate cortex contributes to cognitive control by monitoring conflicts 
during information processing. As it was discussed in earlier studies (e.g. D’Esposito 
et al., 1995; Posner and DiGirolamo, 1998), the ACC is assumed to be engaged in 
processes of cognitive control, as for instance in learning and memory or language 
tasks (Paus et al., 1998). Furthermore, the ACC is also connected with brain areas 
that are assigned to play an essential role in cognitive control. Connections are 
existent to the prefrontal cortex, an area that is involved in executive processes (see 
Cohen et al., 1996), and neuroimaging studies (e.g. Braver et al., 1997; Carter et al., 
1995; Posner et al., 1988) found a functional link between the prefrontal cortex and 
the ACC. 
Concerning experiments on interference task, ACC activation is found to be higher 
for incongruent stimuli in Stroop tasks (Pardo et al., 1990; Carter et al., 1995; Bush 
et al., 1998) as well as in go/no-go tasks for the no-go condition (Casey et al., 1997; 
Kawashima et al., 1996). These findings imply that the ACC is highly involved when 
conflicts have to be resolved. Further results of an fMRI flanker study by van Veen 
et al. (2001) showed that the ACC is activated in response-based conflicts. 
Moreover and aside from a pure response conflict interpretation, the authors of 
this study suggested that the ACC is particularly sensitive to conflicts occurring 
between different goal states, plans, or rewards. Such a deduction directly links the 
ACC activation to a cognitive evaluation process during decision making. 
In summary, the findings of the aforementioned neuroimaging studies (see also 
Carter et al., 1998; Botvinick et al., 1999; MacDonald et al., 2000) provide evidence 
that supports the hypothesis of conflict monitoring and that assigns a central role of 
this process to the anterior cingulate cortex. But for all that, the source of conflicts 
during information processing has to be considered differently and might 
correspond to different phases in the decision making process. This is also indicated 
by the occurrence of the N200 and the ERN which could represent different types of 
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conflicts. As a consequence, distinguishing ACC activation directly from conflicts of 
stimulus encoding, target detection, response selection or response execution 
remains challenging and refers to the structure of the experimental task. The model 
of conflict monitoring rather proposes a mechanism of how conflicts are proceeded 
to be resolved in the brain. However, it has been shown that the N200 is suitable 
for investigating decision making processes with respect to different levels of 
conflict. 
5.6 Implications for choice experiments in 
experimental economics 
The concept of cognitive control and the conflict monitoring hypothesis seem to be 
an appropriate approach for investigating decision making processes in the brain. 
According to this neurological evidence, an implementation to research questions 
concerning the evaluation of economic choice tasks can be applied. The modulation 
of the N200 and the ERN as well as the activation of the ACC can be examined 
through EEG, PET or fMRI. Different occurrences of these components in contrast to 
specific choice tasks situations can provide further understanding of how decision 
making is performed with regard to the level of conflict resolution. The application 
of neuroimaging techniques in combination with the model of conflict monitoring 
can serve for reviewing theoretical assumptions, axioms, or incentivized goal 
systems in decision making theory when different levels of decision conflicts are 
predictable or reasonable. 
In this work, the EEG technique is applied to investigate modulations of the N200 
component in lottery choice task. The observation of different levels of conflict can 
shed light on the evaluation of choice alternatives in different choice task situations. 
For example, the level of conflict should be higher for a subject in case of 
indifference. Indifference itself means that a subject has no preference on a distinct 
choice alternative among all other choice alternatives. But most lottery choice 
experiments impose the subject to give a response, which should therefore result in 
an increased conflict situation for the subject. Thus, the behavioral evidence for 
indifferent choices should also be observable in the N200 modulation. This example 
is rather plausible and not the driving research question of this work. But it should 
emphasize how the model of conflict monitoring can be combined with research 
questions in experimental economics. In the following EEG studies, the modulation 
of the N200 will be used to provide neurological inferences on the decision making 
process with reference to an application of different incentive structures in 
economic experiments. 




6 The hypothetical bias 
The discussion about the suitability of payoff mechanisms (see section 3.4.4) has 
shown that the application of payoff mechanisms in experimental economics is 
attended by potentially distorting influences on the individual decision making 
behavior. Basically, payoff mechanisms are extrinsic motivational incentives which 
have to ensure an incentivized experimental structure for a truthful response of 
subjects according to their real preferences. In this context, the concept of incentive 
compatibility provides a theoretical validation of payoff mechanisms in relation to a 
distinct theory. However, as discussed before, such a theoretical validation cannot 
warrant coherent behavior of subjects in relation to the applied incentive structure. 
Certainly, payoff mechanisms can be presumed to affect individual decision making 
behavior but not necessarily according to a theoretical assumption. In this respect, 
if researchers are interested in identifying truthful responses of subjects with 
reference to their real preferences, then payoff mechanisms may be reconsidered 
detached from theory and analyzed in relation to an impact on the evaluation 
process during decision making. An investigation of the evaluation process through 
neuroimaging techniques could provide inferences toward the characteristic of how 
a decision is performed in the brain. The truthfulness as well as the seriousness of 
responses may be reflected by eliciting a higher level of mental effort on a choice 
task or by evoking a smaller degree of conflict for a choice task. Therefore, cognitive 
models of information processing, as for instance the aforementioned model of 
conflict monitoring, can be used to enunciate suppositions in relation to the 
revelation of real preferences concerning a distinct choice task situation. Hence, the 
suitability of payoff mechanisms can be approached through a neuroscientific 
investigation of the decision making process. 
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As mentioned previously, conflict monitoring is assumed to represent an important 
neural process during decision making. In this context, the N200 component has 
been introduced as an indicator for an action control conflict in the evaluation 
process for a decision. Hence, investigating the N200 in relation to choice tasks of 
individual decision making allows for a direct examination of the evaluation process. 
As a consequence, assumptions and hypotheses for a different modulation of the 
N200 can be articulated in relation to the application of a distinct incentive 
structure reflected by a payoff mechanism. 
The present chapter discusses the modulation of the N200 in hypothetical and real 
payoff choices. According to the introduction of payoff mechanisms, the flat-rate 
payoff mechanism and the random payoff mechanism are applied in an EEG 
experiment with a lottery choice task paradigm. The subsequent analysis ties up to 
the discussion on the reliability of hypothetical choices as well as the influence of 
monetary incentives in economic experiments and provides additional, neural-
based evidence for the existence of a hypothetical bias. As a result, the flat-rate 
payoff mechanism has to be categorized as inappropriate for revealing truthful 
responses and real preferences. 
Subsequently, an introduction to the hypothetical bias and a research hypothesis 
concerning a modulation of the N200 is presented. The EEG study is described and a 
presentation of the results is provided followed by a discussion concerning this 
topic. These parts are based on a working paper (Morgenstern et al., 2013a) which 
was developed in a joint work with Marcus Heldmann (Department of Neurology at 
the University of Lübeck) and Bodo Vogt (Faculty of Economics and Management at 
the University of Magdeburg). Additionally, the current chapter also provides an 
additional data analysis of the EEG study concerning the choice task reaction times 
and concerning a modulation of the P300 component. This additional material was 
not considered in the working paper of Morgenstern et al. (2013a). 
6.1 Introduction1 
An open question in experimental economics is how to verify observed behavior 
from an experiment in relation to behavior in the real world. It is a general goal in 
economic research to reduce biasing effects of a lab environment and its specific 
circumstances. One aspect in this discussion is the reward structure for decisions in 
experiments. In this respect, Smith (1982) has established the condition of 
“saliency” for microeconomic experiments, suggesting a monetary reward function 
according to the responses of subjects. This “salience condition” provides the basis 
for incentive-compatible reward structures, and ensures reliability of behavioral 
                                                     
1 See also Morgenstern et al. (2013a) 
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observations. Subjects are incentivized to respond truthfully according to their real 
preferences. In this context, a hypothetical reward structure does not satisfy 
saliency and subjects are not incentivized to give truthful responses. For this reason, 
hypothetical decisions are supposed to be unreliable even though a hypothetical 
reward structure may not change the basic decision direction in general. Camerer 
and Hogarth (1999, p. 17) quoted that in “[…] games, auctions, and risky choices the 
most typical result is that incentives do not affect mean performance, but 
incentives often reduce variance in responses. In situations where there is no clear 
standard of performance, incentives often cause subjects to move away from 
favorable `self-presentation’ behavior toward more realistic choices.” However, 
overall evidence that hypothetical choices differ from real choices is ambiguous. 
Studies by Kühberger et al. (2002) and Beattie and Loomes (1997) addressing this 
question could not confirm a general difference between hypothetical and real 
choices. However, an early paper of Slovic (1969) discussed differential effects in 
real and hypothetical payoffs and the studies of Holt and Laury (2002, 2005) found 
differences in risk attitudes for high-stakes lotteries. Holt and Laury (2002, 2005) 
have shown that real decisions in high-stakes lotteries evoke more risk averse 
choice behavior in contrast to hypothetical decisions. The difference in risk attitude 
is related to the size of the payoffs and therefore is ascribed to an incentive effect. 
This incentive effect was particularly discussed by Harrison (2006). He reviewed 
former studies by Battalio et al. (1990), Holt and Laury (2002), and Harrison et al. 
(2005) with reference to a hypothetical bias over uncertain outcomes. Harrison 
confirmed a difference in choice behavior of subjects between hypothetical and real 
decisions in those studies. These findings generally support the unreliability of 
hypothetical decisions. However, we also have to consider that there are special 
cases in which a realization of decision outcomes is not possible. For instance, 
outcomes related to questions of moral conflicts, losses, or any kind of damages 
and even very high stakes are often not realizable. In those cases, hypothetical 
decisions may still provide valuable information as good forecast indicators. 
Although the behavioral effects induced by the hypothetical bias in the context of 
high rewards are known, the factors causing this incentive effect are not fully 
investigated. It can be assumed that differences in risk attitude are evoked by 
differences in the evaluation of a decision task. For this reason, it is necessary to 
focus on the preceding evaluation processes of a decision. In standard behavioral 
experimental settings, preceding processes resulting in a decision cannot directly be 
observed. Because specific decision-related processes are known to have a neural 
correlate, event-related potentials (ERPs) derived from an electroencephalogram 
(EEG) can potentially reveal these hidden processes. The spontaneous EEG shows a 
signal originating from the brain’s fast oscillating electrical activity. This EEG is 
typically recorded from the scalp using a set of electrodes placed at standardized 
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positions. ERPs are neural reactions embedded in the spontaneous EEG, and time-
locked to motor, sensory, or cognitive events. They are characterized by their 
temporal appearance, their polarity, and the location of their appearance. Just a 
few processes result in ERPs, which can be observed in a single trial; most ERPs are 
extracted from the spontaneous EEG by way of standard averaging techniques. In 
comparison to functional magnetic imaging, the striking advantage of ERPs is the 
temporal resolution. Because ERPs reflect the fast changing electrical sum potential 
of neocortical neuron ensembles, they are able to differentiate between processes 
in the range of milliseconds. In contrast, functional magnetic resonance imaging, 
which relies on the slow hemodynamic response to neural processes, has a 
temporal resolution of at least one second. In return, the spatial resolution of 
functional fMRI, used primarily for processes occurring in non-cortical/subcortical 
brain sites, is superior to an EEG’s spatial resolution. 
Here, we used ERPs that were time-locked to the presentation of a decision-
requiring stimulus in order to reveal the hypothesized differences in cognitive 
processes taking place before a decision is made. In ERP research, the control of 
decisive behavior is indicated by a negative deflection at fronto-central electrode 
sites occurring approximately 200-300 ms after stimulus presentation. This so-called 
N200 (N2) is driven by activity in the fronto-medial part of the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) and the prefrontal cortex (PFC), and is assumed to reflect the neural 
underpinnings of cognitive control (van Veen and Carter, 2002a; Folstein and van 
Petten, 2008). The latent construct “cognitive control” describes the ability of 
humans to control one’s own behavior and to adapt it to changing environmental 
demands in a most flexible manner (van Veen and Carter, 2002a; Wendt et al., 
2007). Several investigations have shown that in decision tasks, cognitive control 
increases when subjects have to choose between two or more competing 
alternatives (Bland and Schaefer, 2011; De Neys et al., 2011). Accordingly, the N200 
should be able to reveal differences in the neural underpinnings of processes 
related to decisions in a lottery task when comparing hypothetical against real 
payoffs. 
We applied a standard method for eliciting certainty equivalents in a binary lottery 
choice paradigm (see Farquhar, 1984) in order to investigate the differences in risk 
attitudes between hypothetical and real decisions. Eliciting certainty equivalents for 
hypothetical and real high-payoff choices in a within-subject design allows for an 
analysis of a potential hypothetical bias. According to findings in literature (e.g. Holt 
and Laury, 2002), we expect a higher degree of risk aversion for real payoff choices 
compared to hypothetical payoff choices. Thus, we hypothesize that elicited 
certainty equivalents are smaller for real decisions. 
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Moreover, the revelation of a hypothetical bias indicates that differences in the 
evaluation process of hypothetical and real choice tasks apparently exist. As a 
consequence, we expect differences in the appearance of the N200 component, 
which reflects a neural correlate of an evaluation process during decision making. 
As introduced previously, the N200 component is supposed to be affected by 
processes of cognitive control indicating a distinct level of conflict in the decision-
making process. In this respect, an assumption of differences in the appearance of 
the N200 has to be related to the expected level of conflict between hypothetical 
and real choices. An fMRI study by Kang et al. (2011) investigated hypothetical and 
real choices for consumer goods. Kang et al. revealed an increased activity in 
cognitive control areas for real choices. The authors suggested that this finding 
could refer to a more careful comparison process between products and prices 
when real choices are made. Hence, the relevance of real choices may lead to more 
careful decision making, which would result in a higher level of cognitive control. 
According to this implication for consumer goods, real choices in a lottery choice 
paradigm should also provoke a more careful comparison process. We also expect 
to observe a higher level in cognitive control for real decisions because these 
decisions are more relevant for a subject. Thus, we hypothesize that higher N200 
amplitudes are revealed for real choices. 
6.2 Material and Methods2 
6.2.1 Experimental procedure 
The experimental procedure followed the method for eliciting certainty equivalents 
for binary lotteries (Farquhar, 1984). The subjects’ task was to decide either to play 
a lottery or to receive a sure payoff. We used a 50–50 lottery, in which one payoff 
was constantly zero and the other payoff indicated a high-stake outcome. The 
experimental procedure provided a sequence of choice tasks in which the sure 
payoff value varied within the two outcomes of the binary lottery. 
 
Figure 7: Choice task presented to the subjects 
                                                     
2 See also Morgenstern et al. (2013a) 
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For each choice task, the subjects saw a string of three numbers surrounded by a 
white box on a computer screen (see Figure 7). The two outer numbers represented 
the two outcomes of the binary lottery in euros. The inner number indicated the 
sure payoff in euros. Both choice alternatives were presented successively within 
one decision trial. Each decision trial started with a presentation of the two outer 
numbers (lottery payoffs). After a duration of 1,000 ms, the inner number (sure 
payoff) was added to the string (see Figure 8). Subjects were instructed to make 
their decision directly after the presentation of the inner number value. The 
completed information of the choice task lasted for another 1,000 ms on the 
screen. Subsequently, the string was cleared from the screen and the next decision 
trial started. Altogether, each decision trial lasted approximately 3 seconds.  
 
Figure 8: Sequence of screens of one choice task 
The high-stakes payoff of the binary lottery was set to 100 and varied in eight values 
between 100 and 107. The sure payoff was assigned values of 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 
70, 80, and 90. Furthermore, each sure payoff value varied in the last number digit 
between 0 and 7, resulting in values from 10 to 17, 20 to 27, 30 to 37, and so forth. 
Consequently, a total of 576 decision trials resulted from the combination of all 
lottery settings with all sure payoff values. An overview of all choice set 
combinations is provided in Table A8 of Appendix A. All decision trials were 
randomly assigned to the subjects, independent from previous choice tasks. 
Furthermore, subjects received no feedback on their choices. 
During the experiment, all subjects were seated in a comfortable armchair in front 
of a 19 inch screen at a distance of 80 to 100 cm. Subjects made their decisions by 
pressing two buttons with their left or right index finger. The experiment consisted 
of two sessions for every participant within two weeks. Both sessions were 
conducted in the same way, except for the condition of either hypothetical or real 
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payoffs. The two different treatments were indicated by different instructions (see 
A9-A12 of Appendix A) and were assigned in a random order to each subject. Each 
session consisted of 20 practice trials to familiarize subjects with the task. The 
experiment itself consisted of 9 blocks with 64 decision trials, each lasting 
approximately 35 minutes. The total duration of an experimental session was 
approximately 2 hours, including the preparation of the subjects for the EEG 
recording. 
Twenty-one neurologically healthy, right-handed subjects (12 women, ages 20 to 
31) participated in this study by completing a hypothetical and a real treatment in 
two separate EEG sessions. Most of the subjects were students from the Otto-von-
Guericke University of Magdeburg who were recruited from the ORSEE (Greiner, 
2004) subject pool of the university. Subjects received a fixed amount of 14 euros 
for their participation in the hypothetical treatment. For the real treatment, 
subjects were paid according to the random payoff mechanism. One randomly 
selected decision determined the payment for the subjects. Hence, subjects 
received a payment between 0 and 107 euros in the real treatment (average 
earnings was 54.05 euros). 
6.2.2 Behavioral analysis 
The behavioral data were analyzed according to the relative frequency of lottery 
choice. A normalized distance of the sure payoff compared to the expected value of 
the corresponding lottery was calculated in order to provide an objective measure 
for comparing the different lottery settings. For example, an offered lottery 
L(.5, 0; .5, 100) with the expected value of 50 and an offered sure payoff of 30 
resulted in a distance category of -20. A sure payoff of 65 and an offered lottery 
L(.5, 0; .5, 106) resulted in a distance category of +12. Consequently, all 576 
decisions of a subject were classified according to the aforementioned distance 
category, and the relative choice frequency for each distance category was 
calculated. 
6.2.3 EEG recording 
The electroencephalogram was recorded from 61 thin electrodes mounted in an 
elastic cap and placed according to the international 10-10 system (Chatrian et al., 
1985). The EEG was re-referenced offline to the mean activity at the left and right 
mastoid. In order to enable offline rejection of eye movement artifacts, horizontal 
and vertical electrooculograms (EOGs) were recorded using bipolar montages. All 
channels were amplified (bandpass 0.05-70 Hz) and digitized with 4-ms resolution; 
all electrode impedances were kept below 10 kΩ. After epoching the data time-
locked to stimulus onset (baseline -100 to 0, epoch length 1,000 ms), epochs 
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confounded with eye blinks or other artifacts (muscle activity, step-like artifacts 
etc.) were excluded from the calculation of the subject’s average by visual 
inspection. Finally, each subject’s averages were filtered with a 12 Hz low-pass 
filter. 
For the statistical analysis, mean amplitudes are computed within the time range at 
which the N200 is observed. Mean amplitudes of the N200 are analyzed by the use 
of repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for the electrode sites at 
which the N200 is located in order to identify main effects and further factor 
interactions. In this context, degrees of freedom, F-values, and p-values are 
reported as Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. Significant effects are further analyzed 
by a standard t-test. 
6.2.4 EEG analysis 
For both treatments, the EEG data were analyzed for the areas of indifferent 
choices and sure choices with regard to the subject’s decision. According to the 
behavioral data, we identified an area of ambiguous choices for every subject in 
which the relative frequency of lottery choices changes from one to zero. Choices of 
this area were specified as indifferent choices. Furthermore, we determined an 
individual indifference point for a lottery choice frequency of 0.5 within this range 
of indifferent choices. Around the individual indifference point, an interval size of 13 
digits determined the indifference choice area for which we analyzed the 
corresponding lottery choices and sure payoff choices. 
Next, we identified two areas of sure choices in which either the lottery or the sure 
payoff was chosen for sure. We determined the two sure-choice areas based on the 
location of the individual indifference point in relation to the two lottery payoffs. 
The area of sure choices for the lottery was determined by the midpoint between 
the small lottery payoff and the individual indifference point. In contrast, the area 
of sure choices for the sure payoff was determined by the midpoint between the 
individual indifference point and the high lottery payoff. An interval size of seven 
digits around these two midpoints determined the two sure choice areas. 
Based on these three sections of interest and according to the subjects’ decisions, 
event-related potentials were obtained in four bins for each treatment: a sure 
choice area for lottery choices (bin 1), lottery choices in the indifference area (bin 2), 
sure payoff choices in the indifference area (bin 3), and a sure choice area for sure 
payoff choices (bin 4). This bin determination procedure is described in Figure 9, 
where the classification of the four bins for the EEG analysis is presented. The graph 
depicts the relative lottery choice frequency of a subject related to the distance of 
the sure payoff to the expected value of the lottery. 




Figure 9: Description of bin classification 
6.3 Results3 
We primarily analyze the effect of change between the two treatments 
(hypothetical and real payoffs) on the certainty equivalents of the subjects. Then, 
we analyze the effect of these different incentive structures on the EEG data, 
particularly the N200 component. In this second part, we test our hypothesis that 
real payoff leads to higher cognitive control. Afterward we correlate the behavioral 
changes and the changes in the EEG caused by the parameter of the underlying 
incentive structure. In doing so, we extract an explanation for why the hypothetical 
bias occurs in behavioral data that are based on the mental evaluation process 
during decision making. 
6.3.1 Behavior 
Figure 10 depicts the relative frequency of lottery choices summarized across 
subjects. As shown, the relative frequency of lottery choices in the real treatment is 
constantly smaller compared to the hypothetical treatment. The total amount of 
lottery choices (see Table A1 of Appendix A) for each subject differs significantly 
between both treatments in a performed two-sided pair-wise Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test (N=21, V=176, p=0.035). Accordingly, the determined certainty equivalents in 
the real treatment have a median of –12 (mean=11.38, SE=2.42) as the distance to 
the expected value, whereas the median of certainty equivalents for hypothetical 
choices is –7 (mean=8.48, SE=2.51). In both treatments, subjects show risk averse 
behavior due to medians of certainty equivalents that are smaller than zero in their 
distance to the expected value of the lottery. Furthermore, certainty equivalents 
also differ between both treatments. A one-sided pair-wise Wilcoxon signed-rank 
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test confirmed on a 5% significance level (N=21, V=138, p=0.042) that the certainty 
equivalents are smaller in the real treatment. Thus, we can confirm a hypothetical 
bias in the behavioral data. This result is in line with the finding of Holt and Laury 
(2002) that for high-payoff lottery choices, subjects are more risk averse when the 
outcomes are for real. 
 
Figure 10: Relative frequency of lottery choices 
6.3.2 Event-related potentials 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the stimulus-locked event-related potentials at the Fz 
electrode extracted from the EEG recording. The Fz electrode is located in a fronto-
central scalp area at which the N200 is supposed to occur. Both figures show a 
negative peak amplitude within a time range of 270 to 370 ms. This amplitude 
represents the N200 component and its maximum is at approximately 320 ms. 
 
Figure 11: ERPs at the Fz electrode for choices outside the indifference area 




Figure 12: ERPs at the Fz electrode for choices inside the indifference area 
Figure 11 depicts the event-related potentials of the sure-choice areas (bin 1, bin 4) 
for both treatments. Figure 12 illustrates the event-related potentials of the 
indifference area (bin 2, bin 3). N200 amplitudes for choices outside the 
indifference area (see Figure 11) differ between the two treatments. The N200 
amplitudes for sure choices derived from the hypothetical treatment are apparently 
higher than the N200 amplitudes for real choices. This is not the case for choices 
inside the indifference area (see Figure 12). 
 
Figure 13: Topographies of voltage distribution within 270 and 370 ms 
Moreover, Figure 13 shows the average voltage distribution on the scalp for 
hypothetical and real choices within 270 and 370 ms. The topography for the 
hypothetical treatment (on the left hand side) indicates an increased negative 
deflection at the fronto-central scalp area for all four bins. In contrast, an increased 
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negative deflection in the topography for the real treatment (on the right hand side) 
is only observable for indifferent choices. Hence, the N200 component is located on 
the scalp at fronto-central electrode sites within a time range of 270 to 370 ms, and 
is more pronounced for choices of the hypothetical treatment. 
On the basis of this observation, mean amplitudes within a time range of 270 to 
370 ms are calculated for the statistical analysis. Calculated mean amplitudes for 
each subject are provided in Table A2 (Fz electrode), Table A3 (Cz electrode), and 
Table A4 (Pz electrode) in Appendix A. An overview of the averaged mean 
amplitudes at the Fz electrode is provided in Figure 14, illustrating the decreasing 
negative deflection for real payoff choices outside the indifference area. 
Subsequently, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed for Fz, Cz, and Pz 
electrodes as anterior–posterior electrode position factor and with treatment 
(hypothetical, real), choice (lottery, sure payoff), and indifferent position (indifferent 
choice, sure choice) as further factors. A significant interaction (F(1.361)=5.911, 
p=0.014) for the anterior–posterior, treatment, and indifferent position factors was 
revealed (see also Table A5 of Appendix A). A further ANOVA (see also Table A6 of 
Appendix A) for the Fz electrode confirmed an interaction treatment x indifferent 
position (F(1)=4.990, p=0.037). 
 
Figure 14: Mean amplitudes within 270 and 370 ms at the Fz electrode 
To further clarify the found interaction, a pair-wise t-test controlling for differences 
in mean amplitudes was performed (see also Table A7 of Appendix A). The t-test 
revealed significant differences (p<0.05, one-sided) between both treatments for 
the choice areas outside the indifference area. Differences could also be confirmed 
within real choices between mean amplitudes inside and outside the indifference 
area (p<0.05, one-sided). Differences within hypothetical choices could not be 
found. Thus, the N200 amplitudes related to real choices outside the indifference 
area are significantly smaller compared to all other N200 amplitudes. 
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Because the N200 amplitude reflects the level of conflict in the decision-making 
process, this finding leads to a rejection of our primary hypothesis that real 
decisions elicit higher cognitive control. We also have to reject that the level of 
control is equal for both treatments. Hence, we adopt the complementary 
hypothesis that hypothetical decisions require higher cognitive control. 
6.4 Discussion4 
We investigated hypothetical and real payoff choices in an ERP paradigm. We 
addressed the question of whether differences in risk attitude between 
hypothetical and real decisions can result in different levels of cognitive control in 
the preceding phase of a decision. For that reason, we focused on the N200 
component, an ERP component known to reflect cognitive control mechanisms. At 
the behavioral level, the determination of the individual indifference point for both 
treatments revealed the expected hypothetical bias effect. This result confirms the 
findings of former studies (e.g. Holt and Laury, 2002), showing that subjects are 
more risk averse in real treatments for high-payoff lotteries. Moreover, the analysis 
of the corresponding N200 component showed significant differences in the N200 
amplitude between the hypothetical and the real treatment. Cognitive control is 
higher in the hypothetical treatment than in the real treatment. 
For the real treatment, higher N200 amplitudes are shown for choices inside the 
indifference area in contrast to choices outside the indifference area. This indicates 
increased cognitive control during the decision-making process for indifferent 
choices. This is not surprising and seems to be reasonable since a decision for or 
against a choice alternative apparently causes a struggle for a subject when the 
subject is indifferent. In contrast, choice options outside the indifference area are 
easier to decide for a subject. Therefore, less cognitive control is required, and 
correspondingly smaller N200 amplitudes were observed. 
In opposition to real choices, hypothetical decisions did not result in a significant 
N200 amplitude variation between choices inside and outside the indifference area. 
Instead, the N200 amplitude is equally high, indicating a comparable amount of 
cognitive control for all hypothetical decisions. This pattern of results clearly differs 
from our primary prediction, namely, that the level of cognitive control depends on 
the relevance of decisions. In a recent investigation, Kang et al. (2011) addressed a 
similar topic. Using fMRI, they investigated the neural underpinnings of the 
hypothetical bias during the selection of consumer goods. The authors reported no 
increased activations in brain sites related to cognitive control mechanisms for 
hypothetical decisions, although they formulated the explicit alternative hypothesis, 
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that hypothetical decisions do have the potential to result in increased cognitive 
control mechanisms (see also Paulus and Frank, 2003).  
Putting aside the different recording techniques of both studies, we argue that this 
contrary result is based on different stimuli types. Kang et al. (2011) investigated 
consumer goods, we used binary lotteries. The inherent dimensions of choice 
criteria for consumer goods are obviously multifaceted. There are other 
determinant attributes of a product besides a monetary evaluation, like quality, 
shape, or functionality, which potentially influence a subject’s decision. These 
criteria may not be in the mind of a decision maker when making hypothetical 
choices because involving all criteria would require additional and potentially 
disproportional mental effort. If these criteria become more relevant in real 
choices, then higher cognitive control for real payoffs is reasonable. In contrast, in 
the evaluation of lotteries, all relevant choice attributes that may influence the 
decision are known: probabilities and payoffs. Real payoffs do not change this. 
Given this interpretation, we would not expect the results of Kang et al. (2011) for 
the evaluation of lotteries. Lotteries have two obvious attributes that have to be 
considered in both treatments to state a certainty equivalent. For consumer goods, 
additional attributes of a product may only become important if the decision is for 
real. 
Moreover, we assume that the higher level of cognitive control in hypothetical 
choices could be attributed to an extended range of decision alternatives, and 
therefore to a different focus on choice criteria for hypothetical choices. The 
presence of higher cognitive control allows us to draw the conclusion that there is 
at least one additional choice criterion that evokes the higher N200 component. 
This additional choice criterion could be the focus on the expected value of the 
lottery, which reflects the “rational” risk neutral indifference point. The difference 
between the two treatments in the behavioral data shows a shift in the hypothetical 
certainty equivalents toward the expected value of the lottery. Thus, the higher 
N200 component could reflect an additional action control conflict between the 
true individual certainty equivalent of a real decision and the expected value of a 
more rational, risk neutral decision. This difference in cognitive control for 
hypothetical decisions can lead to a different payoff evaluation, resulting in a shift 
of the certainty equivalent toward the expected value. Our results illustrate that the 
hypothetical bias is related to higher cognitive control for hypothetical decisions. 
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6.5 Additional data analysis 
This section will provide a further review of the EEG study concerning the 
hypothetical bias. The main purpose of the study was located in the appearance of 
the N200, but the EEG data additionally showed a modulation of the P300 
component with regard to an attentional categorization process of stimulus events. 
Consequently, potential differences of the P300 will be discussed. Before that, this 
section will also inform about the behavioral reaction times subjects required for 
responding on a given choice task and their relationship to the experimental 
findings of the ERP data. 
6.5.1 Analysis of reaction times 
The reaction times for responses on the experimental task were calculated with 
reference to each stimulus presentation. An overview of the calculated mean 
reaction times is provided in Table A19 of Appendix A. According to the ERP bin 
classification, the subjects responded on average between 500 and 700 ms after 
stimulus presentation. Figure 15 depicts the mean reaction times in both 
treatments separated by the bin classification. As can be seen, the reaction times 
between both payoff treatments do not diverge. Differences appear to be present 
across the stimulus values. Reaction times are about 100 ms higher for stimulus 
values within the indifference area of a subject. Furthermore, lottery choices seem 
to evoke higher reaction times than sure payoff choices. 
 
Figure 15: Mean reaction times 
For a statistical analysis of the reaction time data, a repeated measures ANOVA was 
primarily performed with two factors: treatment (hypothetical, real) and bin 
classification (sure choice for the lottery, indifferent choice for the lottery, 
indifferent choice for the sure payoff, sure choice for the sure payoff). The 
performed ANOVA (see Table A20 of Appendix A) revealed a main effect for bin 
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classification (F(2.323)=105.694, p<0.001). For a further clarification, a three factor 
ANOVA with treatment (hypothetical, real), choice (lottery, sure payoff) and 
indifferent position (indifferent choice, sure choice) was conducted subsequently. A 
main effect for choice (F(1)=37.144, p<0.001) as well as for indifferent position 
(F(1)=182.751, p<0.001) can be confirmed (see also Table A21 of Appendix A). An 
effect between both treatments is absent (F(1)=0.201, p=0.658), which is also 
indicated by insignificant results of pair-wise t-tests for each bin category 
(T(20)<1.473, p>0.15). In contrast, the revealed main effects could be confirmed by 
pair-wise t-tests (see Table A22 of Appendix A), indicating for both treatments that 
lottery choices yield higher reaction times (T(20)>3.014, p<0.01) than sure payoff 
choices while indifferent choices yield higher reaction times (T(20)>8.407, p<0.001) 
than sure choices. 
Higher reaction times for indifferent choices can be related to the indecisiveness of 
subjects in this area. This further supports the result of the increased N200 for 
indifferent choices in both payoff mechanisms. Here, the higher action control 
conflict, reflected by the increased N200, represents the indecisiveness of the 
subject for indifferent choice stimuli resulting in higher reaction times. 
In contrast, the higher action control conflict for hypothetical choices outside the 
indifference area cannot be explained by this reasoning since the reaction times are 
decreasing for sure choices. Decreasing reaction times indicate that the 
indecisiveness of subjects is reduced because smaller reaction times can be 
assumed to reflect higher confidence in making decisions. In this context, the 
constant level of the N200 amplitudes in the hypothetical treatment compared to 
the differences in reaction times would further imply that the underlying process 
does not reflect response inhibition. According to the conflict monitoring 
hypothesis, these findings rather suggest that the increased conflict can be related 
to a process of stimulus evaluation and not to response preparation. 
In summary, the reaction times are corresponding to the results of the ERP data and 
support previous explanations concerning the different appearances of the N200. 
The absence of differences in reaction times between both treatments indicates a 
general similarity of both choice tasks implied by the experimental instructions. 
However, the difference in the behavioral results has provided evidence that both 
payoff mechanisms elicit different risk attitudes. This behavioral difference has to 
be ascribed to a decision conflict independent from a general task information 
processing. Hence, the hypothetical bias cannot be referred to a different response 
time process, which would have indicated a general difference in the mental effort. 
But, the neural evidence shows that the decision evaluation process is different, 
which results in a change of risk attitudes. 
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6.5.2 The P300 and attentional categorization processes 
According to the introduction of the P300 component, the underlying cognitive 
processes reflected by the P300 are ambivalent and a modulation of the P300 has 
been observed in various types of EEG paradigms. Several theoretical and empirical 
implications have been suggested for the P300, from which the context updating 
model proposed by Donchin (1981) is the most prominent. The context updating 
hypothesis is related to novel or infrequent stimuli which influence the appearance 
of the P300. Higher P300 amplitudes are observed for those stimuli which are 
supposed to reflect an information updating process of the working memory with 
reference to the present environmental expectations. In this context, the present 
EEG study does not provide reliable accordance since the value range of stimuli was 
known by the subjects and all stimuli values had the same probability of occurrence. 
Hence, alternative explanations related to the paradigm of the present EEG study 
have to be taken into account. 
In a model of the P300 by Johnson (1986), it is presumed that the P300 amplitude 
can be related to a reduction of uncertainty concerning the type of a stimulus. 
Accordingly, P300 amplitudes are proposed to be smaller when a distinct stimulus is 
difficult to discriminate among others. This assumption is also reflected by the 
event categorization hypothesis (Kok, 2001). With reference to event 
categorization, the P300 represents a process that evaluates a stimulus according to 
a match or a mismatch of an internal representation of a specific target category. 
Such a categorization process is supposed to require attentional and perceptual 
capabilities as well as working memory, which are presumed to be reflected by the 
P300. The model of Kok suggests that larger P300 amplitudes are elicited when a 
presented stimulus matches the target category. 
Rather similar to the event categorization hypothesis, Verleger et al. (2005) 
suggested that the P300 reflects a process of mediating between a perceptual 
analysis and a response initiation. Such a process is presumed to classify the 
stimulus in relation to its consequence. Verleger et al. (2005) stated that the 
amplitude of the P300 decreases when stimuli cannot be classified easily. Hence, 
stimuli which are very close to an internal stimulus classification are supposed to 
evoke higher P300 amplitudes. In comparison to a reduction of uncertainty 
(Johnson, 1986), the P300 amplitude could further reflect different levels of 
attention to distinct stimulus consequences in order to resolve the degree of 
uncertainty concerning a stimulus categorization. 
According to these suppositions, an analysis of the P300 can provide further 
clarifications on the stimulus evaluation in lottery choice paradigms. Since a 
decision reflects two types of consequences (a risky gamble and a certain 
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alternative), a stimulus categorization could be conducted on whether the stimulus 
requires a choice for the lottery or for the sure payoff. In each choice task, a subject 
presumably compares his or her individual indifference point with the value of the 
sure payoff. Hence, a subject categorizes the stimulus information according to a 
preference for the lottery consequence or for the sure payoff consequence. Around 
the indifference point, an unambiguous categorization of sure payoff stimuli is more 
difficult for the subject. Consequently, smaller P300 amplitudes are expected to be 
elicited for stimuli inside the indifference area rather than for stimuli with values 
outside the indifference area. Furthermore, differences in the P300 amplitude are 
supposed to occur with reference to a comparison of both choice types. Since the 
consequences of both choice types differ in terms of risk, a potential disparity in 
stimulus attention can be expected. A lottery choice reflects a risky decision, and 
assuming that risky decisions are probably made more consciously, lottery choices 
might allocate more attentional resources than sure payoff choices. This indicates 
that more attention is attracted to risky decisions since a choice for a risky 
alternative remains with uncertain consequences in the moment of choice, which 
should therefore raise someone’s awareness toward risk. 
These assumptions on a potential P300 modulation in the present EEG study refer 
to general information processing and do not provide predictions for a different 
modulation related to the applied payoff procedures. Thus far, a review on the 
stated assumptions only affords implications for a general processing of stimuli in a 
standard gamble task. A different appearance of P300 amplitudes between the 
applied payoff mechanisms cannot be presumed. Basically, a categorization process 
of stimuli can be related to the instructed choice task. The instructions of both 
treatments motivated a random selection of one choice. Such a comparable 
motivation of stimuli can be assumed to provoke a similar categorization process in 
both treatments. If the P300 amplitudes of both treatments differ generally, then 
the basic perception of the choice task can be presumed as different. However, 
partial difference can be related to different levels of attracted attention to a 
distinct stimulus consequence. In this respect, it can be assumed that real payoffs 
allocate higher levels of attention to specific stimuli, as these choice tasks represent 
a real decision that is apparently more relevant for the subject. 
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6.5.3 Analysis of the P300 component 
A P300 component was determined to occur at about 450 to 550 ms after stimulus 
presentation. Figure 16 and shows the averaged voltage distribution on the scalp 
within this time range for both treatments. As can be seen, a positive maximum is 
located at centro-parietal electrode sites which reflect the characteristic location of 
the P300 component. 
 
Figure 16: Topographies of voltage distribution within 450 and 550 ms 
The following figures depict the event-related potentials for both treatments at the 
Pz electrode separated by indifferent choices (Figure 17) and sure choices (Figure 
18). In that figure, the P300 component shows the most different appearance for 
the bin categories of sure choices. Here, the P300 amplitudes are most pronounced 
for sure lottery choices and seem to differ across both treatments. In contrast, P300 
peak levels for indifferent choices appear rather similar. Furthermore, the 
maximum of the P300 amplitudes is higher for sure choices than for indifferent 
choices.  
 
Figure 17: ERPs at the Pz electrode for choices inside the indifference area 




Figure 18: ERPs at the Pz electrode for choices outside the indifference area 
For a statistical analysis of the P300 modulation, mean amplitudes within a time 
range of 450 to 550 ms were calculated (see also Table A13-A15 of Appendix A). 
Next, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed for the midline electrodes with 
anterior-posterior electrode position (Fz, Cz, Pz), treatment (hypothetical, real), bin 
classification (sure choice for the lottery, indifferent choice for the lottery, 
indifferent choice for the sure payoff, sure choice for the sure payoff) as factors (see 
Table A16 of Appendix A). The ANOVA revealed a main effect for bin classification 
(F(2.253)=5.318, p=0.007) as well as an interaction anterior-posterior electrode 
position x bin classification (F(3.304)=8.957, p<0.001). The main effect for bin 
classification was further analyzed by differentiating this factor into a factor choice 
(lottery, sure payoff) and a factor indifferent position (indifferent choice, sure 
choice). Consequently, an ANOVA for mean amplitudes at the Pz electrode was 
performed with treatment (hypothetical, real), choice (lottery, sure payoff) and 
indifferent position (indifferent choice, sure choice) as factors (see Table A17 of 
Appendix A). The ANOVA revealed main effects for choice (F(1)=9.348, p=0.006) and 
indifferent position (F(1)=15.714, p=0.001) as well as an interaction choice x 
indifferent position (F(1)=7.963, p=0.011). 
In summary, the type of choice in relation to the stimulus value evokes different 
P300 amplitudes but general differences between both payoff mechanisms were 
not revealed. Figure 19 contrasts sure payoff choices against lottery choices outside 
the indifference area while Figure 20 depicts sure payoff choices and lottery choices 
inside the indifference area. In this comparison, P300 amplitudes for both 
treatments are significantly higher for lottery choices than for sure payoff choices in 
performed one-sided pair-wise t-tests (see Table A18 of Appendix A) but solely for 
choices outside the indifference area (T(20)>2.738, p<0.007) and not for indifferent 
choices (T(20)<1.384, p>0.091).  




Figure 19: Mean amplitudes within 450 and 550 ms at the Pz electrode  
for choices outside the indifference area 
 
Figure 20: Mean amplitudes within 450 and 550 ms at the Pz electrode  
for choices inside the indifference area 
Furthermore, a different comparison of mean amplitudes contrasting indifferent 
choices with sure choices is presented in Figure 21 and Figure 22. Here, indifferent 
lottery choices yield smaller mean amplitudes than sure lottery choices, which differ 
significantly for performed one-sided pair-wise t-tests (T(20)>3.198, p<0.003) in 
both treatments. Differences of sure payoff choices between indifferent choices 
and sure choices are not significant in this comparison (T(20)<0.887, p>0.193). 
Furthermore, the P300 amplitude of sure lottery choices in the real payoff 
mechanism is most pronounced and is significantly different for a one-sided pair-
wise t-test (T(20)=-1.773, p=0.046) compared to the P300 amplitude of sure lottery 
choices in the hypothetical treatment. 
 
Figure 21: Mean amplitudes within 450 and 550 ms at the Pz electrode for lottery choices 




Figure 22: Mean amplitudes within 450 and 550 ms at the Pz electrode for sure payoff choices 
The statistical analysis has shown that the P300 amplitudes are differently 
modulated by stimuli in relation to a distinct categorization of responses. With 
respect to the assumption of stimulus categorization, the revealed main effect 
concerning the indifference position of stimuli together with smaller P300 
amplitudes for indifferent choices indicate that a stimulus categorization inside the 
indifference area is more difficult to discriminate for a subject. Hence, stimulus 
values of the sure payoff near the indifference point are reflected by a higher 
degree of uncertainty concerning a predominant choice category. 
Furthermore, the revealed main effect concerning the choice type and the higher 
P300 amplitudes for lottery choices supports the assumption that both choice 
categories differently allocate attentional resources. Additionally, the difference in 
reaction times between lottery choices and sure payoff choices indicates that both 
types of choices are perceived in different ways. A reason for a higher attentional 
resource allocation of lottery choices can be referred to the presence of a risky 
decision. In this context, the more pronounced P300 in the real treatment further 
supports this assumption reasonably since this treatment condition reflects real risk 
consequences and a choice for the risky alternative has to be deliberated more 
consciously. If risky decisions are evaluated more carefully than riskless decisions, 
then these decisions need more time, which is reflected by higher reaction times, 
and are more focused in attention, which is reflected by higher P300 amplitudes. 
Apart from that, a general difference between both treatments could not be 
confirmed, which indicates a similar categorization process of stimulus values 
between hypothetical and real payoffs attended by equal reaction times. This can 
be ascribed to the framing of an equal choice task situation of introducing a random 
payoff selection. Thus, the subjects responded to the same environmental choice 
situation which resulted in the same categorization process. 




7 The portfolio effect 
This chapter will continue on the first EEG study concerning the hypothetical bias 
focusing on the influence of incentive structures in economic experiments. 
According to the discussion about the suitability of payoff mechanisms (see section 
3.4.4), the following EEG study contrasts the random payoff mechanism and the 
averaged payoff mechanism with reference to their applicability for multiple choice 
task experiments. As discussed previously, a theoretical comparison of both payoff 
mechanisms entails the problem of an arising portfolio effect for the averaged 
payoff mechanism in which all decisions are realized for a subject. Since most 
individual decision making models are considering one task decisions, the averaged 
payoff mechanism is presumed to be inappropriate for multiple choice task 
experiments, because the incentive structure induces the subject to form portfolios 
over a certain amount of choices. Hence, the portfolio effect arises from a non-
independent valuation of a single choice task. But again, aside from a theoretical 
comparison, the individual choice behavior does not necessarily warrant a coherent 
result according to this theoretical prediction. In this respect, the evaluation process 
during decision making gets into focus with reference to the independence of a 
single choice in multiple choice task experiments. As already applied in the EEG 
study concerning the hypothetical bias, an analysis of the N200 component in 
relation to conflict monitoring provides an appropriate construct for investigating 
an evaluation process in a neuroscientific approach. 
Therefore, the subsequent EEG study will focus on the neural difference in the 
modulation of the N200 with reference to an independent valuation of the applied 
choice tasks. In this respect, different levels of conflict between both payoff 
mechanisms can be assumed to be evoked by a different valuation of the choice 
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task. The neural analysis of the evaluation process therefore contributes to the 
discussion about the suitability of payoff mechanisms by identifying neural 
differences that can be ascribed to a potential portfolio effect. 
Similar to the previous chapter, an introduction to the portfolio effect and a 
research hypothesis concerning a modulation of the N200 will be presented next. 
The design of the EEG study and the corresponding results will be presented 
followed by a discussion on this topic. These parts are based on a working paper 
(Morgenstern et al., 2013b) which was developed in a joint work with Marcus 
Heldmann (Department of Neurology at the University of Lübeck) and Bodo Vogt 
(Faculty of Economics and Management at the University of Magdeburg). 
Moreover, this chapter will further report an additional data analysis of the EEG 
study with reference to the choice task reaction times and a modulation of the P300 
component. This additional material has not been mentioned in the working paper 
of Morgenstern et al. (2013b). 
7.1 Introduction5 
In experimental economics, payoff mechanisms are important procedures to ensure 
the incentive compatibility of choice tasks in an experiment. The concept of 
incentive compatibility (Smith, 1982) is one essential issue in experiments 
addressing questions in economics and making behavioral results of such 
experiments reliable. Incentive compatibility is achieved by connecting a decision of 
a subject in an experiment to the subject’s reward for participating in the 
experiment. This is realized by informing the subjects about the payoff mechanism 
before the experiment starts. The aim is to provide incentives for a truthful 
response of the subjects. Thus, payoff mechanisms determine the reward for a 
subject and have therefore an influence on the choice behavior. Several approaches 
for appropriate incentivized payoff mechanisms have been discussed in the 
research field of experimental economics (see for example Starmer and Sugden, 
1991; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Lee, 2007; Cox et al., 2011). 
Basically, experiments in which subjects are faced with one single decision that is 
realized can serve as the most fitting reference for real choice behavior (Cox et al., 
2011). This single decision is independent of potential influences that are present in 
multiple choice task experiments. However, single choice experiments are not 
always suitable for analyzing individual choice behavior under risk, such as 
determining certainty equivalents as well as measuring weighting or value 
functions. Therefore, experimenters commonly use multiple choice experiments. 
                                                     
5 See also Morgenstern et al. (2013b) 
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In multiple choice task experiments, a choice between alternatives can depend on 
previous choices, meaning that any previously made choice potentially influences a 
subsequent choice. For this reason, it is preferable to incentivize subjects to make 
independent decisions. This isolation is theoretically achieved by implementing a 
random payoff mechanism in which only one randomly chosen decision is realized 
for a subject. Starmer and Sugden (1991) showed that the random payoff 
mechanism is appropriate to elicit true preferences of the subjects. But, the 
probability of an individual decision being chosen decreases with the number of 
choice tasks. Although the random payoff mechanism implies conditional 
rationality, the importance of one single choice could decrease for a subject. Hence, 
it is also worthy considering that every single choice is realized for the subject. In 
contrast to the random payoff mechanism, paying out all decisions in an experiment 
does not warrant that every single choice is considered as independent by the 
subject. Since every decision is realized, the decreasing variance of risky outcomes 
in a portfolio can induce the subjects to behave in a more risk neutral way. This can 
crucially influence the behavior, or the risk attitudes of subjects respectively, and is 
mentioned as the portfolio effect. 
Up to now, just a few studies have directly addressed the question whether the 
behavior in individual decision making tasks differs between a random payoff 
procedure and a procedure in which all decisions are realized. Laury (2006) 
compared these two payoff mechanisms on a low payoff level and found no 
significant difference in the choice behavior. Differences only occurred between low 
and high payoff choices within the random payoff mechanism. A treatment with 
high payoff choices realizing all decisions was not conducted in this study. In 
contrast, Lawson and Lawson (2011) confirmed a difference in choice behavior for 
an experiment in which they applied both payoff procedures in the experimental 
design of Holt and Laury (2002). They found that subjects are less risk averse in their 
choices when all decisions are paid. In contrast, a study by Selten et al. (1999) 
conducted a binary lottery choice experiment in which all decision were realized 
and found no evidence for an inducement of risk neutral choice behavior. A more 
recent study of Cox et al. (2011) investigated several multiple choice task payoff 
mechanisms in comparison to a one task experiment in a between subject design. 
They attributed behavioral differences between a “one task” treatment and a 
“paying out all decisions” treatment to the portfolio effect. Differences between a 
“paying one randomly” treatment and “paying out all decisions” treatment 
concerning a portfolio effect were not directly discussed. In summary, unambiguous 
evidence indicating a portfolio effect between the payoff mechanisms of paying out 
one or paying out all decisions cannot be provided. Considering portfolio choice 
theory, there should be a behavioral difference among both payoff procedures. 
Hence, a further clarification on the presence of a portfolio effect is still necessary. 
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In our study, we will focus on these two payoff mechanisms in conjunction with a 
potential portfolio effect and address the question of how these two payoff 
mechanisms differ in their evaluation process resulting in the portfolio effect. In this 
context, event-related brain potentials are applicable for analyzing differences in 
information processing related to the evaluation of both choice task designs. Aside 
from incentivized differences in behavior, the decision making process itself should 
be different, if a non-independent evaluation of portfolio choices takes place in 
contrast to an independent evaluation of random payoff choices. Choices in a 
portfolio framed choice task should allocate more cognitive resources, if previous 
choices are involved in the decision making process. Hence, an analysis of processes 
of cognitive control is suitable for addressing this issue since these processes are 
existent when an evaluation of a choice task and its subsequent response takes 
place. 
Therefore, we designed an EEG study to examine different levels of cognitive 
control for these kinds of decisions. Several investigations have shown that 
cognitive control increases in decision tasks when subjects have to choose between 
two or more competing alternatives (Bland and Schaefer, 2011; De Neys et al., 
2011). We identified the N200 component as being appropriate for measuring 
processes of cognitive control. In stimulus-locked EEGs, the N200 component, a 
negative deflection at fronto-central electrode sites appearing 200-300 ms after 
stimulus presentation, is assumed to reflect the neural underpinnings of cognitive 
control (van Veen and Carter, 2002a; Wendt et al., 2007; Folstein and van Petten, 
2008). The N200 component is supposed to reveal an action control conflict when a 
subject comes to a decision. We assume that different levels of involvement of 
cognitive control between the two payoff mechanisms should result in a different 
appearance of the N200 component. 
The experimental procedure comprised a lottery choice paradigm for eliciting 
certainty equivalents. We applied two EEG experiments in which for one session 
one randomly chosen decision was paid out (single treatment) while for the other 
session all decisions were paid out on average (portfolio treatment). Paying out all 
decisions on average should ensure that both treatments have the same payoff 
scale for the subjects. The subjects performed both treatments with equal choice 
tasks in which they always had to choose between a fifty-fifty lottery and a sure 
payoff. In the comparison of both treatments, we presume that a potential portfolio 
effect in the behavior of the subjects would lead to less risky choices in the portfolio 
treatment. 
As a result of behavioral differences, we would also expect differences in the N200 
component. An evoked portfolio effect in the behavioral data between both payoff 
mechanisms indicates that these decisions are also different in the evaluation of the 
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subjects. If the portfolio effect can be ascribed to a non-independent valuation of 
the decision task, then the decision making process in the portfolio treatment 
should allocate more cognitive resources because previous decisions are involved. 
Furthermore, an absence of independent decisions in the portfolio treatment 
should evoke a higher action control conflict due to a higher resource allocation. 
Hence, we expect to observe a higher level of cognitive control appearing in an 
increased N200 component for choices in the portfolio treatment. 
7.2 Material and Methods6 
7.2.1 Experimental procedure 
The study was arranged in two EEG sessions. In one session the random payoff 
mechanism was applied, paying the subjects according to one randomly chosen 
decision (single treatment), while in the other session a portfolio treatment was 
used, in which all decisions of the subjects were realized by paying out all decisions 
on average. In order to avoid any order effects, the time interval between the two 
sessions was about half a year. Across the sessions, only the payoff procedures 
varied while the subjects’ task itself remained constant (see given instructions B11-
B14 of Appendix B).  
The choice task followed the procedure for eliciting certainty equivalents (Farquhar, 
1984) by offering the subjects a fifty-fifty lottery and a sure payoff. The fifty-fifty 
lottery provided a high payoff with a probability of 0.5 and a small payoff of zero 
with the complementary probability. The sure payoff was arranged between the 
two payoffs of the lottery. The subjects had to decide in each decision trial either to 
play the fifty-fifty lottery or to receive the sure payoff instead. 
The high payoff of the lottery was set to 100 euros. The small payoff of the lottery 
was set to 0 euros. Values of the sure payoff were set to 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 
80 and 90 euros. In addition, all values were varied between 0 and 7 resulting in 
high lottery payoffs between 100 and 107 combined with sure payoff values 
between 10 and 97. Thus, a total amount of 576 decision trials was presented 
randomly to the subjects. 
During the experiment, a subject saw three numbers in a white framed box (see 
Figure 23). The two outer numbers indicated the fifty-fifty lottery. The inner 
number indicated the sure payoff. 
                                                     
6 See also Morgenstern et al. (2013b) 




Figure 23: Choice task presented to the subjects 
Each decision trial started with an empty box. Subsequently, the two outer numbers 
(lottery payoffs) were shown and one second later the inner number (sure payoff) 
appeared. After the presentation of the sure payoff, the subjects had to make a 
decision. The subjects indicated their decision by pressing a mouse button with 
their left or right index fingers. Finally, the next decision trial started (see Figure 24). 
 
Figure 24: Sequence of screens of one choice task 
The experiment consisted of 9 blocks with 64 decision trials each comprising a 30 
seconds break for the subjects between each block. In order to familiarize the 
subjects with the task, 20 practice trials were performed by each subject. All 
subjects were seated in a comfortable armchair in front of a 19 inch screen at a 
distance of 80 to 100 cm. 
In our study, the participants were 18 right-handed and neurologically healthy 
subjects (9 women, age range 20 to 31) which were recruited from the ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2004) subject pool of the University of Magdeburg. The subjects were paid 
according to the realization of the two payoff mechanisms. No further endowment 
was given to the subjects. According to the random payoff mechanism, the subjects 
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received a payment between 0 and 107 euros in the single treatment. For the 
portfolio treatment, subjects earned an averaged payment between 57.87 and 
66.63 euros. 
7.2.2 Behavioral analysis 
The behavioral data were examined in the relative frequency of lottery choice 
related to the decision trials. Therefore, all decision trials were categorized by the 
distance of the offered sure payoff to the expected value of the lottery. For 
example, a decision trial, in which a lottery L(.5, 0, .5, 100) with an expected value 
of 50 and a sure payoff of 20 had been offered to a subject, was assorted into a 
distance category of -30 (20-50=-30). Subsequently, for every distance category the 
relative frequency of lottery choices of each subject was calculated. 
7.2.3 EEG recording 
The electroencephalogram was recorded from 61 thin electrodes mounted in an 
elastic cap and placed according to the international 10-10 system (Chatrian et al., 
1985). The EEG was re-referenced offline to the mean activity at the left and right 
mastoid. Horizontal and vertical electrooculograms (EOG) were recorded using 
bipolar montages in order to enable offline rejection of eye movement artifacts. All 
channels were amplified (bandpass 0.05-70 Hz) and digitized with 4 ms resolution. 
Electrode impedances were kept below 10 kΩ. After epoching the data time locked 
to stimulus onset (baseline -100 to 0, epoch length 1,000 ms), epochs containing 
eye blinks or other artifacts (muscle activity, step-like artifacts etc.) were excluded 
from averaging. Finally, a 12 Hz low-pass filter was applied to the subjects’ 
averages. 
7.2.4 EEG analysis 
For both payoff mechanisms, the EEG data were analyzed for indifferent choices 
and for sure choices in relation to the subject’s decision. For this purpose, we 
identified for every subject an area of ambiguous choices in which the relative 
frequency of lottery choices changes from one to zero. The choices in this area were 
specified as indifferent choices. Furthermore, we determined an individual 
indifference point for a lottery choice frequency of 0.5 within this range of 
indifferent choices. Around the individual indifference point, an interval size of 13 
digits determined the indifference choice area bin sections for which we analyzed 
the corresponding lottery choices and sure payoff choices. 
Next, we identified two areas of sure choices in which either the lottery or the sure 
payoff had been chosen frequently by the subject. We determined the two sure 
choice areas based on the individual indifference point and its location in relation to 
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the two lottery payoffs. The area of sure choices for the lottery was determined by 
the midpoint between the small lottery payoff and the individual indifference point. 
In contrast, the area of sure choices for the sure payoff was determined by the 
midpoint between the individual indifference point and the high lottery payoff. An 
interval size of 7 digits around these two midpoints determined the sure choice area 
bin sections. 
This bin determination procedure is illustrated in Figure 25 where the classification 
of the four bins for the EEG analysis is presented. The graph shows exemplarily the 
relative lottery choice frequency of a subject related to the distance of the sure 
payoff to the expected value of the lottery. The averaged expected value of all 
lotteries is at about 52 euros (high payoff variation between 100 and 107). Thus, a 
distance category of -52 corresponds to a sure payoff of 0 euros while a distance 
category of +52 corresponds to a sure payoff of 104 euros. In this example, the 
individual indifference point is at -14, which corresponds to a sure payoff, or a 
certainty equivalent respectively, of 38 euros. Hence, the area of sure choices for 
the lottery is at the midpoint between -52 and -14, namely at -33. In contrast, the 
area of sure choices for the sure payoff is at the midpoint between -14 and +52, 
namely at +19. 
 
Figure 25: Description of bin classification 





The behavioral results summarized over all subjects are presented in Figure 26, 
which shows the relative frequency of lottery choices in relation to the distance of 
the sure payoff to the expected value of the lottery. The lottery choice frequency of 
the two payoff mechanisms differs for choices within a distance of -10 and -5 
(behavioral results are provided in Table B1 of Appendix B). Around this section, the 
medians of the determined indifference points of both treatments are located. The 
single treatment has a median of -11 (mean=-10.11, SE=2.53) while the portfolio 
treatment has a median of -4 (mean=-8.39, SE=2.36). A one-sided pair-wise 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealed a significant difference on a 5 % level (V=21.5, 
p=0.05) for the lottery choice frequency within a distance of -8 to -7. Lottery choices 
are significantly higher in this section when subjects are faced with the decision task 
in the portfolio treatment. Thus, we observe a sharper change in the choices of 
subjects from the lottery to the sure payoff when the sure payoff moves toward the 
expected value of the lottery in the portfolio treatment. 
 
Figure 26: Relative frequency of lottery choices 
An overall difference in the amount of risky choices cannot be confirmed. In the 
single treatment, 36.1 % of all choices are risky choices, whereas in the portfolio 
treatment, 38.0 % of all choices are risky choices. The absence of a general impact 
on risk attitudes is similar to the finding of Laury (2006) for low payoff choices.  
However, the difference in choice behavior can particularly be ascribed to the area 
of indifferent choices. We analyzed the lottery choice frequency for ambiguous 
                                                     
7 See also Morgenstern et al. (2013b) 
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choices related to an interval of indifference. Such an indifference interval 
determines an area for which the subjects are switching from a lottery choice 
frequency of one to a lottery choice frequency of zero. The lottery choice frequency 
within these indifference intervals (see Table B2 of Appendix B) is significantly 
higher in the single treatment (single: 55.0 %; portfolio: 47.1 %) revealed by a one-
sided, pair-wise Wilcoxon signed-rank test (V=43, p=0.033). This indicates that a 
sharper change from a sure choice area for lottery choices to an indifferent choice 
area is present.  
7.3.2 Event-related potentials 
Based on our previous assumption concerning the role of cognitive control for 
choices in the single treatment and for choices in the portfolio treatment, we 
analyzed the N200 component for both treatments. We identified an N200 
component at the fronto-central electrode positions, peaking between 260 and 
360 ms after stimulus presentation. 
Figure 5 shows the event-related potentials of the two payoff mechanisms at the 
FCz electrode elicited for the four determined bins. The four graphs in Figure 27 
compare indifferent choices with sure choices. On the left hand side, the event-
related potentials of the portfolio treatment are displayed. On the right hand side, 
the event-related potentials of the single treatment are shown. In the upper row, 
the sure payoff choices and in the lower row, the lottery choices are compared. 
 
Figure 27: ERPs at the FCz electrode separated by the type of choice and treatment 
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As can be seen, the indifferent choices tend to have a higher N200 peak at about 
310 ms in contrast to sure choices. But for lottery choices of the portfolio 
treatment, this pattern cannot be found (see Figure 27 on the bottom left-hand 
side). Here, both peaks are at the same level. The following figures distinguish the 
ERPs at the FCz electrode between choices inside the indifference area (Figure 28) 
and outside the indifference area (Figure 29). Here we observe that for choices 
outside the indifference area the N200 peak is higher in the portfolio treatment 
when the lottery is chosen. 
 
Figure 28: ERPs at the FCz electrode for choices inside the indifference area 
 
Figure 29: ERPs at the FCz electrode for choices outside the indifference area 
Subsequently, mean amplitudes within 260 and 360 ms were calculated (see Table 
B3-B7 of Appendix B). A repeated measures ANOVA for mean amplitudes between 
260 and 360 ms was performed for the midline electrodes (see Table B8 of 
Appendix B). The ANOVA contained the factors anterior-posterior electrode position 
(Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, and Pz), treatment (portfolio, single), choice (lottery, sure payoff) 
and indifferent position (indifferent choice, sure choice). An interaction for anterior-
posterior x treatment x indifferent position (F(1.956)=6.792, p=0.004) and a main 
effect for indifferent position (F(1)=8.198, p=0.011) was revealed. The difference 
between indifferent and sure choices was confirmed by an ANOVA for the FCz 
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electrode (see Table B9 of Appendix B) with treatment (portfolio, single), choice 
(lottery, sure payoff) and indifferent position (indifferent choice, sure choice) as 
factors, which revealed a main effect for indifferent position (F(1)=9.125, p=0.008). 
All degrees of freedom, F-values, and p-values are reported as Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected. 
Mean amplitudes at the FCz electrode are presented in Figure 30 and Figure 31. The 
observation of higher N200 amplitudes for indifferent choices is present in the 
single treatment for lottery choices as well as for sure payoff choices, indicating an 
increased action control conflict for indifferent choices. These differences are 
confirmed by a one-sided pair-wise t-test (lottery choices: T(17)=-2.016, p=0.030; 
sure payoff choices: T(17)=-1.796, p=0.045). 
In contrast, this pattern is different in the portfolio treatment. The N200 amplitude 
shows a difference between sure choices and indifferent choices in case of choosing 
the sure payoff. But no difference is observed between indifferent lottery choices 
and sure lottery choices. This observation in the portfolio treatment is confirmed by 
a one-sided pair-wise t-test (see also Table B10 of Appendix B) for which the sure 
payoff choices differ significantly on a 5 % level (T(17)=-1.854, p=0.041) but not the 
lottery choices (T(17)=-0.297, p=0.385). 
 
Figure 30: Mean amplitudes within 260 and 360 ms at the FCz electrode for sure payoff choices 
 
Figure 31: Mean amplitudes within 260 and 360 ms at the FCz electrode for lottery choices 
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Thus, the results show a characteristic pattern of the N200 amplitude between 
choices inside and outside the indifference area. Indifferent choices evoke a higher 
N200 amplitude. Furthermore, in the portfolio treatment this higher N200 
amplitude is also present for lottery choices outside the indifference area. 
7.4 Discussion8 
In the present study, we investigated the neural underpinnings of cognitive control 
mechanisms related to the portfolio effect by recording EEGs while the participants 
were performing a lottery choice task. In this respect, event-related brain potentials 
were used to analyze differences in the evaluation process, which can be ascribed 
to a potential portfolio effect. We conducted two identical multiple choice task 
experiments in which we used two different payoff mechanisms. We applied the 
random payoff mechanism (single treatment) by paying out one randomly chosen 
decision and a payoff mechanism in which all decisions were paid out on average 
(portfolio treatment). The averaged payoff mechanism, in comparison to the 
random payoff mechanism, was assumed to result in a more risk neutral behavior, 
which can be attributed to the portfolio effect. We addressed the question of 
neural differences in the evaluation process of these two payoff mechanisms 
because a predicted behavioral difference is caused by an inconsistency in the 
independent evaluation of each lottery choice task. Based on the assumption that 
the evaluation of a choice task is connected with processes of cognitive control, we 
examined the N200 component in relation to these processes. 
A comparison of the behavioral results shows that the subjects chose a higher 
frequency of lottery choices in the portfolio treatment when the sure payoff is close 
to the expected value of the lottery. Furthermore, the steeper change of choice 
frequency in this area can be referred to a higher decrease of lottery choices in the 
indifference area. An overall difference concerning the risk attitudes of subjects 
toward a less risky choice frequency is absent. This general result is in line with the 
study of Laury (2006). However, the difference in lottery choice frequencies 
between both treatments near the expected value of the lottery can be attributed 
to a portfolio effect to a certain extent. This difference in the behavioral data shows 
that the subjects are choosing the lottery more frequently when the sure payoff is 
close to, but still smaller than the expected value of the lottery. This would imply 
that the subjects are in some degree aware of the decreasing variance of risky 
outcomes in a portfolio and adjust their choice frequency toward the expected 
value of the lottery accordingly. 
                                                     
8 See also Morgenstern et al. (2013b) 
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The EEG analysis shows differences between indifferent choices and sure choices 
for the two payoff mechanisms. In both treatments, the N200 amplitudes are higher 
for indifferent choices, which indicate an increased action control conflict for these 
choices. This seems plausible since subjects are less decisive in their decision when 
they are indifferent and one out of two alternatives has to be chosen. In contrast, 
the subjects seem to be more certain in their decisions outside their indifference 
area. The increased action control conflict is missing outside the indifference area 
for sure payoff choices in both treatments and for lottery choices in the single 
treatment. However, we cannot confirm a difference in the N200 amplitudes 
between sure lottery choices and indifferent lottery choices in the portfolio 
treatment. This implies that the level of conflict during decision making is higher in 
a portfolio choice task for the risky choice alternative. 
The increased action control conflict for risky choices can be attributed to a non-
independent evaluation of the present choice task. If the subjects involve previous 
choices into their decision making, then the range of decision making is extended, 
which could lead to such an increased action control conflict. Interestingly, we do 
not find this higher level of conflict for the sure payoff choices in the portfolio 
treatment, which indicates that sure payoff choices do not evoke an increased 
action control conflict. Thus, the portfolio effect can be assigned to a portfolio-
based thinking for risky choices but not for riskless choices. This would imply that a 
higher decision conflict is evoked when subjects are at odds with their true risk 
attitude for an independent decision and the more risk neutral portfolio decision.  
7.5 Additional data analysis 
Similar to the additional data analysis of the study concerning the hypothetical bias, 
further results of the EEG study concerning the portfolio effect will be discussed in 
this section. Aside from a focus on the N200 modulation, the ERP data also provide 
a different appearance of the P300 component. Hence, as already discussed for the 
hypothetical bias, the modulation of the P300 component will also be analyzed 
concerning the applied payoff mechanisms of this study. Consequently, potential 
differences of the P300 will be discussed. Before that, the behavioral reaction times 
will be provided and discussed in the next section. 
7.5.1 Analysis of reaction times 
According to each stimulus presentation, mean response times corresponding to 
the four ERP bin classifications were calculated for every subject. Figure 32 shows 
the mean reaction times for both treatments separated by the bin classification. As 
can be seen, the mean reaction times differ between both payoff treatments. Mean 
reaction times in the single treatment are higher than those in the portfolio 
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treatment (see also Table B21 of Appendix B). The subjects responded on average 
between 500 and 700 ms in the single treatment and between 450 and 650 ms in 
the portfolio treatment. Furthermore, differences are also present across the 
stimulus values. Reaction times are about 100 ms higher for stimulus values within 
the individual indifference area. Additionally, reaction times for lottery choices 
seem to be higher than for sure payoff choices. 
 
Figure 32: Mean reaction times 
For statistical analysis of the mean reaction times, a repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted with treatment (single, portfolio) and bin classification (sure choice for 
the lottery, indifferent choice for the lottery, indifferent choice for the sure payoff, 
sure choice for the sure payoff) as factors (see Table B22 of Appendix B). The 
performed ANOVA revealed a main effect for treatment (F(1)=4.468, p=0.05) as well 
as for bin classification (F(2.574)=88.318, p<0.001) and detected an interaction for 
treatment x bin classification (F(2.555)=6.360, p=0.002). Subsequently, a three 
factor ANOVA with treatment (single, portfolio), choice (lottery, sure payoff) and 
indifferent position (indifferent choice, sure choice) was performed for a further 
clarification of the bin classification effect (see also Table B23 of Appendix B). For all 
three factors a main effect (treatment: F(1)=4.468, p=0.05; choice: F(1)=40.338, 
p<0.001; indifferent position: F(1)=149.222, p<0.001) can be confirmed as well as an 
interaction for treatment x indifferent position (F(1)=15.977, p=0.001). According to 
this interaction, mean reaction times between both treatments differ significantly 
for indifferent choices in performed pair-wise t-tests (T(17)>2.145, p<0.047) but not 
for sure choices (T(17)<1.308, p>0.208). Furthermore, the revealed main effects 
concerning choice and indifferent position could be confirmed by pair-wise t-tests 
(see Table B24 of Appendix B), indicating for both treatments that lottery choices 
yield higher reaction times (T(17)>2.588, p<0.019) as sure payoff choices while 
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indifferent choices yield higher reaction times (T(17)>6.862, p<0.001) than sure 
choices. 
The higher reaction times for indifferent choices compared to those of sure choices 
support the assumption that subjects are more indecisive for these stimuli. This is 
also indicated by an increased action control conflict reflected by higher N200 
amplitudes. In contrast, the decreasing reaction times in both treatments outside 
the indifference area disagree with the presence of an increased N200 component. 
Decreasing reaction times indicate that subjects are more confident in their 
decisions. The increased N200 amplitude in the portfolio treatment for risky choices 
outside the indifference area therefore requires a different reasoning. As already 
stated for hypothetical choices in the previous study, the decrease of reaction times 
and the presence of an increased N200 amplitude cannot be referred to a conflict 
with regard to response inhibition. Hence, this finding also suggests that the 
increased conflict can be related to a process during stimulus evaluation, which is 
presumed by the conflict monitoring hypothesis. 
Moreover, reaction time differences between both treatments indicate that both 
choice tasks are performed differently. Smaller reaction times in the portfolio 
treatment suggest that these choice tasks are easier to perform for a subject. This 
could be referred to the reduction of risk variance by forming portfolios, which 
reduces the uncertainness of a distinct outcome consequence. The importance of 
making the right choice decreases compared to the single treatment.  
The pattern of reaction times provides further clarifications of the ERP data, and the 
presumed explanations of the findings concerning the N200 are supported by the 
mean reaction time data. In contrast to the study concerning the hypothetical bias, 
the differences between both payoff mechanisms can be ascribed to a different 
choice task environment. This further indicates that both payoff mechanisms are 
processed in different manners by the subjects. 
7.5.2 Analysis of the P300 component 
For the analysis of the P300 component in this study, the same approach was 
employed as the one used in the previous study concerning the hypothetical bias. 
Hence, the assumptions concerning a P300 modulation can also be applied for this 
section. According to the event categorization hypothesis (Kok, 2001) of the P300, 
higher P300 amplitudes are generally expected outside the indifference area of the 
subjects because these stimulus values are easier to categorize in relation to a 
predominant response. Furthermore, lottery choices should also evoke higher P300 
amplitudes than sure payoff choices in both payoff procedures, presuming that risky 
decisions demand higher attentional resources due to a risk awareness. In addition 
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and in contrast to the study about the hypothetical bias, differences in the P300 
amplitude between both treatment conditions are possible, if both choice task 
paradigms are perceived in different ways. Assuming that the subjects in the 
portfolio treatment are aware of a potential portfolio strategy, then the attraction 
of attentional resources toward the risky decision could be less pronounced than in 
the single treatment. Moreover, a distinct categorization of stimuli toward the 
predominant response could also diminish for the portfolio treatment since forming 
portfolios in a portfolio strategy could comprise both types of responses and a 
categorization is therefore not unambiguous. Hence, P300 amplitudes are 
presumed to be different between both treatments, expecting generally higher 
P300 amplitudes for the single treatment. 
In the ERP data of the present study, a P300 component was determined to occur at 
about 450 to 550 ms after stimulus onset. Figure 33 depicts the averaged voltage 
distribution on the scalp within this time range for both treatments. The figure 
shows that a positive maximum is located at centro-parietal electrode sites, 
reflecting the characteristic location of the P300 component. 
 
Figure 33: Topographies of voltage distribution within 450 and 550 ms 
The following figures show the event-related potentials at the Pz electrode for both 
treatments separated by indifferent choices (Figure 34) and sure choices (Figure 
35). As can be seen, the P300 component is most diverging for choices outside the 
indifference area. In this area, the P300 amplitudes are most pronounced for sure 
lottery choices and presumably differ across both treatments. Moreover, P300 
amplitudes of portfolio treatment choices appear to be smaller than single 
treatment choices.  




Figure 34: ERPs at the Pz electrode for choices inside the indifference area 
 
Figure 35: ERPs at the Pz electrode for choices outside the indifference area 
Mean amplitudes between 450 and 550 ms after stimulus onset were calculated 
(see Table B15-B17 of Appendix B) and analyzed in a repeated measures ANOVA for 
the midline electrodes with three factors, comprising anterior-posterior electrode 
position (Fz, Cz, Pz), treatment (single, portfolio) and bin classification (sure choice 
for the lottery, indifferent choice for the lottery, indifferent choice for the sure 
payoff, sure choice for the sure payoff) as factors (see also Table B18 of Appendix 
B). The ANOVA revealed a main effect for bin classification (F(2.821)=10.176, 
p<0.001) as well as an interaction anterior-posterior electrode position x bin 
classification (F(3.392)=6.895, p<0.001). A further interaction anterior-posterior 
electrode position x treatment (F(1.220)=16.594, p<0.001) could also be detected. 
Subsequently, mean amplitudes at the Pz electrode were analyzed in a further 
ANOVA (see Table B19 of Appendix B) with treatment (single, portfolio), choice 
(lottery, sure payoff) and indifferent position (indifferent choice, sure choice) as 
factors. For all three factors, a main effect was revealed (treatment: F(1)=10.532, 
p=0.005; choice: F(1)=12.618, p=0.002; indifferent position: F(1)=32.882, p<0.001). 
Moreover, an interaction choice x indifferent position (F(1)=7.860, p=0.012) was 
detected for mean amplitudes at the Pz electrode. 
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The revealed main effect at the Pz electrode for the treatment condition indicates a 
general difference of P300 amplitudes between both payoff mechanisms. Figure 36 
illustrates the mean amplitudes of the P300 component within 450 and 550 ms at 
the Pz electrode. As can be seen, the mean amplitudes in the single treatment are 
constantly higher than mean amplitudes in the portfolio treatment among all four 
bin categories. A pair-wise comparison of both treatment conditions for each bin 
category revealed significantly higher mean amplitudes (T(17)>1.996, p<0.031) for 
the single treatment in performed one-sided t-tests (see Table B20 of Appendix B). 
 
Figure 36: Mean amplitudes within 450 and 550 ms at the Pz electrode 
According to the main effects for the type of choice and the indifferent position of 
stimuli, a pair-wise analysis of mean amplitudes showed a similar pattern as 
revealed in the EEG study concerning hypothetical and real payoff choices. P300 
amplitudes of sure lottery choices and sure payoff choices differ significantly in both 
treatments for performed one-sided pair-wise t-tests (T(17)>3.060, p<0.004). 
Furthermore, P300 amplitudes of indifferent lottery choices are significantly smaller 
than P300 amplitudes of sure lottery choices (T(17)>4.348, p<0.001) in both 
treatments. Figure 37 and Figure 38 depict both comparisons, indicating the 
different appearance of the P300 for sure lottery choices. 
 
Figure 37: Mean amplitudes within 450 and 550 ms at the Pz electrode  
for choices outside the indifference area 




Figure 38: Mean amplitudes within 450 and 550 ms at the Pz electrode for lottery choices 
The results illustrate similarities to the study of hypothetical and real payoffs. The 
difference in P300 amplitudes between indifferent and sure choices is also 
confirmed in this study, indicated by the main effect that refers to the indifferent 
position of a stimulus. Smaller P300 amplitudes are evoked by indifferent choices 
which imply a more difficult discrimination of stimuli according to a potential 
categorization process which is reflected by the P300. In addition, higher reaction 
times for indifferent choices in both treatments also support this assumption. 
Furthermore, the revealed main effect with reference to the type of choice denotes 
different information processing of risky and riskless decisions. Assuming that 
attentional processes are also modulating the P300 component, this result can be 
ascribed to a higher attraction of attention toward the risky alternative. This pattern 
was also found for hypothetical payoffs indicating a general difference between 
these types of choice alternatives. Additionally, the mean reaction time differences 
also imply different stimulus information processing. Lottery choices evoke higher 
reaction times than sure payoff choices, indicating a more careful stimulus 
evaluation. In this context, a more careful evaluation might induce a higher 
attraction of attentional resources. 
Finally, the main effect revealed for the treatment condition further indicates that 
the stimulus perception between both choice task situations differs. With reference 
to the differently introduced choice tasks, the smaller P300 amplitudes in the 
portfolio treatment could refer to a potential forming of portfolios. Forming 
portfolios across different choices reduces the risk in its variance and could 
therefore lead to a decreasing attraction of attentional resources on each stimulus. 
This assumption is also supported by the reaction time data for which constantly 
smaller reaction times could be revealed in the portfolio treatment. Smaller 
reaction times can be referred to the reduction of risk for portfolio choices, 
indicating a smaller importance of each decision. As a result, the difference in P300 
amplitudes between both treatments provides an indicator for the differentness of 
both choice task situations. 




8 The ERN modulation in risky and riskless 
decision making 
According to the previously discussed modulation of the N200 component in 
relation to conflict monitoring processes, this chapter will additionally describe the 
response-related ERN component and its relation to conflict processing in risky 
decision making. The ERN component is assumed to be generated in the anterior 
cingulate cortex which represents a brain region affiliated to the conflict monitoring 
system (Botvinick et al., 2001). Basically, the ERN is supposed to reflect a perceived 
divergence of afore intended and finally performed responses. Occurrences of the 
ERN can therefore be ascribed to specific levels of a response conflict which can 
result from a different subjective relevance or valuation of a given choice task 
(Heldmann et al., 2009). In this context, investigating risky decision making with 
reference to the response-related ERN can provide clarifications of how responses 
are evaluated toward the presence of different levels of risk. 
The subsequent response-related analysis of the ERN component is an additional 
data analysis and refers to the study of Morgenstern et al. (2009) in which a 
stimulus-related ERP analysis was provided. The study compared two methods for 
eliciting utility functions and focused on the stimulus evaluation process concerning 
a potential probability weighting in risky outcomes. Morgenstern et al. (2009) did 
not comprise a response-related analysis for the research hypothesis in this study. 
The utility assessment methods applied in their study were characterized by a 
riskless and a risky method. The riskless method followed a bisection task of 
evaluating the midpoint in utility of two monetary outcomes. The risky method 
followed the certainty equivalent procedure for determining an indifference point 
between a sure monetary outcome and two unsure monetary outcomes 
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represented by a fifty-fifty lottery. According to an EEG study by Heldmann et al. 
(2009), both methods yield similar behavioral results, and the bisection task is 
therefore presumed to be applicable for determining utility functions. Furthermore, 
an ERP comparison concerning response-related conflict processes was conducted 
in this study. As a result, Heldmann and colleagues found that both methods differ 
in the occurrence of the ERN for choices outside an individual indifference area of 
the subjects. ERN amplitudes were larger for error-like choices in the risky 
assessment method when an apparently predominant choice has not been chosen. 
The authors suggested that risky choices are subjectively more engaged in response 
control processes as a result of the presence of risk. Interestingly, the effect was 
revealed although all payoffs had been hypothetical, which emphasizes a general 
subjective relevance of the intended behavioral outcomes in this method. However, 
the experimental setting in the Morgenstern et al. (2009) paradigm allows for an 
additional analysis of the response-locked ERP components addressing the question 
of response conflicts in risky decision making as mentioned in the study by 
Heldmann et al. (2009). 
8.1 Introduction 
According to the concept of utility functions integrated in most economic theories 
(e.g. EUT or Prospect Theory), the determination of utility functions for economic 
goods is a fundamental concern in experimental economics. Utility functions are 
well-established in decision theory, and most models addressing individual decision 
making behavior rely on the assumption that an individual evaluates a decision 
consequence according to the subjective utility he or she receives from the 
decision’s outcomes. Identifying an individual utility of a distinct economic good and 
its functional relationship is the aim of utility assessment methods. Although several 
approaches for determining utility functions are used, so far no generally accepted 
procedure exists. With reference to risky decision making, utility functions are 
determined by applying a choice task situation with risky gambles (see Farquhar, 
1984). The behavioral results of such risky gamble choices reflect an evaluation of 
consequences and its underlying probabilities. Hence, risky gamble choices are 
influenced by two aspects: (1) the size of outcome consequences and (2) the level 
of risk reflected by the probability of occurrence. The functional form of a utility 
function can be inferentially determined from the behavioral results with reference 
to a theoretical model. But theoretical models differ in their assumptions 
concerning the functional form as well as regarding the evaluation process of a risky 
decision. For example, in Expected Utility Theory a decision is evaluated according 
to the utility of outcomes and their probability of occurrence. In contrast, a decision 
in Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) is evaluated according to a value 
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function of outcomes and a probability weighting. In case of determining a value 
function according to Prospect Theory, the process of probability weighting and its 
underlying functional form has to be separated from the result of a utility 
assessment method. This shortcoming can be resolved by applying a utility 
assessment method that is not connected to risk and therefore not connected to a 
potential probability weighting.  
An approach for eliciting utility of monetary outcomes without risk is the bisection 
method suggested by Galanter (1962). This method applies a bisection task 
questionnaire for a subject in which differences in utility associated with monetary 
outcomes have to be evaluated by the subject. An identification of the midpoint in 
utility between two monetary outcomes can be used for determining the functional 
form of utility. Assuming that a risky elicitation method and a riskless elicitation 
method are based on the same utility function, then both methods can be 
combined to separate a utility function, or a value function respectively, from a 
potential probability weighting process, or probability weighting function 
respectively. However, the question arises how both procedures differ in their 
evaluation processes even if they rely on the same utility function. The presence of 
risk in a gamble choice task compared to a riskless monetary evaluation can be used 
to analyze neural processes with regard to the sensitivity toward risk in decision 
making. 
In this context, cognitive control mechanisms are involved in decision making 
processes, and the degree of perceived risk during decision making can be assumed 
to result in a distinct level of response conflict. Higher variances of risky outcomes 
presumably induce an increased awareness of potential choice errors for a subject 
in order to prevent undesirable outcomes. Hence, the model of conflict monitoring 
(Botvinick et al., 2001) seems to be applicable to this assumption. One component 
that reflects the activity of an integrated part of the presumed conflict monitoring 
system is the error-related negativity (ERN). The ERN component, a negative 
deflection at fronto-central electrode sites peaking at about 50 to 150 ms after a 
response, is assumed to be sensitive to response conflicts, indicating the 
significance of errors (Gehring et al., 1993). Furthermore, the ERN is presumed to be 
generated in the anterior cingulate cortex (van Veen and Carter, 2002a) which 
represents an area associated with cognitive control mechanisms (Gehring and 
Knight, 2000; Paus, 2001). 
With reference to risky decision making and its potential influence on the ERN, 
Hewig et al. (2007) analyzed risk taking behavior and the modulation of the ERN in a 
Blackjack gambling task. They have shown that choices with an increased risk result 
in an increased ERN amplitude. Hewig et al. (2007) argue that an increased ERN 
amplitude is associated with a negative evaluation of the current decision and that 
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the amplitude of the ERN can therefore be related to risk taking behavior. In 
addition, Yu and Zhou (2009) conducted an EEG study in which subjects had to 
decide whether to participate in a bet for winning or losing a certain amount of 
money. The results of this study also show that the ERN is modulated by risk taking 
behavior indicated by increased ERN amplitudes for bets with a higher variance. 
Hence, the riskiness of choices reflected by the variance of a decision outcome 
seems to modulate the ERN amplitude. Moreover, the ERN is further observed to be 
influenced by the size of a potential monetary outcome. Hajcak et al. (2005) 
revealed increased ERN amplitudes for high monetary values in contrast to small 
monetary values, indicating an ERN modulation influenced by the size of the 
expected outcome value. Hajcak et al. (2005) attributed this finding to an increased 
significance of errors induced by the higher outcome value. Hence, the factors that 
are presumed to determine the utility of a subject in risky decision making, the 
expected outcome and the variance of risk, both influence the appearance of the 
ERN component. As a result, the ERN component seems to be suitable for 
investigating the role of risk between a utility assessment method without risk and 
a method connected with risk. 
Considering the previously discussed aspects concerning a modulation of the ERN 
amplitude under risk, a comparison of both methods should result in more 
pronounced ERN amplitudes for the method that is connected with risk. In the 
presence of risk, it can be assumed that a deviation from an advantageous choice 
reflects a potentially undesirable outcome, resulting in an increased subjective 
relevance for a correct response. An absence of risk should preclude a potential 
response conflict that is caused by an error-like deviation from an apparently 
predominant choice since an undesirable outcome is not induced by such a choice 
task. 
Subsequently, the implementation of both utility assessment methods as used in 
this study will be described. Besides a theoretical comparison and its implication to 
differences in behavioral results, the focus here is rather drawn on a comparison 
regarding the application of risk. For a more detailed theoretical consideration see 
Morgenstern et al. (2009). 
As mentioned before, a bisection task similar to the procedure of Galanter (1962) 
was applied for determining midpoints in utility between two monetary outcomes. 
Therefore, three monetary values in ascending order were presented to the 
subjects. The subjects were requested to indicate whether they perceive the 
interval within the first two monetary values as greater in utility than the interval 
within the last two monetary values. In order to induce a monetary valuation 
context, the subjects were instructed to evaluate each monetary value according to 
their ‘happiness’ they would feel by receiving these amounts of money (see 
8 The ERN modulation in risky and riskless decision making 
 
92 
Galanter, 1962). In this context, the study used the term of ‘joy’ as a substitute for 
indicating utility. 
The lottery choice task followed the procedure for eliciting certainty equivalents 
(see Farquhar, 1984) of a fifty-fifty lottery. Each choice task similarly comprised 
three monetary values in ascending order, indicating a fifty-fifty lottery with the 
first and the last value as potential outcomes and a sure amount of money 
represented by the center value. The subjects were requested to indicate whether 
they prefer receiving the sure amount of money or not. Here, it is important to note 
that all decisions were made hypothetically and that the subjects were not paid 
according to their decisions. The hypothetical context is necessary for an equivalent 
comparison of both utility assessment methods since the bisection choice task 
cannot be incentivized by an extrinsic incentive structure. 
Comparing the lottery choice task with the bisection task, the lottery choice task 
would indirectly ask for the same utility interval evaluation as requested in the 
bisection task (see Figure 39). Therefore, both procedures determine a midpoint in 
utility of a normalized utility function under Expected Utility Theory. In this regard, 
an evaluation of the choice task would solely differ in the presence of risk. If both 
utility intervals are diverging extensively in the perception of a subject, then an 
error-like choice in the lottery choice task provides a potentially undesirable 
outcome for the risky choice situation. In contrast, an error-like choice in the 
bisection task would only account for an incorrect choice. In this comparison, a 
higher ERN amplitude is assumed to be evoked for error-like choices of the lottery 
choice task. 
 
Figure 39: Comparison of choice tasks between CE method and bisection method 
8 The ERN modulation in risky and riskless decision making 
 
93 
8.2 Material and Methods 
8.2.1 Experimental procedure 
Sixteen right handed and neurologically healthy subjects (9 women, age range 19 to 
27) participated in this study after giving informed consent. The study was arranged 
in two EEG sessions with identical choice task instructions and stimulus material. 
The experimental instruction comprised a bisection task and a lottery choice task, 
which were performed concurrently by the subjects (see given instruction C12 of 
Appendix C). In the experimental proceeding, both choice tasks were differently 
indicated by a specific color signal. Both sessions were conducted for every subject 
within two weeks and lasted about two hours each. The subjects were paid 7 euros 
per hour for their participation. During the experiment, the participants were 
seated in a comfortable armchair in front of a 19 inch monitor with a distance of 80 
to 100 cm. The subjects gave responses by pressing two mouse buttons with their 
left and right index finger. For both choice task situations, the subjects received no 
feedback on their performance. Furthermore, each session began with 20 practice 
trials in order to familiarize the subjects with the task. After that, the experiment 
started, comprising nine blocks with 70 decision trials each.  
In each decision trial, a row of three number values enclosed by a colored box was 
presented to the subjects. When the decision trial started, the two outer number 
values surrounded by a white box were shown first. After 1,000 ms, the white frame 
of the box turned into one out of two colors (light blue and pink). The color of the 
frame indicated for a subject which kind of choice task was currently requested. 
Hence, the color of the frame requested the subject either to decide according to 
the lottery choice task or to decide according to the bisection task. Next, the inner 
number was added after 1,000 ms, and the completed array remained for another 
1,000 ms on the screen. Within this time range, the subjects had to make a decision 
with their index fingers according to the present choice task. Figure 40 depicts the 
sequence of screens for one decision trial. 
In the row of the three numbers, the left number was constantly zero. The right 
number comprised 15 different values around 1,000 (790; 810; 850; 890; 910; 950; 
990; 1,010; 1,050; 1,090; 1,110; 1,150; 1,190; 1,210; 1,250). Furthermore, the inner 
number varied in seven different categories, comprising the exact arithmetic mean 
‘C’ of the two outer numbers as well as categories with positive and negative 
deviations from the arithmetic center position. Number values deviate in steps of 
50 units (C+50, C-50), 150 units (C+150, C-150), and 300 units (C+300, C-300) from 
the arithmetic center position. In addition, all numerical values were multiplied by 
the factors 1, 10, and 100 to result in three scale factor categories. 




Figure 40: Sequence of screens of one choice task with task identification 
According to the bisection task, the two outer numbers corresponded to the 
boundaries of a utility interval while the inner number represented the midpoint in 
utility. For all three number values of a given decision trial, the subjects were 
requested to imagine the ‘joy’ they would feel when receiving these amounts of 
money in euro. Consequently, subjects had to indicate whether they perceive the 
distance in joy between the left and the center number as greater than the distance 
in joy between the center and the right number. If this was true, then subjects gave 
a ‘Yes’ response, otherwise they responded with ‘No’. 
According to the lottery choice task, the two outer numbers corresponded to a fifty-
fifty lottery while the inner number represented a sure payoff. For a given decision 
trial, the subjects had to indicate whether they prefer to receive the sure payoff or 
opt for playing the fifty-fifty lottery. In this context, the subjects were confronted 
with the question whether they want to receive the sure payoff or not. This 
question had to be answered with a ‘Yes’ or a ‘No’ response. Hence, if a subject 
preferred the lottery, then the decision had to be indicated with ‘No’. 
8.2.2 EEG recording and analysis 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 29 thin electrodes mounted in 
an elastic cap and placed according to the international 10-20 system (Jasper, 
1958). The EEG was re-referenced offline to the mean activity at the left and right 
mastoid. Horizontal and vertical electrooculograms (EOG) were recorded using 
bipolar montages in order to enable offline rejection of eye movement artifacts. All 
channels were amplified (bandpass 0.05-30 Hz) and digitized with 4 ms resolution. 
Impedances were kept below 10 kΩ. After epoching the data time locked to 
responses (baseline -300 to 0, epoch length 900 ms), epochs containing eye blinks 
or other artifacts (muscle activity, step-like artifacts etc.) were excluded from 
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averaging by visual inspection. Furthermore, the subjects’ averages were filtered 
using a 1-8 Hz band pass filter. 
According to the presumption that a higher response conflict is present in error-like 
choices of the lottery choice task, the EEG data were sorted into three bin clusters 
based on the deviations of the inner number value. Error-like choices were assumed 
to occur for choice tasks in which the inner number value strongly deviates from its 
center position. Therefore, positive and negative deflections from the center 
position had to be taken into account for revealing error-like responses. In Table 1, 
the conducted bin classification according to the deviation of the inner number and 
the subsequent response is given. According to these bin clusters, averages of 
response-locked ERPs were calculated. 










Strong negative deviation 
from center position 
C-300, C-150 
Yes Error-like choice MinusYES 
No Predominant choice MinusNO 
Center position with 
minor deviation 
C-50, C, C+50 
Yes Indifferent choice CenterYES 
No Indifferent choice CenterNO 
Strong positive deviation 
from center position 
C+150, C+300 
Yes Predominant choice PlusYES 
No Error-like choice PlusNO 
8.3 Results 
As earlier discussed in the paper of Morgenstern et al. (2009), behavioral 
differences between both methods are not revealed. According to this work, choice 
frequencies of both methods had been analyzed for each deviation category of the 
inner number, showing no significant results. Concerning the focus of this analysis, 
an overview of relative choice frequencies of ‘Yes’ responses among the three bin 
clusters is provided in Figure 41 (see also Table C1 of Appendix C). With respect to 
this comparison, a performed repeated measures ANOVA with method (bisection, 
lottery), scale factor (1, 10, 100) and bin category (MinusYES, CenterYES, PlusYES) as 
factors shows no main effect for the factor method (F(1)=0.581, p=0.458). This 
indicates that both methods are comparable for eliciting utility functions, which has 
already been argued by Morgenstern et al. (2009) and Heldmann et al. (2009). 
Furthermore, the figure shows that in the two categories with strong negative and 
strong positive deviations from the center, about one-fifth of all choices have not 
been the predominant choice. These choices are qualified for an error-like choice 
comparison of both methods concerning the ERN component. 




Figure 41: Relative choice frequency of ‘Yes’ responses 
Figure 42 depicts the response-locked event-related potentials at the Fz electrode 
for all three bin clusters. An ERN amplitude can be identified peaking between 30 
and 70 ms after response onset. ERPs in Figure 42 illustrate more pronounced ERN 
amplitudes for error-like choices than for predominant choices in the two bin 
clusters with a strong deviation of the inner number from the center position (see 
upper left and upper right graph). ERPs of choices around the center position show 
no deviation of ERN amplitudes (see middle graph).  
 
Figure 42: Response-locked ERPs at the Fz electrode for all bin clusters 
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Furthermore, the ERN amplitude in the lottery choice task for a strong positive 
deviation from the center position is most pronounced. Figure 43 contrasts solely 
the error-like choices of the two applied methods. As can be seen, the ERN 
amplitude of lottery choices with a strong positive deviation from the center 
position shows a very high negative peak in contrast to the other ERN amplitudes. 
Hence, error-like choices in this area presumably evoke a higher response conflict 
for the subjects in the lottery choice task in contrast to the bisection task. 
 
Figure 43: Response-locked ERPs at the Fz electrode for error-like choices 
In this comparison, Figure 44 illustrates the voltage distribution on the scalp for the 
error-like choices within a time range of 30 to 70 ms. The fronto-central scalp 
distribution of the negative peak is present for both methods, indicating the typical 
pattern of the ERN. Moreover, the picture emphasizes the observation of a very 
pronounced ERN component for error-like lottery choices in an area for which the 
inner number has a strong positive deviation to the center position. 
 
Figure 44: Topographies of voltage distribution within 30 and 70 ms for error-like choices 
For a statistical analysis, mean amplitudes within a time range of 30 to 70 ms were 
calculated (see Table C3-C8 of Appendix C). A repeated measures ANOVA for the 
midline electrodes was conducted with the factors anterior posterior electrode 
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position (Fz, Cz, Pz), method (bisection task, lottery choice task), bin cluster (minus, 
center, plus), and choice (Yes, No). Interactions for anterior posterior electrode 
position x method (F(1.264)=5.876, p=0.023), anterior posterior electrode position x 
method x bin cluster (F(1.429)=4.955, p=0.026), bin cluster x choice (F(1.379)=9.500, 
p=0.003), anterior posterior electrode position x method x bin cluster x choice 
(F(1.697)=5.327, p=0.015) could be revealed (see also Table C9 of Appendix C). A 
further ANOVA for the Fz electrode (see Table C10 of Appendix C) comprising 
method (bisection task, lottery choice task), bin cluster (minus, center, plus) and 
choice (Yes, No) as factors confirmed the interaction bin cluster x choice 
(F(1.345)=7.008, p=0.010) and showed a tendency for a slightly significant main 
effect for the factor method (F(1)=3.815, p=0.070). All degrees of freedom, F-values, 
and p-values are reported as Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. 
Figure 45 depicts the response-locked mean amplitudes at the Fz electrode within 
30 to 70 ms separated by the bin clusters. The figure shows an opposed trend of 
mean amplitudes for ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses. Mean amplitudes increase in their 
negative deflection when choices drift into a more error-like response, which is 
similar for both methods. Additionally, the mean amplitude in the lottery choice 
task for an error-like choice in the area of a strong positive deviation to the center 
position shows an intense deflection in this trend. Here, the ERN amplitude differs 
not only between ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses but also between both applied methods. 
A one-sided pair-wise t-test (see also Table C11 of Appendix C) revealed a significant 
difference in ERN amplitudes between lottery choices of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses 
(T(15)=2.239, p=0.021) as well as between ‘No’ responses of the lottery choice task 
and the bisection task (T(15)=1.766, p=0.049). Hence, the ERN amplitude is 
significantly larger for error-like choices in the lottery choice task when subjects 
decide for the lottery although the sure payoff is extremely attractive in this 
comparison. These unfavorable choices apparently cause a higher response conflict 
for the subjects. 
 
Figure 45: Mean amplitudes within 30 and 70 ms at the Fz electrode 




The present analysis investigated an ERN modulation in the presence of risk. The 
ERN component is presumed to reflect response conflicts in decision making 
processes and is associated with conflict monitoring as proposed by Botvinick et al. 
(2001). Moreover, the ERN is involved in action monitoring processes, and 
differences in its modulation can provide implications on the subjective relevance of 
a given choice task. A higher subjective relevance is presumed to evoke a more 
pronounced ERN amplitude, which implies that responses are reflected by a more 
careful comparison process, resulting in an increased response conflict. As a result 
of different response conflict levels, decision making might be influenced in its 
behavioral outcome due to a different conflict resolution. Therefore, the revelation 
of differences in conflict monitoring could serve as an indicator for verifying 
differences in neural evaluation processes of decision making even in the absence 
of behavioral differences. 
In this comparison, the ERN was used as a tool for identifying differences in the 
perception of risk. Two methods for eliciting utility functions were applied in a 
parallel experimental setup. One method represented a bisection task which 
derives a utility function of monetary outcomes that are not connected with risk. 
The other method represented a lottery choice task which derives a utility function 
of monetary outcomes in the presence of risk. Both methods yielded similar 
behavioral results (see also Morgenstern et al., 2009). However, an analysis of the 
ERN component revealed differences between both methods with reference to 
error-like unfavorable lottery choices. A higher response conflict was detected for 
choices in the lottery choice task when the sure payoff choice outperformed the 
lottery choice but the lottery was chosen. In this case, the lottery choice would 
reflect an error-like choice, and a decision for the lottery would further represent an 
unfavorable risk taking. This is in contrast to the bisection task for which an 
apparently error-like choice would not involve an additional risk taking for the 
decision maker. 
This result has also been found in the study of Heldmann et al. (2009). But in 
contrast to the present analysis, Heldmann and colleagues additionally found an 
increased ERN amplitude for the lottery choice task when the sure payoff is chosen 
but the lottery would have been the favorable choice. The absence of such a second 
increased ERN amplitude in this analysis could refer to the degree of deviation of 
the inner number value to the arithmetic center. Heldmann et al. (2009) used a 
rather similar approach but varied the inner number value up to a deviation of 400 
digits. They also showed that an adjustment of the deviation interval equidistant to 
the indifference point of apparently risk averse subjects resulted in a decreased ERN 
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for unfavorable lottery choices and in an increased ERN for unfavorable sure payoff 
choices. Hence, with an increasing deviation, an error-like choice would become 
more relevant for a subject. A maximum deviation of 300 digits would probably not 
arouse an increased response conflict for unfavorable sure payoff choices in the 
lottery choice task in contrast to the bisection task. This can be reasoned by the 
assumption that a potential risk averse behavior of the subjects would further shift 
the perception of an error-like choice toward a higher negative deviation. 
Consequently, such an assumption would suggest that the ERN amplitudes of error-
like choices could depend on the degree of risk averse behavior, resulting in a 
different subjective relevance of error-like choices. In this context, the ERN in error-
like choices in conjunction with risk would reflect the level of conflict in relation to 
an individual attitude toward the riskiness of the present choice. More precisely, 
this would indicate a relationship between risk attitudes and processes of conflict 
monitoring in which an unfavorable choice according to the individual risk attitude 
of a subject yield a higher response conflict. 
Alternatively, the absence of an increased ERN for error-like sure payoff choices 
could further indicate that unfavorable sure payoff choices are not reflected by an 
additional risk taking. This would imply that the difference of the ERN amplitude 
between both methods results from an increased level of risk. According to Yu and 
Zhou (2009), these increased ERN amplitudes can be assumed to signal the riskiness 
of choices and prepare the brain for potential negative consequences. A similar 
argumentation has also been stated by Hewig et al. (2007) who suggested that an 
increased ERN amplitude can be associated with a negative evaluation of a current 
decision and that the ERN can be connected to risk taking behavior. Hence, the ERN 
amplitude can be presumed to be sensitive toward the presence of risk, which is 
further confirmed by the present data analysis. The level of individual risk taking 
behavior modulates the ERN amplitude according to the subjective relevance of a 
potential negative outcome. 
In summary, the difference of the ERN amplitude between both utility assessment 
methods can directly be ascribed to a subjective relevance in the sensitivity of risk 
perception. Aside from an absence of behavioral differences, it has been shown that 
both evaluation processes are partially different for distinct choice task situations. 
Under the presence of risk, error-like choices in conjunction with a potentially 
unfavorable risky outcome evoke a higher response conflict for the subjects. 
Although the applied choices under risk had been hypothetical, the result indicates 
that subjects seem to be aware of the different choice task environments. This 
finding emphasizes that the perception of risk is observable in event-related brain 
potentials with reference to a distinct response conflict and that the ERN can be 
used as a tool for investigating decision making processes under risk. 




9 Indifference intervals and decision thresholds 
This chapter will provide an additional analysis of the behavioral data obtained from 
the EEG study concerning the hypothetical bias. Aside from the neurological 
research background, the data is suitable for an analysis regarding the existence of 
indifference intervals for certainty equivalents. The procedure of determining the 
individual indifference point has indicated that the subjects did not adjust their 
choice behavior constantly to a specific certainty equivalent but rather on the basis 
of a distinct area of indecisiveness. Additionally, the analysis of the P300 has shown 
that a stimulus categorization process for the indifferent choice areas is less 
pronounced, which can further be reasoned by the existence of indifference 
intervals. Therefore, this chapter will additionally analyze the behavioral data in 
more detail with a focus on the characteristics of such indifference intervals. 
Evidence will be provided that the boundaries of such intervals are systematically 
distributed and that they can be related to processes of numerical response. In this 
context, the transition in the decimal of sure payoff values seems to serve as a 
certain threshold or a focal point for the range of indifferent choices of subjects. 
9.1 Introduction to imprecision intervals 
Eliciting certainty equivalents is an essential issue in the research field of 
experimental economics. Certainty equivalents can inform researchers about risk 
attitudes of subjects in risky decision making. The certainty equivalent in binary 
lottery choice tasks represents a point at which a subject values a risky and a 
riskless alternative equally, indicating indifference between these two alternatives. 
The certainty equivalent of a subject is a precise value and therefore enables a 
defined determination of risk attitudes. But determining an exact certainty 
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equivalent for a subject is different to observations in lab experiments. Subjects are 
often unsure about the exact point at which they are indifferent between two 
alternatives and tend to respond more intuitively to such questions in an 
experiment (see Butler and Loomes, 1988). 
Basically, a non-exact certainty equivalent can be reasoned by an error rate of the 
subjects in multiple choice task experiments (e.g. Hey, 2001, 2005) but also by an 
intentional range of indifference around the supposed certainty equivalent (e.g. 
Butler and Loomes, 1988). Error rates of subjects are a non-negligible distortion of 
choice behavior but are presumably underlying a more random incidence. In this 
context, a potential range of indifference can be ascribed to a more systematic 
imprecision of choice behavior directly related to an uncertainty of subjects in 
decision making around the certainty equivalent. Butler and Loomes (1988) 
described this imprecision as a ‘sphere of haziness’. 
With reference to a systematic imprecision of choice behavior, Beach et al. (1974) 
investigated the accuracy of judgments and ranges of subjectively acceptable 
judgment errors in experiments and enunciated the term ‘equivalence interval’. 
Furthermore, MacCrimmon and Smith (1986) initially described an imprecision in 
certainty equivalents as ‘imprecise equivalences’. The suggestion of MacCrimmon 
and Smith (1986), that the presence of ‘imprecise equivalences’ in certainty 
equivalents can potentially explain the phenomenon of the preference reversal, was 
enhanced and further investigated by Loomes (1988) and Butler and Loomes (1988, 
2007). Butler and Loomes argue that individuals cannot state their true certainty 
equivalent with complete confidence and “[…] that even for simple lotteries 
involving just two monetary consequences well within normal experience and 
straightforward probabilities, many people find it difficult to be precise about their 
certainty equivalent valuation.“ (Butler and Loomes, 1988, p. 193) As a 
consequence, the certainty equivalent is not an exact value but rather reflects an 
interval of imprecision. This supposition differs from an interpretation that the 
presence of imprecise responses is referred to an error rate of subjects. In this 
respect, the certainty equivalent reflects an exact value with a distinct error term 
that is related to a kind of noise in the responses of the subjects. Hey (2001) 
analyzed this noise in subjects’ responses concerning its consistency in repeated 
experiments. He found that for some subjects the variability decreased across 
repetitions but an overall decrease could not be confirmed. Hence, subjects are able 
to get more precise in their responses but an interval of imprecision still remains. 
Moreover, the presence of imprecision intervals may further reflect the result of a 
numerical response interval for certainty equivalents. According to Spengler and 
Vogt (2008), a set of reasonable alternatives on a numerical stimulus is generated 
through an iterative numerical response process. In this comparison, the width of 
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an imprecise interval represents the degree of exactness of a response regarding 
the individual certainty equivalent of a subject. Furthermore, the boundaries of 
these intervals reflect the perception of numbers in the decimal system and the 
frequency scale of these boundary values rely on the theory of prominence (see 
Albers and Albers, 1983; Vogt and Albers, 1992; Albers, 1997; Albers, 2000). 
According to prominence theory, some numbers are more easily accessible to 
individuals than others which are labeled as ‘prominent’. Prominent numbers in a 
decimal system are the powers of 10 (10𝑧 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍), their halves (5 ∙ 10𝑧 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍) and 
their doubles (2 ∙ 10𝑧 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍). Hence, especially ‘0’ and ‘5’ are the most frequent last 
digits of the interval boundaries related to this type of numerical response process. 
This would imply that the range of imprecision has a distinct characteristic around 
an individual certainty equivalent. 
In this context, these interval boundaries can also be described as psychological 
thresholds indicating a change in choice preferences. Psychological thresholds in 
choices have been enunciated by Georgescu-Roegen (1958) and are generally 
discussed and investigated in marketing research in terms of price thresholds (e.g. 
Monroe, 1971, 1973; Han et al., 2001). In this respect, the location of price 
thresholds is also assigned to prominent numbers of the decimal system. Aside from 
marketing research, Sugden (1995) described a theory of focal points which decision 
makers use to indentify strategies in coordination games. These focal points can be 
ascribed to a kind of psychological anchor in decision making and may rely on the 
fact that individuals are using mental heuristics for facilitating the decision making 
process. In this respect, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) also discussed heuristics 
occurring in judgments under uncertainty which can result in behavioral biases. In 
summary, psychological aspects regarding individual decision making have to be 
taken into account, and even for the elicitation of certainty equivalents, 
psychological thresholds for determining a decision are presumed to exist. Hence, 
the question arises whether a potential interval of indifference in the valuation of 
certainty equivalents is reflected by a systematic distribution in its boundaries 
caused by psychological thresholds. 
Behavioral data from an EEG study can be used to analyze the presence of 
imprecision intervals in certainty equivalent valuation tasks and their potential 
relationship to psychological thresholds. There are two advantages why these data 
are suitable for an analysis of imprecision intervals: (1) The data provide a high 
amount of repetitions of the same choice task, and (2) the variation of the certainty 
equivalent is applied in a small step size. Thus, the high amount of repetitions 
should reduce the noise in the subjects’ decisions while the small step size of the 
offered sure payoff allows for a detailed determination of an area for which 
subjects are indifferent or imprecise in their choices. Therefore, the present section 
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reconsiders the behavioral data of the EEG study concerning the hypothetical bias 
with reference to a detailed analysis of imprecision intervals. 
9.2 Material and Methods 
The experimental method has already been described in the study concerning the 
hypothetical bias. Therefore, only a short recapitulation on the main issues of the 
experimental procedure, those which are important for the subsequent analysis, is 
presented. For a detailed comparison, see section 6.2.1 of this work. 
As mentioned before, 21 subjects took part in two EEG sessions in which a method 
for eliciting certainty equivalents was applied in a standard gamble approach. Both 
experimental sessions comprised equal choice settings in which one session 
comprised hypothetical payoffs and the other session real payoffs. The subjects’ 
task was to choose between a fifty-fifty lottery and a sure payoff. The low payoff of 
the binary lottery was set to 0 euros. The high payoff of the binary lottery was at 
about 100 euros, meaning that the payoff was varied in eight values between 100 
and 107 euros. The sure payoff was assigned to values of 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 
80 and 90 euros. Furthermore, each sure payoff value was varied in the last number 
digit between 0 and 7, resulting in values from 10 to 17, 20 to 27, 30 to 37 and so 
forth. Hence, a total amount of 576 decision trials were presented to the subjects 
by combining all lottery payoff settings with all sure payoff values. This amount was 
necessary to ensure that enough decision trials could be provided for the EEG 
analysis. During the experiment, each decision trial was randomly assigned to the 
subject. The random order of all decision trials should therefore avoid order effects 
in the frequency of choices. Furthermore, each decision trial lasted about 3 
seconds. Despite the high time pressure, almost all decision trials (mean rate of 
missing values=0.006, SD=0.016) were responded by each subject.  
9.3 Behavioral analysis concerning the range of 
indifference 
In the analysis of the behavioral data, the relative frequency of lottery choices was 
analyzed according to the normalized distance of the sure payoff compared to the 
expected value of the lottery. Previously, the data had been analyzed for an 
accumulated choice frequency within an interval of 5 units in the distance category 
(for a review see Figure 10, p. 55). In a more detailed comparison, Figure 46 depicts 
the relative lottery choice frequency over all subjects for every distance category. In 
this analysis, a distinct pattern in choice frequency can be observed, indicating 
decision thresholds for certain areas in a constant interval. As can be seen, a kind of 
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plateaus and thresholds for the relative lottery choices is obtained reflected by a 
steeper change in choice frequency for a frequent interval with 10 number digits. 
 
Figure 46: Relative frequency of lottery choices illustrated for the smallest step size in the distance category 
This descriptive consistency is presumed to be related to the characteristic of the 
presented sure payoff value. Therefore, the relative choice frequency is directly 
analyzed by the sure payoff without a normalized comparison to the expected value 
of the binary lottery. In this respect, the relative choice frequency is estimated 
according to the presented sure payoff value within an interval of 3 number digits 
for the first digits of a decimal (0-2) and for the later digits (5-7) in equal distance. 
Figure 47 shows the relative frequency of lottery choices in these categories (see 
also Table D1 and D2 of Appendix D). Again, a characteristic pattern of steeper 
changes in choice frequency for a transition from one decimal to another can be 
observed. 
 
Figure 47: Relative frequency of lottery choices in the first (0-2) and the last (5-7) number digits of the sure 
payoff values 
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Subsequently, the mean rate of change in the relative choice frequency from one 
category to another will be calculated for every subject. The rate of change inside a 
decimal, which is the change from the ‘0-2’ category to the ‘5-7’ category, has a 
mean of 0.032 (SD=0.026) in the hypothetical treatment and a mean of 0.037 
(SD=0.019) in the real treatment. In contrast, the rate of change from one decimal 
to another, which is the change from the ‘5-7’ category to the ‘0-2’ category, has a 
mean of 0.088 (SD=0.029) in the hypothetical treatment and a mean of 0.080 
(SD=0.021) in the real treatment. 
The mean rate of change of every subject separated by these two categories is 
displayed in Table 2. As can be seen, the mean rate of change inside a decimal is 
only for 3 out of 21 subjects higher than the mean rate of change from one decimal 
to another in both treatments. This observation is significant for a binomial test on 
a 1 % significance level. Even for a comparison of both treatments, 5 out of 21 
subjects show a higher mean rate of change inside a decimal, which is still 
significant on a 5 % level for a binomial test.  
Table 2: Mean rates of change within a decimal and in the transition of a decimal 
 hypothetical treatment real treatment 
subject Mean rate of change within a decimal 
Mean rate of change in the 
transition of a decimal 
Mean rate of change 
within a decimal 
Mean rate of change in 
the transition of a decimal 
1 0.074 0.042 0.050 0.068 
2 0.037 0.078 0.039 0.081 
3 0.032 0.089 0.025 0.097 
4 0.028 0.094 0.042 0.078 
5 0.088 0.021 0.074 0.036 
6 0.000 0.120 0.037 0.083 
7 0.001 0.119 0.037 0.083 
8 0.032 0.083 0.060 0.052 
9 0.000 0.125 -0.005 0.130 
10 0.037 0.083 0.042 0.078 
11 0.028 0.093 0.028 0.083 
12 0.032 0.083 0.042 0.078 
13 0.005 0.120 0.051 0.063 
14 0.028 0.083 0.015 0.109 
15 0.032 0.089 0.023 0.099 
16 0.031 0.090 0.028 0.094 
17 0.083 0.031 0.014 0.089 
18 0.001 0.124 0.022 0.094 
19 0.051 0.068 0.068 0.043 
20 0.028 0.094 0.044 0.075 
21 0.013 0.110 0.047 0.073 
mean 0.032 0.088 0.037 0.080 
SD 0.026 0.029 0.019 0.021 
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This result shows that the change of the decimal value leads to a higher change in 
choice frequencies by the subjects. This higher rate of change can supposedly be 
obtained by subjects who adjust their choice behavior in these areas. For a detailed 
review of this supposition, the range of indifferent choices is determined for every 
subject (see also Table D3 of Appendix D), which reflects the region of changing 
from one choice alternative to another. 
Therefore, a region is identified in which the relative frequency of lottery choices 
constantly changes from one to zero. This region refers to an individual area of 
indifference, for which a lower and upper boundary can be obtained. According to 
an increasing sure payoff value, the lower boundary reflects the change from a sure 
choice for the lottery to an area of indifferent choices. In contrast, the upper 
boundary reflects the change from an area of indifferent choices to a sure choice of 
the sure payoff. In this comparison, the mean sure payoff value of the lower 
boundary is 40.10 (SD=10.93) for hypothetical choices and 35.76 (SD=10.57) for real 
choices. The upper boundary of the indifference interval has an averaged sure 
payoff value of 47.33 (SD=12.45) for hypothetical choices and 45.33 (SD=11.11) for 
real choices. The lower boundary value between the hypothetical and the real 
treatment differs significantly for a pair-wise Wilcoxon signed-rank test (V=104, 
p=0.013). In contrast, the difference of the upper boundary between both 
treatments is not significant. Thus, the previously found evidence of this study (see 
section 6.3.1) that real choices evoke higher risk aversion is further reflected by an 
earlier change from choices for the lottery to choices for the sure payoff. 
Furthermore, the averaged width of the indifference interval was estimated for 
hypothetical choices at 8.24 (SD=3.74) and for real choices at 10.57 (SD=5.78) which 
reflects 9.8 % of all choices in the hypothetical treatment and 12.4 % of all choices 
in the real treatment. The difference in the width of the indifference interval 
between both treatments is significant for a one-sided pair-wise t-test (t=-1.7618, 
p=0.047). This indicates that subjects have a broader indifference interval when 
choices are for real.  
In this context, the potential error rate of subjects has to be reviewed in general 
due to the fact that over 500 decisions were performed within a short amount of 
time. Therefore, the amount of imprecise choices, or rather ambiguous choices, for 
each sure payoff value was examined. Ambiguous choices were determined by a 
relative frequency in the sure payoff category that is unequal to zero or one (see 
also Table D4 of Appendix D). In the hypothetical treatment, 19.2 % of all sure 
payoff categories were reflected by ambiguous choices and 17.5 % in the real 
treatment. In this comparison, choices of the indifference area are included. 
Ambiguous choices that can directly be assigned to potential errors are on average 
at 9.4 % for hypothetical choices and at 5 % for real choices. The error rate exclusive 
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of indifferent choices is significantly different between both treatments for a pair-
wise Wilcoxon signed-rank test (V=146.5, p=0.008). Thus, the subjects were more 
precise in their choices outside their indifference interval for real choices. 
Finally, the boundaries of the indifference intervals will be examined in more detail 
with regard to the last number digit of the related sure payoff value. According to 
the experimental procedure, all sure payoff values included eight last digits (0-7). 
Consequently, the amount of interval boundary values for each ending digit was 
calculated and is presented in Table 3.  
Table 3: Occurrences of last number digits in interval boundaries 




















0 10 7 11 3 
1 3 3 2 3 
2 2 1 0 4 
3 3 1 2 3 
4 1 0 2 0 
5 1 2 1 1 
6 0 3 1 2 
7 1 4 2 5 
As can be seen, the amount of lower interval boundary values at the ‘0’ digit is 
extremely high, indicating that 10 out of 21 lower interval boundary values for 
hypothetical choices and 11 out of 21 for real choices are located at the beginning 
of a decimal. Assuming that a uniform distribution among the eight digits is existent, 
these amounts are significantly different from such a distribution on a 0.1 % 
significant level for a performed binomial test. Furthermore, even if such a 
clustering at ’0’ can be ascribed to the missing number digits of ‘8’ and ‘9’, the 
uniform distribution for this cluster is also rejected by a one-sided binomial test on 
a 5 % level of significance. Thus, the occurrence of the lower interval boundary 
values at the beginning of a decimal is systematic. The subjects seemed to have a 
preferred threshold for which they are changing from a sure lottery choice to a 
range of indifferent choices. In contrast, this pattern cannot be confirmed for the 
upper interval boundary. There seem to be a tendency for hypothetical choices, but 
these observations are not significant.  
 




The characteristic pattern of plateaus and thresholds in the behavioral data can be 
traced back to the existence of indifference intervals and to the systematic location 
of the corresponding boundaries caused by processes related to numerical 
response. These results contribute to the line of argumentation of Butler and 
Loomes (1988) of ‘imprecise intervals’, that an individual can be unsure about his or 
her true certainty equivalent. In contrast to Butler and Loomes, the imprecise 
intervals of this study were revealed through a process of repetition instead of 
asking the subjects about their own confidence in the responses. An area of 
indifference was determined for a sequence of choices in which the relative choice 
frequency constantly changes from one to zero. As a result, interval boundaries of 
imprecise choices were obtained. A further examination revealed that the values of 
the lower interval boundary are highly accumulated to the first number digit of a 
decimal of the sure payoff value. Thus, it can be concluded that the initiation of an 
area of imprecision is related to the appearance of the sure payoff value. The 
transition of the decimal seems to serve as a kind of focal point for the subjects. 
Each subject appears to set a response threshold from which each choice task is 
evaluated, and the beginning of a new decimal interval of the sure payoff value 
could be the most pronounced focal point. This kind of heuristic facilitates the 
decision making process and reduces the complexity for the subjects. Interestingly, 
a significant accumulation of the upper interval boundary values is not found, which 
indicates that an overall interval-related decision evaluation is missing. The end of 
the imprecision area depends on the individual degree of imprecision of each 
subject and is not systematically distributed. According to a numerical response 
process as introduced by Spengler and Vogt (2008), it can be confirmed that the 
response interval is partially related to prominent numbers, indicated by an 
accumulation of boundary values at ‘0’. 
Furthermore, the high amount of choice tasks shed light on the averaged error rate 
or noisiness of the subjects’ responses. The majority of all ambiguous choices, 
which could reflect potential response errors, can be assigned to the indifference 
interval. Aside from the determined indifference intervals, the error rate is quite 
small (<0.1) for an experiment in which the predetermined response time is very 
short. Thus, the noise of the subjects’ responses is mostly assigned to an area of 
imprecision around the indifference points, and the argumentation of noise in 
behavioral data (see Hey, 2005) can be ascribed to such intervals. The subjects are 
rather certain about their decisions outside the indifference interval even in case of 
high time pressure. 
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The finding of decision thresholds with regard to a transition in decimal values can 
be connected with the research on price thresholds in the marketing literature. 
Here, the price sensitivity of customers should increase when a certain price 
threshold is exceeded. Price thresholds are broadly discussed, but an overall 
validation is still absent. Some studies confirmed the existence of such price 
thresholds, others did not (see Gedenk and Sattler, 1999). But if so, price thresholds 
are generally supposed to emerge between price endings from ‘9’ to ‘0’. This 
pattern is also present if the relative frequency is considered as a demand rate and 
the sure payoff value as a price of sale. 
The transition of decimals seems to be an important signal in the perception and 
judgment of numerical stimuli. Hence, processes of numerical response should be 
reconsidered in the validation of eliciting certainty equivalents. As a consequence, 
the presence of imprecise intervals along with a systematic focus on prominent 






Thus far, the present work has investigated neural processes regarding individual 
decision making behavior under risk. The major purpose of this work has been to 
provide neural inferences on the behavioral effects of incentive structures and the 
suitability of payoff mechanisms in experimental economics. Therefore, two EEG 
studies have been conducted in which three different payoff mechanisms were 
investigated with reference to conflict monitoring. In these studies, the N200 
component served as an indicator for the level of conflict in the evaluation process 
of choice tasks. In addition to behavioral differences, the results of the EEG data 
have shown a characteristic pattern of the N200 in relation to the different choice 
task situations and with respect to the underlying incentive structure. Basically, for 
all applied payoff mechanisms a higher level of conflict was detected for choices 
around an area of indifference. Distinct differences in the level of conflict between 
the applied payoff mechanisms were solely detectable outside an indifference area.  
This stands to reason a more general decision conflict for indifferent choices which 
may superpose incentive-related differences in the level of conflict. In this respect, 
the increased level of conflict for indifferent choices is therefore not surprising but 
rather expectable since the demand for a decision in case of indifference apparently 
evokes a decision conflict for a subject. Hence, the attention has to be drawn to an 
area in which the subjects have a strong preference for a distinct choice alternative. 
In this area, the analyzed N200 component differs across the applied payoff 
mechanisms. According to the experimental choice task, the level of conflict for 
unambiguous choice preferences can be distinguished between risky choices 
(lottery choices) and riskless choices (sure payoff choices). The following table 




conflict has decreased for risky and riskless choices in relation to choices of the 
indifference area. 
Table 4: Comparison of the applied payoff mechanisms regarding a decreasing level of conflict 
 Sure risky choices Sure riskless choices 
Random payoff mechanism Yes Yes 
Flat-rate payoff mechanism No No 
Averaged payoff mechanism No Yes 
In this comparison, the random payoff mechanism reveals a decreasing level of 
conflict for both sure choice categories, which indicates that the appearing decision 
conflict for indifferent choice is dissolved for choices in which subjects have a strong 
preference. This finding reflects an expectable pattern for a decision conflict that is 
solely related to an uncertainness of the subjects in case of indifference. The results 
do not provide evidence for an additional decision conflict in the random payoff 
mechanism. Hence, if the increased level of conflict represents the uncertainness of 
indifferent choices, then the decreasing level of conflict indicates that subjects are 
more confident in their decision. As a result of this neural evidence, the area in 
which the conflict is increased can be assumed to represent the true indifference 
area. Consequently, the individual choice behavior underlying the random payoff 
mechanism is reflected by truthful responses. 
This pattern cannot be confirmed for choice tasks underlying the flat-rate payoff 
mechanism. A decreasing level of conflict is absent, and in comparison to the 
random payoff mechanism, the level conflict is significantly increased outside the 
indifference area. Hence, there is evidence that the decision conflict is higher for 
hypothetical choices. Furthermore, this increased conflict cannot be related to the 
uncertainness of indifferent choices. As a consequence, this finding indicates the 
presence of an additional source of conflict during decision making, which suggests 
that this kind of choice behavior cannot be related to truthful responses. The 
additional decision conflict can further be assumed to affect the individual choice 
behavior, resulting in the detected behavioral differences. Thus, the absence of an 
incentive structure in relation to the choice task yields a distinct decision conflict 
which biases the individual choice behavior. 
The averaged payoff mechanism also evokes an additional decision conflict that 
cannot be related to an uncertainness of indifferent choices. But in contrast to the 
flat-rate payoff mechanism, the increased level of conflict outside the indifference 
area is only present for risky choices. This pattern can be reasoned by the 
characteristic of the underlying incentive structure. Subjects are incentivized to 
generate portfolio choices which provoke a non-independent evaluation of the 




and that they are also aware of forming portfolios, then these individuals would 
have to deviate from their true indifference point of an independent decision to a 
more risk neutral position. Hence, these subjects have to dispose their choice 
behavior according to a more frequent choice of risky decisions, which may induce 
an additional decision conflict for these risky choices. As a consequence, the higher 
level of conflict for risky choices can be related to the awareness of forming 
portfolio choices. This implies that a choice task in the averaged payoff mechanism 
is not evaluated independently.  
Concerning a comparison of the investigated payoff mechanisms with reference to a 
methodological applicability for experiments on individual decision making 
behavior, the implications on the results of the two EEG studies would infer that the 
random payoff mechanism is most suitable for these kinds of experiments. The EEG 
analysis has shown that the random payoff mechanism causes least decision 
conflicts. Moreover, no neural evidence was found that indicates a diverging 
decision conflict in the evaluation process between the applied incentive structure 
and other motivational influences on the decision. With respect to the averaged 
payoff mechanism, the EEG data further indicates that the random payoff 
mechanism induces an independent evaluation of multiple choice tasks. Admittedly, 
a direct comparison to a single choice task experiment is not possible. This would 
have afforded a direct analysis regarding the influence of multiple decisions on the 
individual choice behavior. However, the neurological indications argue for a 
suitability of the random payoff mechanism in multiple choice task experiments. 
In contrast, the flat-rate payoff mechanism cannot be described as suitable for 
investigating individual decision making behavior. An absence of a task-related 
incentive structure causes a different choice behavior yielding a hypothetical bias. 
Hypothetical choices provoke additional decision conflicts which are presumably 
responsible for the different choice behavior. Hence, behavioral results derived 
from the flat-rate payoff mechanism cannot provide reliability for truthful 
responses since the results may be influenced by a decision conflict that is not 
present in real decision situations. 
In this comparison, the averaged payoff mechanism remains ambiguous. The 
behavioral data show that there is no apparent portfolio effect yielding a 
modification of risk attitudes. But there is an influence on the individual choice 
behavior and there is neural evidence for an additional decision conflict for risky 
choices. Thus, the incentive structure of the averaged payoff mechanism differently 
modulates the decision making process in contrast to the random payoff 
mechanism, indicating an awareness for a non-independent evaluation of the 




as suitable for experiments on individual choice behavior since an independence of 
choices is not warranted by the neural evidence. 
In summary, the neural as well as the behavioral evidence of this work fits into 
other behavioral findings of empirical investigations concerning the applicability of 
payoff mechanisms in experimental economics. As previous behavioral studies have 
shown (see Starmer and Sugden, 1991; Cubitt et al., 1998; Hey and Lee, 2005), the 
random payoff mechanism is applicable for inducing an independent choice task 
evaluation in multiple choice task experiments. This conclusion can deductively be 
supported by the neural analysis of this work. However, a direct comparison to a 
single choice task experiment cannot be provided, which would have indicated a 
potential cross task contamination effect as revealed by Cox et al. (2011). 
Furthermore, an implication for a decreasing importance of choices in the random 
payoff mechanism can also not be specified. According to the argument of Wilcox 
(1993), that the probability of a decision being selected needs to be sufficiently 
large in order to exert an appropriate effort, the huge amount of choices would 
result in a negligible probability of each choice task for being chosen. This would 
imply that even real choices would have become rather hypothetical. In this 
context, the observed differences between hypothetical and real choices 
emphasizes that real choices of the random payoff mechanism are perceived 
differently in contrast to hypothetical choices. This indicates that both incentive 
structures have a different influence on the choice behavior. Thus, the subjects 
were apparently aware of a potential realization of each choice task which supports 
the assumption of conditional rationality. Moreover, the evidence for a hypothetical 
bias, which has also been shown in other studies (see Holt and Laury, 2002; 
Harrison, 2004), can additionally be explained by the EEG data, indicating an 
additional decision conflict for hypothetical choices. This strongly recommends the 
application of a task-related incentive structure in economic experiments and 
disproves the reliability of the flat-rate payoff mechanism. In this respect, the 
averaged payoff mechanism provides a task-related incentive structure, but these 
incentives do not provide an independent choice task evaluation. The behavioral 
result in this work concerning a portfolio effect lacks in its expressiveness, which 
may also explain the ambiguous findings of other studies (see Selten et al., 1999; 
Laury, 2006; Lawson and Lawson, 2011). But the EEG results provide an indication 
for a non-independent evaluation and, consequently, serve as an argument for the 
presence of a portfolio effect. The evidence of different neural processing between 
the random payoff mechanism and the averaged payoff mechanism suggests that 
the averaged payoff mechanism is unsuitable when an independent choice task 




Aside from the focus on conflict monitoring, both EEG studies have been analyzed in 
relation to event categorization as suggested by Kok (2001). This analysis provided a 
general review of stimuli processing for lottery choice tasks. According to the 
assumption of event categorization, it can be concluded that choices of the 
indifference area are more difficult to classify by the subjects with reference to a 
distinct response. Additionally, a different stimulus processing of risky and riskless 
choices could be revealed. Risky choices outside the indifference area allocate more 
attentional resources, indicating a kind of awareness toward the riskiness of such a 
decision. Furthermore, the stimulus categorization process is less pronounced in the 
averaged payoff mechanism. This further indicates that the choice task alternatives 
are less categorized by the subjects. As a consequence, this analysis provides an 
additional implication for portfolio-based thinking of the subjects because a strong 
classification for a risky or riskless choice is not present.  
In addition to a neuroeconomic investigation of incentive structures, this work has 
further studied the subjective relevance of risk during decision making. A third EEG 
study investigated the appearance of error-like response conflicts in the presence of 
risk. The results of the EEG analysis have shown that there is a difference in error-
like response conflicts between risky and riskless choice tasks. Hence, the presence 
of risk evokes an additional error-like response conflict. This result supports 
previous findings of a study by Heldmann et al. (2009) and provides evidence for the 
subjective relevance of risk. Moreover, the findings of Heldmann et al. (2009) in 
comparison to the present analysis indicate that the error-like response conflict can 
further be related to the individual risk attitude. In this respect, the appearance of 
the error-like response conflict supposedly depends on the disparity between an 
unfavorable choice in relation to an individual indifference position since the error-
like response conflict is more pronounced for an increased disparity (see Heldmann 
et al., 2009). Hence, the level of a response conflict in decision making under risk 
depends on the individual position of the indifference point. This would imply that 
the risk attitude of the subjects can further be derived and verified from such a 
neural indicator. 
Finally, this work has utilized the huge amount of behavioral data to analyze 
individual choice behavior with reference to imprecision intervals (see Butler and 
Loomes, 1988). In this respect, it was found that such intervals, located around the 
individual indifference point of the subjects, are arranged according to a specific 
heuristic. In the investigated lottery choice task, the change in choice behavior from 
an explicit lottery choice preference to an area of indifference is frequently located 
at the beginning of a new decimal of the sure payoff value. Thus, the transition of a 
decimal seems to serve as a decision threshold for an adjustment of choice 




and the focus on the beginning of a new decimal can be related to prominent 
numbers.  
Summing up, this work has shown that an application of neurological methods to 
economic experiments can provide additional inferences and implications on 
research question in experimental economics. With reference to individual decision 
making behavior under risk, the EEG technique can serve as a tool for revealing the 
neural underpinnings of the decision making process. The characteristics of event-
related potentials and their functional modulation to specific choice tasks allow for 
a formulation of research hypotheses that directly addresses distinct aspects of the 
decision making process. Especially cognitive ERP components, like the N200, the 
P300, and the ERN, are appropriate objects of investigation for analyzing the 
decision making process. In this respect, the model of conflict monitoring provides a 
suitable neurological construct that can be applied to EEG paradigms with a focus 
on cognitive processes. Thus, the EEG technique by itself may not be the state of 
the art in neuroeconomic research but does also afford reasonable fields of 
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Appendix A: Data from the EEG study concerning the hypothetical bias 
Table A1: Individual choice behavior of both treatments 
subject total amount of lottery choices 
total amount of 
sure payoff choices 
determined individual 
indifference point 
No. Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real 
1 217 237 357 327 -8 -4 
2 317 313 254 262 7 6 
3 177 158 399 417 -15 -18 
4 258 294 317 282 -2 3 
5 105 108 470 468 -27 -26 
6 205 153 370 422 -11 -19 
7 114 116 462 460 -25 -25 
8 191 193 385 383 -13 -13 
9 171 186 405 389 -16 -14 
10 274 263 299 313 -1 -2 
11 189 180 386 396 -13 -14 
12 324 261 251 313 7 -2 
13 250 228 326 348 -4 -6 
14 235 197 339 379 -7 -12 
15 285 320 257 254 4 7 
16 122 85 453 490 -24 -29 
17 314 211 262 364 6 -10 
18 245 237 329 314 -6 -4 
19 271 262 305 314 -1 -2 
20 272 126 303 406 -1 -23 
21 94 67 481 509 -28 -32 
median 235 197 339 379 -7 -12 














No. Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real 
1 0.849 5.173 1.469 -1.621 2.492 0.792 3.422 5.688 
2 4.956 6.865 3.889 8.256 7.058 5.484 7.179 9.355 
3 4.438 8.591 5.690 1.564 6.673 0.180 4.315 6.211 
4 -0.754 1.237 1.398 -0.473 1.495 3.035 2.466 2.790 
5 10.804 8.192 11.731 5.156 5.769 3.638 3.632 5.053 
6 -1.439 -2.788 -3.130 -3.974 -1.607 -1.002 1.184 0.920 
7 7.302 8.252 6.337 7.512 6.931 7.595 3.647 9.405 
8 -0.850 5.851 0.587 3.201 2.660 5.521 5.793 3.179 
9 0.467 -0.572 -0.990 -0.087 1.384 0.410 -1.362 0.661 
10 3.900 9.511 4.497 9.647 2.844 7.130 2.856 13.153 
11 1.429 3.408 2.522 1.861 2.950 0.822 6.228 2.370 
12 -2.266 -2.426 -1.045 -0.342 0.740 -5.265 1.817 -0.597 
13 2.974 2.295 1.894 3.264 -0.090 2.092 1.460 2.311 
14 7.884 1.452 3.608 3.139 5.162 1.653 2.791 1.198 
15 -6.070 -5.492 -5.218 -6.791 -3.922 -4.111 -4.842 -4.429 
16 -0.935 0.693 -0.773 -0.043 3.844 -0.502 3.747 1.081 
17 3.545 1.626 3.885 3.875 1.662 1.288 -0.543 -1.954 
18 -1.670 2.891 -3.243 0.671 0.938 2.161 -0.395 5.823 
19 1.157 4.038 0.162 1.932 -2.493 0.123 -2.578 -2.266 
20 2.703 12.012 3.200 10.859 6.328 10.516 5.645 12.820 
21 -2.933 1.248 -2.693 1.664 -4.976 1.327 -2.436 0.269 
mean 1.690 3.431 1.608 2.346 2.183 2.042 2.096 3.478 
SE 0.876 0.974 0.847 0.939 0.763 0.812 0.693 1.037 
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No. Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real 
1 -0.218 6.478 3.398 2.378 5.661 3.951 6.564 7.826 
2 8.061 7.985 4.113 9.581 7.934 6.735 7.167 9.900 
3 12.258 15.778 13.158 9.280 11.303 9.067 10.982 13.811 
4 1.988 5.633 3.619 3.419 3.903 6.731 4.614 4.669 
5 13.625 9.438 14.952 7.502 4.571 6.839 7.221 5.401 
6 5.065 -1.023 4.851 0.856 5.472 6.066 8.132 6.094 
7 13.990 12.255 9.403 10.394 12.446 11.790 7.395 17.057 
8 0.196 7.438 -0.032 4.511 1.715 6.196 5.765 5.293 
9 -0.306 -1.360 -2.413 -1.060 1.996 -1.043 0.080 -0.146 
10 1.651 8.972 5.857 9.853 3.027 7.706 2.518 12.345 
11 1.351 3.287 1.483 2.495 1.624 2.435 5.264 2.969 
12 4.310 6.755 1.630 4.944 6.429 0.721 5.670 3.396 
13 4.030 3.515 5.861 4.227 3.779 3.450 3.620 2.924 
14 7.955 0.798 2.788 3.784 4.328 2.634 2.159 2.835 
15 -6.289 -6.778 -7.507 -6.108 -7.660 -4.959 -6.057 -3.055 
16 3.267 3.719 1.882 3.368 3.818 1.859 6.773 2.762 
17 6.290 2.016 3.859 4.212 3.942 2.390 0.787 0.339 
18 -1.116 5.420 -1.053 3.617 1.683 5.066 2.235 6.412 
19 0.707 -0.653 -2.834 -2.050 -3.453 -3.032 -2.411 -0.949 
20 2.410 11.153 4.669 10.203 7.247 11.726 5.517 12.989 
21 -3.279 4.014 -0.501 5.237 -4.309 5.800 -1.199 6.173 
mean 3.616 4.992 3.199 4.316 3.593 4.387 3.943 5.669 
SE 1.157 1.139 1.122 0.933 1.024 0.940 0.881 1.131 














No. Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real 
1 1.711 6.633 3.481 5.544 3.278 3.838 4.790 6.996 
2 8.742 6.942 6.327 9.696 7.082 6.448 8.229 9.203 
3 13.871 11.799 14.039 8.763 12.579 9.292 14.387 12.771 
4 6.510 8.586 6.031 6.468 6.923 7.074 6.510 4.485 
5 11.563 9.732 9.323 6.778 1.941 6.183 6.928 4.504 
6 10.953 4.611 10.766 7.907 12.655 10.764 15.122 12.114 
7 14.995 9.875 9.851 8.886 13.385 12.223 10.130 16.270 
8 6.364 11.394 5.467 6.719 8.717 11.826 10.616 9.983 
9 1.876 2.526 0.552 1.631 3.686 1.904 0.786 2.531 
10 2.699 9.465 6.376 11.011 5.160 9.138 6.168 12.748 
11 3.234 3.569 2.756 2.690 1.942 3.095 5.278 3.579 
12 9.831 10.494 8.069 9.065 11.204 6.694 10.722 8.294 
13 5.490 5.453 10.215 5.605 7.789 5.789 4.837 5.157 
14 8.328 2.672 3.322 4.722 5.523 4.817 2.995 5.468 
15 0.195 -4.484 -2.667 -0.922 -2.733 -0.900 -0.166 1.040 
16 4.408 4.281 2.564 6.291 6.061 3.814 6.830 4.107 
17 10.447 4.585 8.538 6.924 6.516 4.848 4.970 4.741 
18 3.200 9.934 3.063 7.818 6.543 10.801 4.133 7.917 
19 2.478 2.115 -0.137 -0.901 -1.082 0.057 2.246 1.876 
20 5.084 10.025 6.836 12.304 10.841 13.852 7.907 13.401 
21 -3.615 5.375 -1.567 5.412 -3.821 8.490 1.750 6.516 
mean 6.113 6.456 5.391 6.305 5.914 6.669 6.437 7.319 
SE 1.035 0.874 0.950 0.754 1.064 0.873 0.893 0.925 
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Table A5: Results of performed ANOVA for mean amplitudes within 270 and 370 ms 
at the midline electrodes (Fz, Cz, Pz) 
factor/ interaction degree of freedom 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) F-value 
p-value 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
anterior posterior position 1.554 25.414 0.000*** 
treatment 1.000 2.541 0.127 
choice 1.000 0.783 0.387 
indifferent position 1.000 10.145 0.005** 
anterior posterior position x 
treatment 1.635 1.269 0.289 
anterior posterior position x 
choice 1.514 0.781 0.434 
anterior posterior position x 
indifferent position 1.322 0.241 0.694 
treatment x choice 1.000 0.061 0.807 
treatment x indifferent 
position 1.000 1.390 0.252 
choice x indifferent position 1.000 0.191 0.667 
anterior posterior position x 
treatment x choice 1.822 2.390 0.110 
anterior posterior position x 
treatment x indifferent 
position 
1.361 5.911 0.014* 
anterior posterior position x 
choice x indifferent position 1.648 0.092 0.878 
treatment x choice x 
indifferent position 1.000 0.343 0.565 
anterior posterior position x 
treatment x choice x 
indifferent position 
1.687 0.032 0.951 
 
Table A6: Results of performed ANOVA for mean amplitudes 
within 270 and 370 ms at the Fz electrode 
factor/ interaction degree of freedom 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) F-value 
p-value 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
treatment 1.000 2.429 0.135 
choice 1.000 0.162 0.692 
indifferent position 1.000 7.417 0.013* 
treatment x choice 1.000 1.321 0.264 
treatment x indifferent 
position 1.000 4.990 0.037
* 
choice x indifferent position 1.000 0.049 0.827 
treatment x choice x 
indifferent position 1.000 0.286 0.599 
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Table A7: Results of one-sided pair-wise t-tests for mean amplitudes 
within 270 and 370 ms at the Fz electrode 
pair degree of freedom T-value p-value 
bin 1: sure choice for lottery 
hypothetical vs. real 20 -2.245 0.018
* 
bin 2: indifferent choice for lottery 
hypothetical vs. real 20 -1.021 0.160 
bin 3: indifferent choice for sure payoff 
hypothetical vs. real 20 0.192 0.425 
bin 4: sure choice for sure payoff 
hypothetical vs. real 20 -1.768 0.046
* 
lottery choices (hypothetical) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 20 -0.253 0.401 
sure payoff choices (hypothetical) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 20 0.196 0.424 
lottery choices (real) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 20 -2.007 0.029
* 
sure payoff choices (real) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 20 -2.435 0.012
* 
Table A8: Combinations of lottery pairs and sure payoff values presented to the subjects 
lottery pairs sure payoff values (categorized by each decimal) 
50 %      50 % 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 










































































































































































































































































































A9: Original instruction (German) as used for the hypothetical treatment 
Instruktion 
In der folgenden Untersuchung werden von Ihnen hypothetische Entscheidungen 
verlangt. Treffen Sie diese bitte so, als wären es reale Entscheidungen. Für diese 
Untersuchung werden Sie eine Aufwandsentschädigung von 7 Euro pro Stunde 
erhalten. 
Anleitung Untersuchung 
Wir werden Ihnen in der heutigen Untersuchung Kombinationen von drei Zahlen 
präsentieren. Diese drei Zahlen repräsentieren einen Betrag in Euro. Dabei steht der 
kleinste mögliche Gewinn, eine Null, immer links, der größte mögliche Gewinn steht 
immer rechts. Außerdem zeigen wir Ihnen mit einer Verzögerung von einer Sekunde 
einen sicheren Gewinn in der Mitte, der immer größer als der linke und kleiner als 
der rechte mögliche Gewinn sein wird. Die folgende Abbildung stellt diese 
Entscheidungssituation in einem Beispiel dar. 
 
Sie sollen sich nun entscheiden, ob Sie den Betrag in der Mitte sicher bekommen 
wollen oder lieber eine Lotterie spielen, bei dem die Wahrscheinlichkeit zu 
gewinnen, 50% beträgt. Wenn Sie sich für die Lotterie entscheiden, haben Sie eine 
Chance von 50%, den Betrag, der auf der rechten Seite steht, zu gewinnen und eine 
Chance von 50%, den Betrag, der auf linken Seite steht, also Null, zu gewinnen. Sie 
entscheiden sich für eine der beiden Möglichkeiten über einen Tastendruck mit 
dem rechten oder dem linken Zeigefinger: 
Nehmen Sie den rechten Zeigefinger, um den mittleren, sicheren Betrag 
auszuwählen, und nehmen Sie den linken Zeigefinger, um die Lotterie zu wählen. 
Sie haben für jede Auswahl eine Sekunde Zeit. Die Zahlen in der Mitte variieren 
dabei zwischen 10 und 97, die Zahlen auf der rechten Seite zwischen 100 und 107. 
Wir werden Ihnen eine Reihe von Entscheidungen zeigen. Am Ende der 
Untersuchung würden wir durch Zufall eine der von Ihnen getroffenen 
Entscheidungen ziehen. Haben Sie sich bei der zufällig ausgewählten Entscheidung 
für die Zahl in der Mitte entschieden, so würden Sie diesen Betrag in Euro 
0 10 40 
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unmittelbar vom Versuchsleiter ausgezahlt bekommen. Haben Sie sich bei der 
zufällig ausgewählten Entscheidung für eine Lotterie entschieden, so würde per 
Münzwurf entschieden, ob Sie den Betrag auf der rechten Seite vom Versuchsleiter 
direkt bekommen oder nicht. Wenn Kopf fällt, bekämen Sie den Betrag auf der 
linken Seite, wenn Zahl fällt, erhielten Sie den rechten Betrag. 
Um es noch einmal deutlich zu machen: Ist Kopf oben, so würden Sie keinen 
Gewinn erhalten. Ist hingegen Zahl oben, so würden Sie den Betrag der rechten Zahl 
in Euro unmittelbar vom Versuchsleiter ausgezahlt bekommen. 
Haben Sie sich beispielsweise bei dem obigen Beispiel dafür entschieden, die Zahl in 
der Mitte sicher zu erhalten, dann würden Sie, so diese Entscheidung gezogen wird, 
10 Euro vom Versuchsleiter bekommen. Haben Sie sich für die Lotterie mit den 
Zahlen 0 und 40 entschieden, würden wir eine Münze werfen. Bei Zahl gewinnen Sie 
40 Euro, die Sie dann ebenfalls unmittelbar vom Versuchsleiter erhalten. Bei Kopf 
gehen Sie leer aus. 
 
Die Abfolge der verschiedenen Entscheidungen wird relativ rasch erfolgen, lassen 
Sie sich davon nicht beeindrucken. Es wird vor dem eigentlichen Experiment zwei 
Probedurchgänge geben, in welchen Sie sich an die Bedingungen gewöhnen 
können. 
Bitte vergewissern Sie sich, dass Sie die Instruktion richtig verstanden haben und 
stellen Sie ansonsten Ihre Fragen an den Versuchsleiter. 
 
Noch ein Hinweis: Bitte versuchen Sie während der Untersuchung nicht zu blinzeln 
und die Augen so wenig wie möglich zu bewegen. Sie haben in mehreren Pausen 
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A10: Translated instruction (English) of the hypothetical treatment 
Instruction 
In this experiment, you are asked to make a series of decisions involving 
hypothetical payoffs. Please make all your decisions, as if real payoffs were used. 
You receive a show-up fee of 7 euros per hour for your participation in the 
experiment. 
Instruction 
In our today’s experiment, we will present to you combinations of three numbers. 
Each of the numbers represents an amount in euros. The smallest possible payoff of 
0 euros is always listed on the left side of a given combination of numbers, while 
the largest possible payoff is always listed on the right side. A sure payoff, that is 
larger than the payoff given on the left side but smaller than the one given on the 
right side, will be shown with a delay of one second in the middle of a given 
combination of numbers. An illustrative example of this decision problem is 
presented in the following figure. 
 
Your task is to decide whether you would like to receive the sure payoff shown in 
the middle, or you would rather play a lottery with a success probability of 50%. If 
you decide to play the lottery, you will receive the payoff shown on the right side 
with a probability of 50% and nothing otherwise. You choose between receiving the 
sure payoff and playing the lottery by pressing a button with your right or left index 
finger: 
Please use the right index finger to choose the sure payoff; and the left index finger 
to choose the lottery. You have one second time for each decision. The numbers 
shown in the middle vary between 10 and 97, and those shown on the right side, 
between 100 and 107. 
You are asked to make a series of decisions for different combinations of numbers. 
At the end of the experiment, we would randomly select one of your decisions. If, 
for that particular decision, you would have chosen the sure payoff, you would 
immediately receive that from the experimenter. If, you would have chosen the 
0 10 40 
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lottery, the flip of a coin would determine whether you will be paid-out the right or 
the left payoff. If head falls, you would receive the payoff on the left side. If tails 
falls, you would receive the payoff on the right side.  
That is: if head falls, you would receive a payoff of 0 euros; otherwise you would 
immediately receive from the experimenter the payoff shown on the right side.  
For example, if for the combinations of numbers shown above, you have chosen the 
sure payoff and that particular decision is selected at the end of the experiment, 
you would immediately receive 10 euros from the experimenter. Alternatively, if 
you have chosen the lottery with the numbers 0 and 40, a coin would be flipped. If 
tails falls, you would immediately receive 40 euros from the experimenter. If head 
falls, you would receive nothing.  
 
Please note that the combinations of numbers shown to you will change relatively 
quickly. Prior to the actual experiment, you will be given the chance to get used to 
the experimental conditions in two probe trials. 
Please make sure that you have understood the experimental instructions and ask 
the experimenter any questions you may have.  
 
Note: Please try to move your eyes as little as possible and not to blink during the 
experiment. This will significantly contribute to the quality of the EEG data. There 
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A11: Original instruction (German) as used for the real treatment 
Instruktion 
In der folgenden Untersuchung werden von Ihnen reale Entscheidungen verlangt. 
Eine dieser von Ihnen getroffenen Entscheidungen wird am Ende Ihre 
Aufwandsentschädigung für diese Untersuchung sein. 
Anleitung Untersuchung 
Wir werden Ihnen in der heutigen Untersuchung Kombinationen von drei Zahlen 
präsentieren. Diese drei Zahlen repräsentieren einen Betrag in Euro. Dabei steht der 
kleinste mögliche Gewinn, eine Null, immer links, der größte mögliche Gewinn steht 
immer rechts. Außerdem zeigen wir Ihnen mit einer Verzögerung von einer Sekunde 
einen sicheren Gewinn in der Mitte, der immer größer als der linke und kleiner als 
der rechte mögliche Gewinn sein wird. Die folgende Abbildung stellt diese 
Entscheidungssituation in einem Beispiel dar. 
 
Sie sollen sich nun entscheiden, ob Sie den Betrag in der Mitte sicher bekommen 
wollen oder lieber eine Lotterie spielen, bei dem die Wahrscheinlichkeit zu 
gewinnen, 50% beträgt. Wenn Sie sich für die Lotterie entscheiden, haben Sie eine 
Chance von 50%, den Betrag, der auf der rechten Seite steht, zu gewinnen und eine 
Chance von 50%, den Betrag, der auf linken Seite steht, also Null, zu gewinnen. Sie 
entscheiden sich für eine der beiden Möglichkeiten über einen Tastendruck mit 
dem rechten oder dem linken Zeigefinger: 
Nehmen Sie den rechten Zeigefinger, um den mittleren, sicheren Betrag 
auszuwählen, und nehmen Sie den linken Zeigefinger, um die Lotterie zu wählen. 
Sie haben für jede Auswahl eine Sekunde Zeit. Die Zahlen in der Mitte variieren 
dabei zwischen 10 und 97, die Zahlen auf der rechten Seite zwischen 100 und 107. 
Wir werden Ihnen eine Reihe von Entscheidungen zeigen. Am Ende der 
Untersuchung ziehen wir durch Zufall eine der von Ihnen getroffenen 
Entscheidungen. Haben Sie sich bei der zufällig ausgewählten Entscheidung für die 
Zahl in der Mitte entschieden, so bekommen Sie diesen Betrag in Euro unmittelbar 
vom Versuchsleiter ausgezahlt. Haben Sie sich bei der zufällig ausgewählten 
0 10 40 
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Entscheidung für eine Lotterie entschieden, so wird per Münzwurf entschieden, ob 
Sie den Betrag auf der rechten Seite vom Versuchsleiter direkt bekommen oder 
nicht. Wenn Kopf fällt, bekommen Sie den Betrag auf der linken Seite, wenn Zahl 
fällt, erhalten Sie den rechten Betrag. 
Um es noch einmal deutlich zu machen: Ist Kopf oben, so erhalten Sie keinen 
Gewinn. Ist hingegen Zahl oben, so bekommen Sie den Betrag der rechten Zahl in 
Euro unmittelbar vom Versuchsleiter ausgezahlt. 
Haben Sie sich beispielsweise bei dem obigen Beispiel dafür entschieden, die Zahl in 
der Mitte sicher zu erhalten, dann würden Sie, so diese Entscheidung gezogen wird, 
10 Euro vom Versuchsleiter bekommen. Haben Sie sich für die Lotterie mit den 
Zahlen 0 und 40 entschieden, würden wir eine Münze werfen. Bei Zahl gewinnen Sie 
40 Euro, die Sie dann ebenfalls unmittelbar vom Versuchsleiter erhalten. Bei Kopf 
gehen Sie leer aus. 
 
Die Abfolge der verschiedenen Entscheidungen wird relativ rasch erfolgen, lassen 
Sie sich davon nicht beeindrucken. Es wird vor dem eigentlichen Experiment zwei 
Probedurchgänge geben, in welchen Sie sich an die Bedingungen gewöhnen 
können. 
Bitte vergewissern Sie sich, dass Sie die Instruktion richtig verstanden haben und 
stellen Sie ansonsten Ihre Fragen an den Versuchsleiter. 
 
Noch ein Hinweis: Bitte versuchen Sie während der Untersuchung nicht zu blinzeln 
und die Augen so wenig wie möglich zu bewegen. Sie haben in mehreren Pausen 





Ihr Untersuchungsteam  
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A12: Translated instruction (English) of the real treatment 
Instruction 
In this experiment, you are asked to make a series of decisions involving real 
payoffs. At the end of the experiment, one of these decisions will determine the 
payment for your participation in this experiment. 
Instruction 
In our today’s experiment, we will present to you combinations of three numbers. 
Each of the numbers represents an amount in euros. The smallest possible payoff of 
0 euros is always listed on the left side of a given combination of numbers, while 
the largest possible payoff is always listed on the right side. A sure payoff, that is 
larger than the payoff given on the left side but smaller than the one given on the 
right side, will be shown with a delay of one second in the middle of a given 
combination of numbers. An illustrative example of this decision problem is 
presented in the following figure. 
 
Your task is to decide whether you would like to receive the sure payoff shown in 
the middle, or you would rather play a lottery with a success probability of 50%. If 
you decide to play the lottery, you will receive the payoff shown on the right side 
with a probability of 50% and nothing otherwise. You choose between receiving the 
sure payoff and playing the lottery by pressing a button with your right or left index 
finger: 
Please use the right index finger to choose the sure payoff; and the left index finger 
to choose the lottery. You have one second time for each decision. The numbers 
shown in the middle vary between 10 and 97, and those shown on the right side, 
between 100 and 107. 
You are asked to make a series of decisions for different combinations of numbers. 
At the end of the experiment, we will randomly select one of your decisions. If, for 
that particular decision, you have chosen the sure payoff, you will immediately 
receive that amount from the experimenter. If, you have chosen the lottery, the flip 
of a coin will determine whether you will be paid-out the right or the left payoff. If 
0 10 40 
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head falls, you will receive the payoff on the left side. If tails falls, you will receive 
the payoff on the right side.  
That is: if head falls, you will receive a payoff of 0 euros; otherwise you will 
immediately receive the payoff shown on the right side from the experimenter.  
For example, if you have chosen the sure payoff for the combinations of numbers 
shown above and that particular decision is selected at the end of the experiment, 
you will immediately receive 10 euros from the experimenter. Alternatively, if you 
have chosen the lottery with the numbers 0 and 40, a coin will be flipped. If tails 
falls, you will immediately receive 40 euros from the experimenter. If head falls, you 
will receive nothing.  
 
Please note that the combinations of numbers shown to you will change relatively 
quickly. Prior to the actual experiment, you will be given the chance to get used to 
the experimental conditions in two probe trials. 
Please make sure that you have understood the experimental instructions and ask 
the experimenter any questions you may have.  
 
Note: Please try to move your eyes as little as possible and not to blink during the 
experiment. This will significantly contribute to the quality of the EEG data. There 





















No. Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real 
1 5.4552 3.7798 8.1707 -0.3815 0.3560 3.0105 4.4392 4.0444 
2 7.1584 4.1267 7.4757 11.9925 8.8193 6.3889 7.3272 11.8817 
3 4.4599 9.7247 7.4620 3.2133 6.9041 1.1700 4.1858 8.9113 
4 4.9352 10.0453 4.7146 4.8045 4.2580 6.8302 7.3939 8.6416 
5 5.2115 8.3124 9.6549 10.2631 2.2169 4.1684 2.0207 5.3606 
6 2.6449 0.3896 1.9562 -2.6780 -0.4395 2.4717 2.7217 4.0962 
7 1.9735 14.1992 4.7784 17.2089 6.1187 14.9897 4.5107 8.3982 
8 1.8327 6.1749 0.6228 4.3021 6.6907 6.5403 7.6111 3.8280 
9 2.2777 -0.6560 3.9441 0.2013 7.0667 2.5725 1.9601 -0.4583 
10 7.5796 12.4155 7.2815 13.1654 4.4817 8.7841 4.6443 16.0989 
11 5.5530 5.3963 5.6909 4.8096 7.1817 5.3629 8.0284 1.3132 
12 3.0695 1.0097 3.3151 1.7102 7.4793 -2.5276 2.8094 -0.1815 
13 3.7556 10.7760 5.3686 9.6360 2.0150 7.4936 3.6760 7.7735 
14 8.4984 1.4718 2.7650 6.3988 5.7474 2.5066 5.2734 2.5996 
15 -1.9450 -2.2939 -0.9604 -4.6622 0.5407 -2.1834 -1.8532 -1.2344 
16 -4.5857 -0.0371 1.7007 0.6022 1.2198 -2.6346 -0.1883 -2.6869 
17 8.9505 8.7614 8.4932 9.7529 2.1181 4.7359 0.4276 -0.2304 
18 5.9072 7.0606 0.0040 1.9793 2.1752 6.3570 -1.1610 7.4279 
19 2.8104 6.1264 3.8898 0.4906 -1.9491 0.4395 1.9121 2.4423 
20 2.2422 12.4585 6.3860 8.5704 5.6916 7.4839 2.7363 4.3483 
21 5.0790 6.8847 1.8951 6.0754 1.2551 6.0891 5.3901 8.5496 
mean 3.9459 6.0060 4.5052 5.1169 3.8070 4.2881 3.5174 4.8059 
SE 0.7028 1.0389 0.6518 1.2146 0.6727 0.9154 0.6169 1.0323 














No. Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real 
1 6.1944 9.5714 10.2305 4.1264 5.3985 7.4243 9.4698 7.7096 
2 9.9310 7.7962 11.6640 13.9789 10.7681 8.0623 9.1741 16.8384 
3 15.3784 18.4528 16.5788 13.4877 12.9663 9.8668 10.7025 15.1242 
4 11.2454 18.6400 10.9371 11.2174 8.7632 14.4068 13.2995 17.3291 
5 15.0089 15.2737 18.3350 15.7413 5.8901 8.7584 9.8827 8.2096 
6 7.6760 2.1204 9.3233 0.6139 4.8400 8.3755 9.0242 6.2434 
7 17.6940 24.8694 14.7187 22.0643 15.4637 19.5512 14.2872 16.7428 
8 7.1207 13.1670 2.3786 9.4334 8.7754 9.1538 12.9007 11.4552 
9 7.2150 2.3486 4.7347 0.8013 11.2645 4.1911 5.4867 3.7366 
10 11.3136 16.2671 11.1439 14.3030 7.8385 9.9905 8.6080 17.5489 
11 5.6166 6.8765 4.4360 6.1439 5.5961 4.5885 7.8415 2.7867 
12 10.2497 14.7818 8.4972 11.1132 15.2163 8.5380 9.7550 8.0865 
13 4.1414 11.9901 7.8697 9.9727 5.6341 6.1368 5.1458 8.6230 
14 9.0305 2.2333 2.0608 5.5216 4.6197 2.7767 6.0470 4.7097 
15 1.1574 0.6526 -0.8857 -1.9357 1.3363 -0.4689 3.3160 2.4164 
16 2.9660 3.8709 1.8606 4.4575 3.0398 2.0919 3.6409 -0.6974 
17 13.9600 10.0985 9.2781 11.7556 6.0806 7.0981 3.0600 4.3580 
18 8.2374 14.9253 2.9347 7.5687 6.2992 11.6769 6.0248 10.8211 
19 5.8995 4.9496 3.3198 0.5340 -1.3141 1.8326 3.8211 6.0857 
20 6.0341 15.9366 9.7564 10.8888 8.7424 10.6547 5.1058 8.0221 
21 8.1523 15.7316 4.8703 12.4572 3.1756 13.5109 8.8611 18.1779 
mean 8.7725 10.9787 7.8115 8.7736 7.1616 8.0103 7.8788 9.2537 
SE 0.9229 1.4554 1.1262 1.3068 0.9353 1.0211 0.7308 1.2512 
  
 138 














No. Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real 
1 5.6306 11.3069 7.2247 5.2216 2.6674 7.4298 4.3658 6.1469 
2 12.9579 10.5945 13.2120 14.2525 9.9184 8.7045 12.4284 17.3042 
3 18.8853 19.3842 18.1088 13.1294 14.3476 9.2256 12.0269 10.1397 
4 13.6466 17.9796 11.8489 9.6699 8.4336 9.9697 9.9592 13.4766 
5 14.0529 18.1306 13.7999 14.3979 3.2602 8.4746 6.4138 5.6505 
6 11.1251 5.3224 11.2849 3.8377 8.8227 7.5417 12.0455 5.4422 
7 21.8738 22.7093 16.7102 16.9943 13.5958 14.4275 16.3887 15.5072 
8 10.7374 15.5207 4.4544 10.9272 11.5923 11.2410 13.5775 11.9569 
9 6.5255 4.5826 4.0182 1.9953 6.6123 2.8572 0.6496 2.4768 
10 14.2146 18.3663 12.7676 16.2685 9.3304 11.8985 8.3826 17.5597 
11 5.0532 6.6763 2.3884 3.3977 3.2187 2.9319 6.9142 2.4655 
12 12.0744 17.9349 12.3861 14.0028 15.0937 8.9987 10.9318 5.5816 
13 5.3699 12.6715 10.6402 10.8365 8.1729 7.1767 5.4782 8.2562 
14 10.2546 4.3263 4.1378 4.7300 5.9052 4.0074 7.4948 5.9716 
15 6.6998 3.3983 2.1260 2.6903 3.4575 4.2247 4.7234 6.2156 
16 6.8200 5.9341 3.4839 6.7969 5.8976 4.8967 4.9444 1.7049 
17 18.8536 13.0571 13.9506 14.8434 8.1712 8.8477 5.6793 5.3872 
18 11.0018 20.0421 6.6055 10.5404 12.9132 16.7617 11.7891 12.9725 
19 8.7722 10.4269 5.5026 4.2197 1.2210 4.4473 4.8778 5.7640 
20 6.8848 11.9671 7.9954 10.9960 11.0043 11.2836 9.4950 11.9633 
21 6.6264 16.9813 2.8303 10.2109 0.4512 13.0202 8.7933 16.6862 
mean 10.8600 12.7292 8.8322 9.5219 7.8137 8.4937 8.4457 8.9823 
SE 1.0543 1.3031 1.0906 1.0539 0.9533 0.8285 0.8339 1.1143 
Table A16: Results of performed ANOVA for mean amplitudes within 450 and 550 ms 
at the midline electrodes (Fz, Cz, Pz) 
factor/ interaction degree of freedom 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) F-value 
p-value 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
anterior posterior position 1.638 49.319 0.000*** 
treatment 1.000 3.127 0.092 
bin classification 2.253 5.318 0.007** 
anterior posterior position x 
treatment 1.409 0.274 0.684 
anterior posterior position x 
bin classification 3.304 8.957 0.000
*** 
treatment x bin classification 2.912 0.946 0.423 
anterior posterior position x 
treatment x bin classification 3.299 0.355 0.804 
Table A17: Results of performed ANOVA mean amplitudes 
within 450 and 550 ms at the Pz electrode 
factor/ interaction degree of freedom 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) F-value 
p-value 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
treatment 1.000 1.900 0.183 
choice 1.000 9.348 0.006** 
indifferent position 1.000 15.714 0.001** 
treatment x choice 1.000 0.845 0.369 
treatment x indifferent 
position 1.000 0.751 0.396 
choice x indifferent position 1.000 7.963 0.011* 
treatment x choice x 
indifferent position 1.000 1.050 0.318 
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Table A18: Results of one-sided pair-wise t-tests for mean amplitudes 
within 450 and 550 ms at the Pz electrode 
pair degree of freedom T-value p-value 
bin 1: sure choice for lottery 
hypothetical vs. real 20 -1.773 0.046
* 
bin 2: indifferent choice for lottery 
hypothetical vs. real 20 -0.921 0.184 
bin 3: indifferent choice for sure payoff 
hypothetical vs. real 20 -0.778 0.223 
bin 4: sure choice for sure payoff 
hypothetical vs. real 20 -0.621 0.271 
lottery choices (hypothetical) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 20 -3.198 0.003
** 
sure payoff choices (hypothetical) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 20 -0.887 0.193 
lottery choices (real) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 20 -4.303 0.000
*** 
sure payoff choices (real) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 20 -0.703 0.245 
sure choices (hypothetical) 
lottery choice vs. sure payoff choice 20 2.738 0.007
** 
indifferent choices (hypothetical) 
lottery choice vs. sure payoff choice 20 1.096 0.143 
sure choices (real) 
lottery choice vs. sure payoff choice 20 3.592 0.001
*** 
indifferent choices (real) 
lottery choice vs. sure payoff choice 20 1.384 0.091 














No. Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real 
1 582.43 693.28 695.98 948.90 681.18 924.90 518.69 689.15 
2 553.89 477.10 786.70 631.28 734.89 621.90 621.33 474.99 
3 639.34 523.44 746.24 685.16 698.92 680.80 563.10 423.25 
4 577.72 515.93 654.92 664.84 646.96 592.76 504.05 493.07 
5 431.08 501.92 480.15 541.45 451.74 516.83 366.54 439.57 
6 557.89 503.14 593.32 554.90 544.78 541.63 479.15 478.82 
7 471.18 495.22 577.62 625.26 602.48 626.04 485.60 440.86 
8 590.27 538.47 669.13 643.91 590.31 600.49 500.43 479.26 
9 510.35 542.47 577.15 606.87 525.22 589.84 457.12 448.12 
10 552.26 566.38 687.90 693.53 717.07 723.67 493.50 522.80 
11 675.65 564.56 801.58 675.47 792.40 741.99 667.46 592.39 
12 480.89 481.50 571.99 536.33 556.77 499.81 483.22 383.98 
13 932.25 928.21 985.88 1062.70 928.73 990.95 830.57 827.55 
14 575.43 525.08 727.18 628.53 687.34 613.16 581.00 505.75 
15 519.73 598.40 602.25 646.60 533.65 624.19 465.54 523.22 
16 517.87 522.11 619.03 584.69 579.80 544.75 455.69 430.91 
17 562.55 635.07 643.55 638.12 677.97 620.07 489.49 480.54 
18 475.39 482.87 622.02 640.82 569.01 577.02 557.74 501.08 
19 550.56 555.96 634.51 709.46 609.84 632.78 442.08 447.14 
20 533.48 579.05 659.96 648.33 592.38 658.17 553.19 505.80 
21 530.74 440.38 614.95 518.62 563.99 490.84 508.71 455.41 
mean 562.90 555.74 664.38 661.23 632.64 638.69 524.96 502.08 
SE 22.12 22.43 23.07 27.75 23.23 27.24 20.89 21.45 
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Table A20: Results of performed ANOVA for reaction times with bin classification as factor 
factor/ interaction degree of freedom 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) F-value 
p-value 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
treatment 1.000 0.201 0.658 
bin classification 2.323 105.694 0.000*** 
treatment x bin classification 2.648 2.447 0.081 
Table A21: Results of performed ANOVA for reaction times 
separated by choice type and indifferent position 
factor/ interaction degree of freedom 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) F-value 
p-value 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
treatment 1.000 0.201 0.658 
choice 1.000 182.751 0.000*** 
indifferent position 1.000 37.144 0.000*** 
treatment x choice 1.000 0.214 0.649 
treatment x indifferent 
position 1.000 3.369 0.081 
choice x indifferent position 1.000 3.069 0.095 
treatment x choice x 
indifferent position 1.000 3.199 0.089 
Table A22: Results of two-sided pair-wise t-tests for mean reaction times 
pair degree of freedom T-value p-value 
bin 1: sure choice for lottery 
hypothetical vs. real 20 0.508 0.617 
bin 2: indifferent choice for lottery 
hypothetical vs. real 20 0.166 0.870 
bin 3: indifferent choice for sure payoff 
hypothetical vs. real 20 -0.355 0.726 
bin 4: sure choice for sure payoff 
hypothetical vs. real 20 1.473 0.156 
lottery choices (hypothetical) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 20 10.726 0.000
*** 
sure payoff choices (hypothetical) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 20 9.585 0.000
*** 
lottery choices (real) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 20 8.407 0.000
*** 
sure payoff choices (real) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 20 11.228 0.000
*** 
sure choices (hypothetical) 
lottery choice vs. sure payoff choice 20 3.269 0.004
** 
indifferent choices (hypothetical) 
lottery choice vs. sure payoff choice 20 4.514 0.000
*** 
sure choices (real) 
lottery choice vs. sure payoff choice 20 5.006 0.000
*** 
indifferent choices (real) 




Appendix B: Data from the EEG study concerning the portfolio effect 
Table B1: Individual choice behavior of both treatments 
subject total amount of lottery choices 
total amount of 
sure payoff choices 
Lottery choice frequency 
within the distance 
categories of -8 and -7 
No. Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio 
1 237 252 327 311 0.79 1.00 
2 313 261 262 313 1.00 1.00 
3 158 148 417 423 0.00 0.00 
4 294 277 282 296 1.00 0.94 
5 108 94 468 482 0.00 0.00 
6 153 132 422 444 0.00 0.00 
7 116 253 460 320 0.00 1.00 
8 193 262 383 313 0.00 0.94 
9 186 182 389 386 0.06 0.06 
10 263 256 313 313 1.00 1.00 
11 180 126 396 443 0.06 0.00 
12 261 271 313 299 0.88 1.00 
13 228 261 348 313 0.56 0.94 
14 197 249 379 325 0.00 0.88 
15 320 152 254 420 1.00 0.19 
16 85 328 490 246 0.00 1.00 
17 211 244 364 329 0.31 0.63 
18 237 196 314 379 0.81 0.19 
median 204 250.5 371.5 322.5 0.19 0.91 
mean 207.78 219.11 365.61 353.06 0.42 0.60 
SE 16.13 15.31 16.45 15.38 0.105 0.106 
Table B2: Data of determined indifference areas 
subject begin of indifference interval 




Lottery choice frequency 
within the indifference area 
No. Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio 
1 -10 -3 -3 -3 -4 -3 0.72 0.50 
2 0 -6 10 3 6 -2 0.59 0.46 
3 -23 -27 -13 -13 -18 -18 0.49 0.57 
4 -2 -3 7 7 3 2 0.54 0.47 
5 -32 -35 -20 -23 -26 -28 0.53 0.57 
6 -23 -23 -14 -22 -19 -22 0.44 0.38 
7 -30 -3 -18 -2 -25 -3 0.46 0.50 
8 -13 -3 -13 4 -13 -2 0.50 0.18 
9 -18 -18 -11 -13 -14 -14 0.54 0.71 
10 -3 -5 0 4 -2 -2 0.50 0.34 
11 -23 -23 -10 -23 -14 -23 0.64 0.50 
12 -7 -6 0 5 -2 -1 0.59 0.44 
13 -21 -4 0 5 -6 -3 0.65 0.23 
14 -13 -8 -11 -3 -12 -4 0.50 0.80 
15 -3 -28 16 -5 7 -19 0.53 0.42 
16 -33 4 -25 14 -29 8 0.46 0.45 
17 -18 -12 -3 2 -10 -5 0.53 0.50 
18 -10 -17 -2 -7 -4 -12 0.68 0.47 
median -15.5 -7 -6.5 -2.5 -11 -3.5 0.529 0.468 
mean -15.67 -12.22 -6.11 -3.89 -10.11 -8.39 0.550 0.471 
SE 2.479 2.615 2.544 2.584 2.532 2.360 0.019 0.034 
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No. Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio 
1 5.5498 5.5313 -1.2768 6.6005 1.0918 7.1051 5.5644 6.3611 
2 7.1930 9.3849 8.2236 7.0275 5.4622 7.1368 9.5816 9.6061 
3 8.0006 6.3240 2.2864 5.0987 0.4682 4.7177 6.2360 3.4232 
4 1.2918 -2.3744 -0.2236 4.0082 3.4356 1.8161 2.8061 6.9480 
5 8.3460 11.6460 5.1264 11.5658 3.8869 5.5952 5.6317 2.8199 
6 7.0604 8.6529 6.8393 8.6128 7.5358 6.1940 8.2406 9.9957 
7 5.5112 2.6880 2.9367 3.6410 5.6270 3.2058 2.9329 4.1024 
8 -0.4925 -2.8189 -0.0241 -2.5740 0.4846 0.0556 0.4417 0.5468 
9 10.0646 5.3668 9.8749 4.4812 7.4446 3.9226 13.3703 1.6583 
10 3.0210 4.7029 1.6985 0.4110 0.6767 2.5323 2.4101 4.1910 
11 1.5788 1.1723 3.1617 2.8531 1.7005 2.1843 2.1192 3.3554 
12 1.9234 1.6654 3.5104 4.9052 1.9407 3.4596 1.8155 3.3285 
13 -5.3710 -1.7350 -5.7843 -2.1433 -3.7376 -2.2866 -3.9887 -1.9012 
14 0.4210 1.7582 -0.3561 1.2351 -0.4041 2.3098 1.1173 4.2393 
15 2.4716 1.1928 0.4094 0.5031 1.7730 1.5983 5.3020 2.1247 
16 4.2683 -2.3214 2.3442 -0.7766 0.6933 2.5855 -2.0337 2.0365 
17 13.0986 8.0829 11.8850 4.9710 11.5436 9.1522 13.7951 7.7218 
18 1.3049 0.0467 1.4582 2.3145 1.4214 -0.0503 -0.0459 0.4897 
mean 4.1801 3.2759 2.8939 3.4853 2.8358 3.4019 4.1831 3.9471 
SE 1.0338 1.0387 1.0078 0.8739 0.8434 0.6781 1.1362 0.7455 














No. Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio 
1 6.5067 5.5298 1.2852 5.9057 2.9774 6.8150 6.4980 5.7526 
2 8.1855 9.4535 8.7422 7.0818 5.9845 8.2023 9.6768 10.2975 
3 11.6951 11.2194 6.3924 10.1424 5.4162 6.0949 10.0316 8.0874 
4 2.4828 -0.9604 0.7726 3.2900 4.7137 1.2723 3.4894 8.1737 
5 8.7798 11.6959 6.3220 12.5131 4.6387 5.7290 5.0949 4.7181 
6 10.3139 10.2686 8.2891 9.8500 9.8796 9.4245 13.5409 13.7099 
7 6.2792 2.6312 3.0496 2.3036 5.7348 2.5499 3.0314 1.9066 
8 -1.4466 -3.9165 -1.8121 -4.0640 -0.9219 -0.8751 -0.8767 -1.1194 
9 9.7123 3.9489 9.5242 4.4779 7.9279 3.6595 12.6001 1.1217 
10 2.7957 4.7891 2.5108 -0.6863 4.6004 0.6230 -0.2622 4.0133 
11 1.6329 4.2585 3.5330 5.1327 1.3999 1.9619 1.2891 1.0384 
12 1.1970 1.8281 4.0055 4.6340 2.0396 1.6156 2.3940 4.1284 
13 -6.5940 -1.8683 -5.8772 -3.5981 -4.7747 -4.3130 -3.3346 -3.4711 
14 3.5442 3.2130 2.2384 2.0406 0.4815 2.1668 4.2042 4.8462 
15 3.4629 0.6395 2.1490 -1.1764 1.6630 2.0913 5.7260 2.2612 
16 1.8539 -3.7720 -0.0882 -3.4081 -1.4620 -0.0015 -2.2536 -0.4134 
17 11.9329 6.8826 10.1163 5.6660 12.0387 9.2031 13.4300 7.6349 
18 2.1921 1.7827 4.1901 4.7396 3.3270 1.0987 2.2384 3.6077 
mean 4.6959 3.7569 3.6302 3.6025 3.6480 3.1843 4.8065 4.2385 
SE 1.1508 1.1379 0.9789 1.1341 0.9627 0.8720 1.2398 1.0076 
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No. Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio 
1 6.6314 4.0471 2.6301 7.8930 3.9489 4.0794 7.6117 5.8842 
2 8.1457 9.6229 9.6309 6.5028 6.6450 8.9709 9.7399 9.4333 
3 15.2020 11.3789 9.8734 11.8460 9.1759 8.2878 13.7125 10.6723 
4 5.3437 2.1097 3.4239 6.5689 7.1131 4.3438 4.3673 9.7794 
5 9.1635 10.6975 7.2313 12.1277 6.9841 6.7067 5.8809 6.1031 
6 11.1386 9.7009 9.7322 9.7154 11.8572 9.8696 15.5096 15.0343 
7 6.5374 2.6226 3.8143 1.0871 5.9401 1.3095 4.4597 -0.5570 
8 -1.5204 -3.2088 -1.3169 -4.7687 -1.3002 -0.0625 -0.8387 -1.2952 
9 9.0787 3.7611 9.6336 4.4324 7.5870 4.2845 12.3055 1.5029 
10 3.1116 4.5352 2.3437 -1.8551 2.3949 0.4429 2.8157 4.8316 
11 2.9391 2.2218 4.1038 2.9656 3.1799 4.6500 2.7343 4.4913 
12 1.1511 1.5111 4.0892 4.3523 2.8587 2.5233 3.2447 3.5431 
13 -6.6746 -2.1890 -5.1518 -3.7191 -4.3769 -5.4527 -2.6028 -2.9655 
14 3.1548 5.4573 2.7511 3.1762 1.6639 3.5686 2.4781 6.1192 
15 4.8124 2.8014 3.4542 2.1371 4.4266 2.9030 5.9039 3.9212 
16 -0.5512 -4.3425 -1.7730 -5.4536 -2.6478 -1.1473 -1.0845 -1.8631 
17 12.2017 7.5452 11.0300 6.9353 12.5242 9.0975 13.8184 7.6817 
18 3.9311 1.7987 5.2313 3.7089 5.7306 1.9915 5.4578 4.5847 
mean 5.2109 3.8928 4.4851 3.7585 4.6503 3.6870 5.8619 4.8279 
SE 1.2507 1.0835 1.0543 1.2395 1.0717 0.9386 1.2579 1.1177 














No. Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio 
1 7.6759 6.7404 5.1507 4.0870 6.3978 6.0393 8.0553 5.3581 
2 7.2546 9.6495 10.6827 7.0519 6.5714 8.9352 9.6889 9.2456 
3 14.0794 11.5261 9.4985 9.2236 9.8258 7.7927 13.2317 12.4288 
4 7.8726 3.4775 5.7732 7.4674 7.9634 5.3367 5.7186 9.2055 
5 10.1876 10.1828 6.9833 10.5086 7.6251 6.2018 5.6335 6.4281 
6 11.1216 8.8551 10.1217 7.7973 12.2999 9.1856 15.5311 14.3899 
7 7.5232 3.3096 4.4207 2.2156 7.0910 3.4560 7.1549 0.8936 
8 -0.1153 -2.0402 -0.2450 -4.3558 0.1248 0.6870 0.3359 -0.7807 
9 9.3307 3.9403 10.5633 4.5575 8.0633 5.2207 12.7270 2.1852 
10 2.6042 4.3760 2.3086 -2.0060 2.9637 -0.8945 3.1594 5.3546 
11 4.0944 5.4854 6.9360 5.4093 5.1344 6.6089 5.5385 7.9352 
12 2.0715 2.6141 4.3342 4.9840 3.9622 3.2707 4.1128 4.5794 
13 -6.2903 -0.4549 -2.9161 -2.1525 -2.6503 -3.3130 -0.8513 -0.2529 
14 4.7126 6.7513 3.1007 4.4239 1.9898 4.2415 2.4016 6.7863 
15 7.0080 4.7747 5.3586 1.5851 8.2339 5.9910 8.4245 5.0505 
16 -2.1952 -1.7913 -1.8881 -3.2563 0.0703 0.6785 1.2257 0.5246 
17 11.4008 8.2175 11.4693 7.6580 13.2357 9.0192 12.4425 7.4207 
18 3.5866 1.7599 4.7020 3.2367 7.3502 3.3868 5.0874 5.4675 
mean 5.6624 4.8541 5.3530 3.8020 5.9029 4.5469 6.6454 5.6789 
SE 1.2156 0.9404 1.0018 1.0346 0.9909 0.8268 1.1072 0.9851 
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No. Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio 
1 6.8072 3.4948 5.7867 1.0509 3.6683 5.3868 6.7617 5.2434 
2 6.8796 8.2669 9.4999 6.0880 6.0663 9.1896 8.8260 8.2950 
3 11.1974 10.2931 9.0613 7.5587 9.1453 6.2003 12.4637 11.2043 
4 8.2064 2.4080 6.4743 7.0895 7.4817 3.3658 4.4868 4.6462 
5 9.3180 9.2673 6.5687 9.0058 6.3589 5.6013 4.8639 6.0987 
6 9.1306 7.5807 8.5251 5.7504 12.4673 8.6748 14.7959 12.0749 
7 10.8785 4.8266 6.3457 4.6358 11.4921 6.3671 9.3537 3.8830 
8 2.4676 -0.0349 1.4997 -1.7823 1.8902 3.0720 2.1018 0.6670 
9 9.1674 4.7960 10.5875 5.3329 8.8039 6.7717 12.5172 3.4581 
10 3.4577 4.3207 2.6848 -2.0312 3.0853 -0.5545 3.4391 4.4066 
11 4.9082 5.8286 5.4381 6.3117 5.4571 7.7314 4.9397 8.7429 
12 2.7465 2.9345 4.8637 5.1872 4.7272 4.0498 5.4092 5.6404 
13 -4.4112 1.9969 -0.2781 0.0066 -0.4993 -1.2282 1.1773 1.6260 
14 3.5061 7.8532 5.5344 5.5101 3.3223 5.0905 3.5054 7.1300 
15 9.3016 4.8468 7.3546 1.0065 9.9343 6.4902 7.2414 7.1553 
16 1.8110 0.4902 -0.9936 -0.6767 0.0560 3.0487 1.6928 2.1464 
17 10.8335 8.7160 12.9181 8.2913 14.3155 9.1287 13.7581 8.1561 
18 5.2427 3.3589 5.5446 3.6830 8.6461 5.0991 5.9583 6.7385 
mean 6.1916 5.0691 5.9675 4.0010 6.4677 5.1936 6.8496 5.9618 
SE 0.9651 0.7170 0.8499 0.8278 0.9856 0.6880 0.9984 0.7299 
Table B8: Results of performed ANOVA for mean amplitudes within 260 and 360 ms 
at the midline electrodes (Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, and Pz) 
factor/ interaction degree of freedom 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) F-value 
p-value 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
anterior posterior position 2.108 11.526 0.000*** 
treatment 1.000 2.508 0.132 
choice 1.000 1.841 0.193 
indifferent position 1.000 8.198 0.011* 
anterior posterior position x 
treatment 1.555 6.405 0.009
** 
anterior posterior position x 
choice 1.668 2.937 0.078 
anterior posterior position x 
indifferent position 2.087 0.557 0.585 
treatment x choice 1.000 0.136 0.717 
treatment x indifferent 
position 1.000 0.113 0.741 
choice x indifferent position 1.000 0.710 0.411 
anterior posterior position x 
treatment x choice 2.099 0.485 0.629 
anterior posterior position x 
treatment x indifferent 
position 
1.956 6.792 0.004** 
anterior posterior position x 
choice x indifferent position 2.477 1.168 0.328 
treatment x choice x 
indifferent position 1.000 0.052 0.822 
anterior posterior position x 
treatment x choice x 
indifferent position 
2.584 1.309 0.283 
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Table B9: Results of performed ANOVA for mean amplitudes 
within 260 and 360 ms at the FCz electrode 
factor/ interaction degree of freedom 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) F-value 
p-value 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
treatment 1.000 0.862 0.366 
choice 1.000 0.012 0.914 
indifferent position 1.000 9.125 0.008** 
treatment x choice 1.000 0.003 0.955 
treatment x indifferent 
position 1.000 2.321 0.414 
choice x indifferent position 1.000 0.826 0.376 
treatment x choice x 
indifferent position 1.000 0.544 0.471 
Table B10: Results of one-sided pair-wise t-tests for mean amplitudes 
within 260 and 360 ms at the FCz electrode 
pair degree of freedom T-value p-value 
bin 1: sure choice for lottery 
portfolio vs. single 17 -1.303 0.105 
bin 2: indifferent choice for lottery 
portfolio vs. single 17 -0.036 0.486 
bin 3: indifferent choice for sure payoff 
portfolio vs. single 17 -0.843 0.206 
bin 4: sure choice for sure payoff 
portfolio vs. single 17 -0.660 0.259 
lottery choices (portfolio) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 17 -0.297 0.385 
sure payoff choices (portfolio) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 17 -1.854 0.041
* 
lottery choices (single) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 17 -2.016 0.030
* 
sure payoff choices (single) 




B11: Original instruction (German) as used for the single treatment 
Instruktion 
In der folgenden Untersuchung werden von Ihnen reale Entscheidungen verlangt. 
Eine dieser von Ihnen getroffenen Entscheidungen wird am Ende Ihre 
Aufwandsentschädigung für diese Untersuchung sein. 
Anleitung Untersuchung 
Wir werden Ihnen in der heutigen Untersuchung Kombinationen von drei Zahlen 
präsentieren. Diese drei Zahlen repräsentieren einen Betrag in euros. Dabei steht 
der kleinste mögliche Gewinn, eine Null, immer links, der größte mögliche Gewinn 
steht immer rechts. Außerdem zeigen wir Ihnen mit einer Verzögerung von einer 
Sekunde einen sicheren Gewinn in der Mitte, der immer größer als der linke und 
kleiner als der rechte mögliche Gewinn sein wird. Die folgende Abbildung stellt 
diese Entscheidungssituation in einem Beispiel dar. 
 
Sie sollen sich nun entscheiden, ob Sie den Betrag in der Mitte sicher bekommen 
wollen oder lieber eine Lotterie spielen, bei dem die Wahrscheinlichkeit zu 
gewinnen, 50% beträgt. Wenn Sie sich für die Lotterie entscheiden, haben Sie eine 
Chance von 50%, den Betrag, der auf der rechten Seite steht, zu gewinnen und eine 
Chance von 50%, den Betrag, der auf linken Seite steht, also Null, zu gewinnen. Sie 
entscheiden sich für eine der beiden Möglichkeiten über einen Tastendruck mit 
dem rechten oder dem linken Zeigefinger: 
Nehmen Sie den rechten Zeigefinger, um den mittleren, sicheren Betrag 
auszuwählen, und nehmen Sie den linken Zeigefinger, um die Lotterie zu wählen. 
Sie haben für jede Auswahl eine Sekunde Zeit. Die Zahlen in der Mitte variieren 
dabei zwischen 10 und 97, die Zahlen auf der rechten Seite zwischen 100 und 107. 
Wir werden Ihnen eine Reihe von Entscheidungen zeigen. Am Ende der 
Untersuchung ziehen wir durch Zufall eine der von Ihnen getroffenen 
Entscheidungen. Haben Sie sich bei der zufällig ausgewählten Entscheidung für die 
Zahl in der Mitte entschieden, so bekommen Sie diesen Betrag in euros unmittelbar 
vom Versuchsleiter ausgezahlt. Haben Sie sich bei der zufällig ausgewählten 
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Entscheidung für eine Lotterie entschieden, so wird per Münzwurf entschieden, ob 
Sie den Betrag auf der rechten Seite vom Versuchsleiter direkt bekommen oder 
nicht. Wenn Kopf fällt, bekommen Sie den Betrag auf der linken Seite, wenn Zahl 
fällt, erhalten Sie den rechten Betrag. 
Um es noch einmal deutlich zu machen: Ist Kopf oben, so erhalten Sie keinen 
Gewinn. Ist hingegen Zahl oben, so bekommen Sie den Betrag der rechten Zahl in 
euros unmittelbar vom Versuchsleiter ausgezahlt. 
Haben Sie sich beispielsweise bei dem obigen Beispiel dafür entschieden, die Zahl in 
der Mitte sicher zu erhalten, dann würden Sie, so diese Entscheidung gezogen wird, 
10 euros vom Versuchsleiter bekommen. Haben Sie sich für die Lotterie mit den 
Zahlen 0 und 40 entschieden, würden wir eine Münze werfen. Bei Zahl gewinnen Sie 
40 euros, die Sie dann ebenfalls unmittelbar vom Versuchsleiter erhalten. Bei Kopf 
gehen Sie leer aus. 
 
Die Abfolge der verschiedenen Entscheidungen wird relativ rasch erfolgen, lassen 
Sie sich davon nicht beeindrucken. Es wird vor dem eigentlichen Experiment zwei 
Probedurchgänge geben, in welchen Sie sich an die Bedingungen gewöhnen 
können. 
Bitte vergewissern Sie sich, dass Sie die Instruktion richtig verstanden haben und 
stellen Sie ansonsten Ihre Fragen an den Versuchsleiter. 
 
Noch ein Hinweis: Bitte versuchen Sie während der Untersuchung nicht zu blinzeln 
und die Augen so wenig wie möglich zu bewegen. Sie haben in mehreren Pausen 
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B12: Translated instruction (English) of the single treatment 
Instruction 
In this experiment, you are asked to make a series of decisions involving real 
payoffs. At the end of the experiment, one of these decisions will determine the 
payment for your participation in this experiment. 
Instruction 
In our today’s experiment, we will present to you combinations of three numbers. 
Each of the numbers represents an amount in euros. The smallest possible payoff of 
0 euros is always listed on the left side of a given combination of numbers, while 
the largest possible payoff is always listed on the right side. A sure payoff, that is 
larger than the payoff given on the left side but smaller than the one given on the 
right side, will be shown with a delay of one second in the middle of a given 
combination of numbers. An illustrative example of this decision problem is 
presented in the following figure. 
 
Your task is to decide whether you would like to receive the sure payoff shown in 
the middle, or you would rather play a lottery with a success probability of 50%. If 
you decide to play the lottery, you will receive the payoff shown on the right side 
with a probability of 50% and nothing otherwise. You choose between receiving the 
sure payoff and playing the lottery by pressing a button with your right or left index 
finger: 
Please use the right index finger to choose the sure payoff; and the left index finger 
to choose the lottery. You have one second time for each decision. The numbers 
shown in the middle vary between 10 and 97, and those shown on the right side, 
between 100 and 107. 
You are asked to make a series of decisions for different combinations of numbers. 
At the end of the experiment, we will randomly select one of your decisions. If, for 
that particular decision, you have chosen the sure payoff, you will immediately 
receive that amount from the experimenter. If, you have chosen the lottery, the flip 
of a coin will determine whether you will be paid-out the right or the left payoff. If 
0 10 40 
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head falls, you will receive the payoff on the left side. If tails falls, you will receive 
the payoff on the right side.  
That is: if head falls, you will receive a payoff of 0 euros; otherwise you will 
immediately receive the payoff shown on the right side from the experimenter.  
For example, if you have chosen the sure payoff for the combinations of numbers 
shown above and that particular decision is selected at the end of the experiment, 
you will immediately receive 10 euros from the experimenter. Alternatively, if you 
have chosen the lottery with the numbers 0 and 40, a coin will be flipped. If tails 
falls, you will immediately receive 40 euros from the experimenter. If head falls, you 
will receive nothing.  
 
Please note that the combinations of numbers shown to you will change relatively 
quickly. Prior to the actual experiment, you will be given the chance to get used to 
the experimental conditions in two probe trials. 
Please make sure that you have understood the experimental instructions and ask 
the experimenter any questions you may have.  
 
Note: Please try to move your eyes as little as possible and not to blink during the 
experiment. This will significantly contribute to the quality of the EEG data. There 







B13: Original instruction (German) as used for the portfolio treatment 
Instruktion 
In der folgenden Untersuchung werden von Ihnen reale Entscheidungen verlangt. 
Alle getroffenen Entscheidungen führen zu einer Auszahlung. Wie dies genau 
geschieht, ist am Ende der Anleitung beschrieben. 
Anleitung Untersuchung 
Wir werden Ihnen in der heutigen Untersuchung Kombinationen von drei Zahlen 
präsentieren. Diese drei Zahlen repräsentieren einen Betrag in Euro. Dabei steht der 
kleinste mögliche Gewinn, eine Null, immer links, der größte mögliche Gewinn steht 
immer rechts. Außerdem zeigen wir Ihnen mit einer Verzögerung von einer Sekunde 
einen sicheren Gewinn in der Mitte, der immer größer als der linke und kleiner als 
der rechte mögliche Gewinn sein wird. Die folgende Abbildung stellt diese 
Entscheidungssituation in einem Beispiel dar. 
 
Sie sollen sich nun entscheiden, ob Sie den Betrag in der Mitte sicher bekommen 
wollen oder lieber eine Lotterie spielen, bei dem die Wahrscheinlichkeit zu 
gewinnen, 50% beträgt. Wenn Sie sich für die Lotterie entscheiden, haben Sie eine 
Chance von 50%, den Betrag, der auf der rechten Seite steht, zu gewinnen und eine 
Chance von 50%, den Betrag, der auf linken Seite steht, also Null, zu gewinnen. Sie 
entscheiden sich für eine der beiden Möglichkeiten über einen Tastendruck mit 
dem rechten oder dem linken Zeigefinger: 
Nehmen Sie den rechten Zeigefinger, um den mittleren, sicheren Betrag 
auszuwählen, und nehmen Sie den linken Zeigefinger, um die Lotterie zu wählen. 
Sie haben für jede Auswahl eine Sekunde Zeit. Die Zahlen in der Mitte variieren 
dabei zwischen 10 und 97, die Zahlen auf der rechten Seite zwischen 100 und 107. 
Wir werden Ihnen eine ganze Reihe dieser Entscheidungssituationen zeigen, welche 
in einem Log-File protokolliert werden. Am Ende dieser Untersuchung werden alle 
von Ihnen getroffenen Entscheidungen realisiert. Der Auszahlungsbetrag gemäß 
einer Entscheidung für den sicheren Betrag entspricht der mittleren Zahl des 
jeweiligen Entscheidungsproblems. Der Auszahlungsbetrag für den Fall der 
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Lotterieentscheidungen wird über einen Münzwurf im Computer ermittelt. Dabei 
gilt, dass „Kopf“ den Auszahlungsbetrag der linken Zahl und „Zahl“ den 
Auszahlungsbetrag der rechten Zahl des jeweiligen Entscheidungsproblems zur 
Folge hat. Um es noch einmal deutlich zu machen: Ist der jeweilige Münzwurf 
„Kopf“, so erhalten Sie keinen Gewinn. Ist hingegen der jeweilige Münzwurf „Zahl“, 
so bekommen Sie den Betrag der rechten Zahl. Aus allen Auszahlungsbeträgen wird 
anschließend die Summe gebildet und durch die Anzahl der getroffenen 
Entscheidungen dividiert, welches dem Durchschnitt aller Auszahlungen entspricht. 
Dieser Betrag wird dann vom Versuchsleiter an Sie direkt ausgezahlt. 
Haben Sie sich beispielsweise bei dem obigen Beispiel dafür entschieden, die Zahl in 
der Mitte sicher zu erhalten, würde ein Betrag von 10 Euro in die Berechnung der 
Auszahlung einfließen. Haben Sie sich für die Lotterie mit den Zahlen 0 und 40 
entschieden, würden in Abhängigkeit des jeweiligen Münzwurfs entweder 0 Euro 
oder 40 Euro in die Berechnung der Auszahlung einfließen. 
 
Die Abfolge der verschiedenen Entscheidungen wird relativ rasch erfolgen, lassen 
Sie sich davon nicht beeindrucken. Es wird vor dem eigentlichen Experiment zwei 
Probedurchgänge geben, in welchen Sie sich an die Bedingungen gewöhnen 
können. 
Bitte vergewissern Sie sich, dass Sie die Instruktion richtig verstanden haben und 
stellen Sie ansonsten Ihre Fragen an den Versuchsleiter. 
 
Noch ein Hinweis: Bitte versuchen Sie während der Untersuchung nicht zu blinzeln 
und die Augen so wenig wie möglich zu bewegen. Sie haben in mehreren Pausen 









B14: Translated instruction (English) of the portfolio treatment 
Instruction 
In this experiment, you are asked to make a series of decisions involving real 
payoffs. Each of your decisions will be paid out. The exact payment mechanism is 
explained at the end of the experimental instructions. 
Instruction 
In our today’s experiment, we will present to you combinations of three numbers. 
Each of the numbers represents an amount in euros. The smallest possible payoff of 
0 euros is always listed on the left side of a given combination of numbers, while 
the largest possible payoff is always listed on the right side. A sure payoff, that is 
larger than the payoff given on the left side but smaller than the one given on the 
right side, will be shown with a delay of one second in the middle of a given 
combination of numbers. An illustrative example of this decision problem is 
presented in the following figure. 
 
Your task is to decide whether you would like to receive the sure payoff shown in 
the middle, or you would rather play a lottery with a success probability of 50%. If 
you decide to play the lottery, you will receive the payoff shown on the right side 
with a probability of 50% and nothing otherwise. You choose between receiving the 
sure payoff and playing the lottery by pressing a button with your right or left index 
finger: 
Please use the right index finger to choose the sure payoff; and the left index finger 
to choose the lottery. You have one second time for each decision. The numbers 
shown in the middle vary between 10 and 97, and those shown on the right side, 
between 100 and 107. 
You will be shown a sequence of such decision situations and your choices will be 
recorded in a Log-File. At the end of the experiment, all of your decisions will be 
actualized. In the cases in which the sure payoff is selected, the payoff is given by 
the middle number in the corresponding decision situations. In the cases in which 
the lottery is selected, your payoff will be determined by a flip of a coin simulated 
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on the computer. If head falls, you will receive the payoff on the left side. If tails 
falls, you will receive the payoff on the right side. That is: if head falls, you will 
receive a payoff of zero euros; if tails falls you will receive the payoff shown on the 
right side. The average payoff will be calculated by first summing up the payoffs 
obtained in all decision situations and then dividing this amount to the total number 
of decisions you have made. You will be paid out the average payoff.  
For example, if for the combinations of numbers shown in the above example, you 
have chosen the sure payoff, 10 euros will be added to the total sum of your payoffs 
on the basis of which the average payoff is calculated. Alternatively, if you have 
chosen the lottery with the numbers 0 and 40, depending on the exact realization of 
the coin flip, 0 euros or 40 euros will be added to the total sum of your payoffs on 
the basis of which the average payoff is calculated.  
Please note that the combinations of numbers shown to you will change relatively 
quickly. Prior to the actual experiment, you will be given the chance to get used to 
the experimental conditions in two probe trials. 
Please make sure that you have understood the experimental instructions and ask 
the experimenter any questions you may have.  
 
Note: Please try to move your eyes as little as possible and not to blink during the 
experiment. This will significantly contribute to the quality of the EEG data. There 





















No. Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio 
1 3.7798 10.1421 -0.3815 10.5917 3.0105 7.3501 4.0444 7.1072 
2 4.1267 7.6736 11.9925 11.6015 6.3889 9.2351 11.8817 8.7820 
3 9.7247 14.8014 3.2133 10.0982 1.1700 9.6904 8.9113 12.6392 
4 10.0453 7.0319 4.8045 6.7534 6.8302 7.1787 8.6416 10.9935 
5 8.3124 11.8195 10.2631 10.0947 4.1684 11.4411 5.3606 5.3716 
6 14.1992 14.6705 17.2089 12.7098 14.9897 9.4096 8.3982 9.0058 
7 6.1749 6.0171 4.3021 6.1633 6.5403 6.0008 3.8280 6.0679 
8 -0.6560 0.4701 0.2013 -0.7075 2.5725 1.2737 -0.4583 1.0934 
9 12.4155 8.7461 13.1654 9.8407 8.7841 8.6104 16.0989 3.1781 
10 5.3963 7.5803 4.8096 6.6271 5.3629 7.9567 1.3132 4.5315 
11 10.7760 12.3155 9.6360 9.7448 7.4936 5.4194 7.7735 8.2870 
12 1.4718 2.1642 6.3988 5.5605 2.5066 2.1791 2.5996 -0.6782 
13 -2.2939 1.5523 -4.6622 -0.7783 -2.1834 -1.0487 -1.2344 0.2053 
14 -0.0371 2.0208 0.6022 1.1613 -2.6346 5.6704 -2.6869 3.6338 
15 7.0606 5.5734 1.9793 1.8973 6.3570 3.0026 7.4279 1.7183 
16 6.1264 3.7093 0.4906 1.3038 0.4395 1.4185 2.4423 1.7560 
17 12.4585 10.5730 8.5704 5.3964 7.4839 8.5458 4.3483 4.3854 
18 6.8847 10.4911 6.0754 9.1866 6.0891 8.0436 8.5496 11.1643 
mean 6.4425 7.6307 5.4817 6.5136 4.7427 6.1876 5.4022 5.5135 
SE 1.1228 1.0495 1.3078 1.0226 0.9872 0.8210 1.1295 0.9428 














No. Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio 
1 9.5714 8.6369 4.1264 13.9016 7.4243 3.9663 7.7096 11.5411 
2 7.7962 11.9050 13.9789 13.2869 8.0623 11.7975 16.8384 10.9844 
3 18.4528 22.4404 13.4877 19.9054 9.8668 13.5842 15.1242 19.1094 
4 18.6400 13.6631 11.2174 11.1747 14.4068 14.5878 17.3291 17.1908 
5 15.2737 15.6060 15.7413 14.4507 8.7584 12.0601 8.2096 7.1110 
6 24.8694 22.2208 22.0643 17.7304 19.5512 12.8182 16.7428 14.0060 
7 13.1670 11.0252 9.4334 4.3863 9.1538 4.7456 11.4552 9.5249 
8 2.3486 4.7970 0.8013 -2.1954 4.1911 4.6109 3.7366 3.8017 
9 16.2671 12.2630 14.3030 11.6720 9.9905 10.3519 17.5489 6.6567 
10 6.8765 8.7178 6.1439 4.3805 4.5885 6.0487 2.7867 6.7434 
11 11.9901 13.6069 9.9727 11.3191 6.1368 6.3009 8.6230 10.2987 
12 2.2333 2.7153 5.5216 5.0176 2.7767 1.8569 4.7097 1.6171 
13 0.6526 3.5915 -1.9357 -0.4770 -0.4689 -1.2187 2.4164 3.5170 
14 3.8709 6.2322 4.4575 3.4722 2.0919 5.7783 -0.6974 5.6983 
15 14.9253 11.0438 7.5687 8.1546 11.6769 7.1717 10.8211 5.6824 
16 4.9496 6.0815 0.5340 -3.3155 1.8326 0.7882 6.0857 2.8017 
17 15.9366 11.3668 10.8888 8.0344 10.6547 11.2372 8.0221 7.9685 
18 15.7316 17.7023 12.4572 14.5746 13.5109 9.1716 18.1779 14.8470 
mean 11.3085 11.3120 8.9312 8.6374 8.0114 7.5365 9.7578 8.8389 
SE 1.6107 1.3496 1.4415 1.5870 1.1946 1.0961 1.4218 1.1821 
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No. Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio 
1 11.3069 5.5036 5.2216 6.5551 7.4298 2.7264 6.1469 4.5639 
2 10.5945 12.7112 14.2525 13.4946 8.7045 12.6100 17.3042 11.1332 
3 19.3842 20.1474 13.1294 14.9122 9.2256 9.2341 10.1397 13.1901 
4 17.9796 10.9325 9.6699 10.0113 9.9697 8.4824 13.4766 6.4666 
5 18.1306 15.0939 14.3979 11.9590 8.4746 8.9350 5.6505 4.8054 
6 22.7093 20.3368 16.9943 12.6505 14.4275 8.3979 15.5072 11.8069 
7 15.5207 10.6169 10.9272 5.1570 11.2410 7.0623 11.9569 11.6532 
8 4.5826 3.9781 1.9953 -0.5883 2.8572 4.6710 2.4768 1.4791 
9 18.3663 14.8550 16.2685 13.3701 11.8985 12.7273 17.5597 7.1410 
10 6.6763 7.0421 3.3977 1.2132 2.9319 1.4340 2.4655 5.0418 
11 12.6715 13.9042 10.8365 12.6430 7.1767 5.8996 8.2562 9.5578 
12 4.3263 4.1789 4.7300 5.6159 4.0074 2.4151 5.9716 3.3599 
13 3.3983 6.4090 2.6903 2.7074 4.2247 2.2492 6.2156 5.9550 
14 5.9341 9.6147 6.7969 6.2195 4.8967 5.7645 1.7049 6.3622 
15 20.0421 15.0538 10.5404 5.7132 16.7617 11.2445 12.9725 11.6900 
16 10.4269 8.0680 4.2197 0.9108 4.4473 4.5934 5.7640 5.4286 
17 11.9671 9.7121 10.9960 6.9330 11.2836 10.4106 11.9633 9.3785 
18 16.9813 16.6910 10.2109 14.4478 13.0202 5.4216 16.6862 11.3553 
mean 12.8333 11.3805 9.2931 7.9959 8.4988 6.9044 9.5677 7.7983 
SE 1.4359 1.1925 1.1214 1.1920 0.9684 0.8400 1.2502 0.8174 
Table B18: Results of performed ANOVA for mean amplitudes within 450 and 550 ms 
at the midline electrodes (Fz, Cz, Pz) 
factor/ interaction degree of freedom 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) F-value 
p-value 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
anterior posterior position 1.998 24.939 0.000*** 
treatment 1.000 0.397 0.537 
bin classification 2.821 10.176 0.000*** 
anterior posterior position x 
treatment 1.220 16.594 0.000
*** 
anterior posterior position x 
bin classification 3.392 6.895 0.000
*** 
treatment x bin classification 2.644 0.367 0.752 
anterior posterior position x 
treatment x bin classification 3.710 0.525 0.704 
Table B19: Results of performed ANOVA mean amplitudes 
within 450 and 550 ms at the Pz electrode 
factor/ interaction degree of freedom 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) F-value 
p-value 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
treatment 1.000 10.532 0.005** 
choice 1.000 12.618 0.002** 
indifferent position 1.000 32.882 0.000*** 
treatment x choice 1.000 0.222 0.644 
treatment x indifferent 
position 1.000 0.057 0.814 
choice x indifferent position 1.000 7.860 0.012* 
treatment x choice x 
indifferent position 1.000 0.000 0.988 
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Table B20: Results of one-sided pair-wise t-tests for mean amplitudes 
within 450 and 550 ms at the Pz electrode 
pair degree of freedom T-value p-value 
bin 1: sure choice for lottery 
portfolio vs. single 17 -1.997 0.031
* 
bin 2: indifferent choice for lottery 
portfolio vs. single 17 -2.018 0.030
* 
bin 3: indifferent choice for sure payoff 
portfolio vs. single 17 -2.263 0.019
* 
bin 4: sure choice for sure payoff 
portfolio vs. single 17 -1.996 0.031
* 
lottery choices (portfolio) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 17 -4.686 0.000
*** 
sure payoff choices (portfolio) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 17 -1.164 0.131 
lottery choices (single) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 17 -4.348 0.000
*** 
sure payoff choices (single) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 17 -1.481 0.079 
sure choices (portfolio) 
lottery choice vs. sure payoff choice 17 4.844 0.000
*** 
indifferent choices (portfolio) 
lottery choice vs. sure payoff choice 17 1.138 0.136 
sure choices (single) 
lottery choice vs. sure payoff choice 17 3.060 0.004
** 
indifferent choices (single) 
lottery choice vs. sure payoff choice 17 1.072 0.150 














No. Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio Single Portfolio 
1 693.28 540.28 948.90 715.63 924.90 583.98 689.15 488.31 
2 477.10 477.28 631.28 584.66 621.90 670.79 474.99 524.14 
3 523.44 575.99 685.16 601.40 680.80 597.45 423.25 434.25 
4 515.93 482.08 664.84 625.13 592.76 542.61 493.07 462.78 
5 501.92 468.15 541.45 525.82 516.83 444.57 439.57 364.06 
6 495.22 527.61 625.26 585.42 626.04 631.58 440.86 491.49 
7 538.47 552.24 643.91 604.01 600.49 549.73 479.26 517.25 
8 542.47 500.69 606.87 608.03 589.84 542.94 448.12 479.26 
9 566.38 564.77 693.53 687.34 723.67 663.54 522.80 491.14 
10 564.56 581.86 675.47 618.87 741.99 582.53 592.39 509.49 
11 928.21 586.98 1062.70 636.26 990.95 610.62 827.55 550.70 
12 525.08 559.32 628.53 717.74 613.16 579.83 505.75 513.61 
13 598.40 525.30 646.60 613.97 624.19 585.13 523.22 528.04 
14 522.11 532.59 584.69 587.37 544.75 601.03 430.91 480.89 
15 482.87 566.14 640.82 603.43 577.02 576.35 501.08 524.15 
16 555.96 475.95 709.46 698.55 632.78 566.12 447.14 475.44 
17 579.05 569.58 648.33 609.10 658.17 509.44 505.80 473.45 
18 440.38 437.85 518.62 524.22 490.84 467.21 455.41 419.26 
mean 558.38 529.15 675.36 619.27 652.84 572.52 511.13 484.87 
SE 25.35 10.66 30.91 13.09 30.20 13.83 24.04 10.55 
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Table B22: Results of performed ANOVA for reaction times with bin classification as factor 
factor/ interaction degree of freedom 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) F-value 
p-value 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
treatment 1.000 4.468 0.050* 
bin classification 2.574 88.318 0.000*** 
treatment x bin classification 2.555 6.360 0.002** 
Table B23: Results of performed ANOVA for reaction times 
separated by choice type and indifferent position 
factor/ interaction degree of freedom 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) F-value 
p-value 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
treatment 1.000 4.468 0.050* 
choice 1.000 149.222 0.000*** 
indifferent position 1.000 40.338 0.000*** 
treatment x choice 1.000 0.793 0.386 
treatment x indifferent 
position 1.000 15.977 0.001
*** 
choice x indifferent position 1.000 0.921 0.351 
treatment x choice x 
indifferent position 1.000 3.124 0.095 
Table B24: Results of two-sided pair-wise t-tests for mean reaction times 
pair degree of freedom T-value p-value 
bin 1: sure choice for lottery 
portfolio vs. single 17 -1.308 0.208 
bin 2: indifferent choice for lottery 
portfolio vs. single 17 -2.145 0.047
* 
bin 3: indifferent choice for sure payoff 
portfolio vs. single 17 -2.938 0.009
** 
bin 4: sure choice for sure payoff 
portfolio vs. single 17 -1.260 0.225 
lottery choices (portfolio) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 17 6.862 0.000
*** 
sure payoff choices (portfolio) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 17 8.590 0.000
*** 
lottery choices (single) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 17 9.360 0.000
*** 
sure payoff choices (single) 
indifferent choice vs. sure choice 17 10.491 0.000
*** 
sure choices (portfolio) 
lottery choice vs. sure payoff choice 17 4.330 0.000
*** 
indifferent choices (portfolio) 
lottery choice vs. sure payoff choice 17 3.279 0.004
** 
sure choices (single) 
lottery choice vs. sure payoff choice 17 4.446 0.000
*** 
indifferent choices (single) 




Appendix C: Data from the EEG study concerning the ERN modulation 
Table C1: Individual choice behavior 
subject 
Relative choice 
frequency in bin 
category ‘MinusYES’ 
Relative choice 
frequency in bin 
category ‘CenterYES’ 
Relative choice 
frequency in bin 
category ‘PlusYES’ 
No. bisection lottery bisection lottery bisection lottery 
1 0.173 0.190 0.862 0.746 0.965 0.915 
2 0.399 0.113 0.506 0.437 0.616 0.908 
3 0.088 0.090 0.649 0.680 0.983 0.943 
4 0.247 0.253 0.780 0.733 0.888 0.820 
5 0.017 0.074 0.549 0.299 0.925 0.875 
6 0.061 0.164 0.708 0.836 0.904 0.988 
7 0.089 0.194 0.622 0.794 0.944 0.977 
8 0.145 0.096 0.407 0.459 0.817 0.894 
9 0.180 0.077 0.832 0.829 0.987 0.982 
10 0.098 0.099 0.524 0.094 0.896 0.244 
11 0.065 0.132 0.513 0.523 0.926 0.903 
12 0.281 0.335 0.312 0.284 0.344 0.300 
13 0.473 0.534 0.661 0.597 0.677 0.621 
14 0.308 0.248 0.486 0.409 0.787 0.633 
15 0.089 0.039 0.446 0.474 0.844 0.833 
16 0.050 0.156 0.597 0.880 0.989 0.989 
mean 0.173 0.175 0.591 0.567 0.843 0.802 
SE 0.033 0.031 0.038 0.058 0.043 0.059 
Table C2: Results of performed ANOVA for behavioral results 
factor/ interaction degree of freedom 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) F-value 
p-value 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
method 1.000 0.581 0.458 
scale factor 1.208 5.283 0.028* 
bin category 1.380 75.001 0.000*** 
method x scale factor 1.356 0.244 0.698 
method x bin category 1.498 0.433 0.597 
scale factor x bin category 3.195 0.661 0.589 
method x scale factor x bin category 3.310 0.768 0.529 
Table C3: Calculated mean amplitudes within 30 and 70 ms at the Fz electrode for ‘Yes’-responses 
subject MinusYES CenterYES PlusYES 
No. bisection lottery bisection lottery bisection lottery 
1 2.4180 -0.7746 0.7346 1.6061 1.9527 -0.2676 
2 0.3169 -0.2772 0.1872 -0.3433 -0.0552 -0.8572 
3 -7.8465 -1.5305 0.3186 -0.7980 0.0892 0.0032 
4 -1.3913 -0.8692 0.4619 1.1146 1.1976 3.5206 
5 2.3968 0.5618 -0.7363 0.0521 1.9264 1.4341 
6 -1.3760 0.3334 0.0711 -0.3192 1.1458 1.6985 
7 -1.8858 -2.4409 -1.3756 0.3769 0.7032 1.1541 
8 2.3581 0.1781 -0.1715 0.4801 1.0302 0.4045 
9 -2.9279 0.1084 -1.2621 -1.6314 -1.1026 -0.7332 
10 -0.3064 -1.1912 -0.4651 -0.3954 1.9546 0.4661 
11 -0.1074 -4.4322 -0.5257 0.1821 1.0618 1.0621 
12 -0.6339 -1.6452 -1.7972 0.8320 -0.1951 0.8127 
13 -3.4462 -4.4125 -3.3435 -4.7462 -3.6505 -4.4778 
14 -0.3457 0.6977 0.3362 -0.1649 0.5056 1.2304 
15 2.9067 -1.0416 2.0979 1.3603 1.1299 0.7554 
16 -2.5724 3.1838 0.7395 0.5481 -1.3117 -0.8928 
mean -0.7777 -0.8470 -0.2956 -0.1154 0.3989 0.3321 
SE 0.6852 0.4729 0.3130 0.3713 0.3656 0.4250 
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Table C4: Calculated mean amplitudes within 30 and 70 ms at the Fz electrode for ‘No’-responses 
subject MinusNO CenterNO PlusNO 
No. bisection lottery bisection lottery bisection lottery 
1 1.6739 2.0610 -1.4186 0.4866 6.0185 -3.7558 
2 -1.1960 -1.1881 -0.2794 -0.9029 -0.7317 -0.9056 
3 -0.1770 -1.8158 -2.5401 -2.3343 4.5002 7.8646 
4 1.0607 1.7163 -0.3738 0.8133 -1.5415 -2.2329 
5 2.2531 2.3162 0.6367 0.9264 -0.1776 1.0499 
6 1.2003 0.0543 -0.3825 2.0876 -3.2912 -10.0087 
7 1.1842 0.1905 1.5977 -2.1183 -3.6782 -12.4098 
8 -0.2975 -0.3476 0.3272 -0.2357 -0.4600 -2.9766 
9 -3.1895 -2.5814 -0.5084 -2.9737 -5.9692 -11.7477 
10 2.9496 1.6427 1.6005 0.5518 -1.1005 1.4675 
11 -0.2014 0.0413 -1.7631 -2.2832 -4.4683 2.1486 
12 -0.4284 0.5613 0.1430 -0.6145 0.7353 0.4978 
13 -1.6848 -1.5238 -2.2920 -2.4887 -3.3560 -2.3128 
14 0.6246 0.3910 -0.1922 -0.4810 -0.2647 -1.0968 
15 0.3915 0.9839 1.8006 3.0975 2.5254 -1.0881 
16 -0.6707 -1.5011 0.4360 0.1019 -1.9624 -16.2661 
mean 0.2183 0.0625 -0.2005 -0.3980 -0.8264 -3.2358 
SE 0.3849 0.3693 0.3286 0.4338 0.7958 1.5755 
Table C5: Calculated mean amplitudes within 30 and 70 ms at the Cz electrode for ‘Yes’-responses 
subject MinusYES CenterYES PlusYES 
No. bisection lottery bisection lottery bisection lottery 
1 2.2006 -2.6581 1.5242 1.3849 2.2167 -0.4941 
2 0.2497 -0.6219 0.3342 -0.8070 -0.4342 -1.2960 
3 -10.7073 -0.0952 -1.0035 -1.2869 -1.6598 -0.5144 
4 0.0637 0.1082 1.0397 1.9506 2.4113 3.5563 
5 0.3458 0.0564 0.1030 0.1741 2.2552 2.3770 
6 -0.7463 -1.0227 0.3044 -0.0115 0.6990 1.9756 
7 -2.7117 -2.5066 -0.8001 1.4724 1.7874 2.8911 
8 1.2681 0.3774 -0.0663 0.8854 0.6663 0.6511 
9 -2.3878 0.4235 -0.3352 -0.7385 -0.1746 0.5387 
10 -1.5960 -0.7921 -0.5480 -0.3072 2.1984 0.5483 
11 -1.2057 -4.4206 -0.5933 0.6461 1.9172 1.6774 
12 -1.1892 -0.9303 -1.7593 1.3463 -0.5973 0.2548 
13 -1.1639 -2.2703 -0.7120 -1.7574 0.1413 -1.0497 
14 -0.4539 1.5065 1.3535 1.2793 2.4985 2.9533 
15 3.7077 2.1340 2.4091 2.3151 0.7839 0.7306 
16 -3.4779 0.5330 -1.1738 -1.1122 -2.6449 -1.9062 
mean -1.1128 -0.6362 0.0048 0.3396 0.7540 0.8059 
SE 0.7850 0.4181 0.2788 0.3120 0.3903 0.4095 
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Table C6: Calculated mean amplitudes within 30 and 70 ms at the Cz electrode for ‘No’-responses 
subject MinusNO CenterNO PlusNO 
No. bisection lottery bisection lottery bisection lottery 
1 1.8571 2.5629 0.7830 0.8600 5.2453 -2.1384 
2 -1.5151 -1.1209 -0.9377 -1.2658 -0.6253 -1.4403 
3 -2.8858 -3.4202 -4.3907 -4.3967 0.8021 5.0502 
4 -0.1124 2.4109 -0.2426 0.3114 -3.0027 -2.8186 
5 3.0810 3.0457 0.8736 1.4333 -0.7101 0.8157 
6 1.7190 0.3490 -0.9574 0.9762 -3.3136 -4.3735 
7 2.7222 1.0779 1.9999 -1.8946 -5.1669 -10.1061 
8 -0.3110 -0.4176 0.1367 -0.9350 -0.9408 -2.5997 
9 -3.1502 -1.9654 -0.8854 -2.1398 -7.4270 -12.4443 
10 4.6361 1.4950 2.6301 0.9090 1.0159 1.0278 
11 0.5953 1.1698 -1.3535 -1.9719 -4.4138 1.8629 
12 -0.2437 0.7789 0.3040 -0.3384 0.1971 0.0808 
13 1.3913 1.4251 0.1444 0.0933 -0.6918 -0.6242 
14 1.5715 1.0131 0.4516 0.2502 0.3760 -1.1249 
15 2.0370 3.2723 3.0387 4.3836 1.3294 -0.1439 
16 -2.5004 -2.8468 -2.6933 -0.9143 -10.3223 -22.6680 
mean 0.5557 0.5519 -0.0687 -0.2900 -1.7280 -3.2278 
SE 0.5618 0.5047 0.4690 0.4892 0.9432 1.6795 
Table C7: Calculated mean amplitudes within 30 and 70 ms at the Pz electrode for ‘Yes’-responses 
subject MinusYES CenterYES PlusYES 
No. bisection lottery bisection lottery bisection lottery 
1 2.9146 -3.1070 1.3445 1.2772 2.3703 -0.1677 
2 1.4979 -0.2305 0.7568 -0.0227 0.3370 0.0441 
3 -7.2863 1.8938 1.1787 1.3118 0.9091 2.1149 
4 2.0777 1.1262 1.0314 2.3093 2.7911 3.8473 
5 0.5523 -0.0629 0.6838 -0.5430 1.2517 1.8648 
6 1.0273 0.2174 0.6095 0.1557 0.9908 2.1199 
7 -1.0947 -1.0963 0.1176 2.5106 2.5926 4.1056 
8 1.1454 1.5020 -0.1096 0.3844 0.7304 0.6808 
9 -0.7063 1.0569 0.8897 0.2083 0.9965 1.6914 
10 -0.4875 0.4303 -0.0626 0.3847 2.0342 0.7356 
11 -0.2951 -3.8127 -0.0195 0.6782 2.3192 2.1663 
12 -0.8631 -0.0073 -0.2578 1.6924 -0.5996 0.8132 
13 1.2123 0.1817 1.5205 1.2271 2.2796 0.7582 
14 -0.1097 1.6374 1.6107 1.7100 3.0371 3.6139 
15 3.1338 2.7277 1.7047 1.2274 0.2555 1.2824 
16 -2.5965 0.7178 -1.5932 -0.9141 -1.6930 -0.9720 
mean 0.0076 0.1984 0.5878 0.8498 1.2877 1.5437 
SE 0.6179 0.4279 0.2178 0.2431 0.3282 0.3620 
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Table C8: Calculated mean amplitudes within 30 and 70 ms at the Pz electrode for ‘No’-responses 
subject MinusNO CenterNO PlusNO 
No. bisection lottery bisection lottery bisection lottery 
1 2.0594 2.4669 0.8784 0.5995 2.4249 -0.0929 
2 -1.0472 -0.4457 -0.8855 -0.7004 -0.9915 -0.5338 
3 -0.1003 -0.6846 -2.4261 -2.5407 1.9494 8.6359 
4 1.2856 2.8397 1.1905 0.6151 -2.4801 -1.8870 
5 2.7128 2.0711 1.2513 1.1170 0.3349 1.2778 
6 2.2389 1.5138 -1.1231 1.9516 -2.1071 4.9585 
7 5.3290 3.3053 2.7593 0.2757 -1.5563 -1.6989 
8 -0.5990 -0.8429 -0.4183 -1.7065 -1.7232 -1.8518 
9 -2.1986 -0.5734 -0.6042 -1.3073 -5.2313 -6.8206 
10 4.8286 1.1975 3.2174 0.5820 2.5605 0.6149 
11 1.4923 1.4701 -0.4466 -0.8766 -2.7937 2.8437 
12 0.0885 1.8324 1.0449 0.6236 0.0076 0.3843 
13 3.2611 3.1686 2.3425 1.8841 1.7739 1.1851 
14 0.6771 0.2069 -0.0291 -0.2352 0.0725 -0.7396 
15 2.7011 3.8013 2.7286 3.7788 0.4135 0.7188 
16 -1.0257 -1.2922 -2.9146 -1.9296 -8.2411 -18.0342 
mean 1.3565 1.2522 0.4103 0.1332 -0.9742 -0.6900 
SE 0.5343 0.4155 0.4574 0.4096 0.7204 1.4233 
Table C9: Results of performed ANOVA for mean amplitudes within 30 and 70 ms 
at the midline electrodes (Fz, Cz, Pz) 
factor/ interaction degree of freedom 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) F-value 
p-value 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
anterior posterior position 1.543 6.388 0.010* 
method 1.000 0.468 0.504 
bin cluster 1.082 0.893 0.367 
choice 1.000 1.827 0.197 
anterior posterior position x 
method 1.264 5.567 0.023
* 
anterior posterior position x 
bin cluster 2.137 1.912 0.162 
anterior posterior position x 
choice 1.594 0.563 0.538 
method x bin cluster 1.638 0.783 0.445 
method x choice 1.000 1.700 0.212 
bin cluster x choice 1.379 9.500 0.003** 
anterior posterior position x 
method x bin cluster 1.429 4.955 0.026
* 
anterior posterior position x 
method x choice 1.150 1.727 0.208 
anterior posterior position x 
bin cluster x choice 1.830 3.222 0.059 
method x bin cluster x 
choice 1.851 0.404 0.656 
anterior posterior position x 
method x bin cluster x 
choice 
1.697 5.327 0.015* 
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Table C10: Results of performed ANOVA for mean amplitudes 
within 30 and 70 ms at the Fz electrode 
factor/ interaction degree of freedom 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) F-value 
p-value 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected) 
method 1.000 3.815 0.070 
bin cluster 1.186 0.828 0.395 
choice 1.000 1.591 0.226 
method x bin cluster 1.455 1.950 0.174 
method x choice 1.000 2.071 0.171 
bin cluster x choice 1.345 7.008 0.010* 
method x bin cluster x 
choice 1.799 1.728 0.199 
Table C11: Results of one-sided pair-wise t-tests for mean amplitudes 
within 30 and 70 ms at the Fz electrode 
pair degree of freedom T-value p-value 
bin ‘MinusYES’ 
bisection vs. lottery 15 0.090 0.465 
bin ‘MinusNO’ 
bisection vs. lottery 15 0.786 0.222 
bin ‘CenterYES’ 
bisection vs. lottery 15 -0.681 0.253 
bin ‘CenterNO’ 
bisection vs. lottery 15 0.516 0.307 
bin ‘PlusYES’ 
bisection vs. lottery 15 0.251 0.403 
bin ‘PlusNO’ 
bisection vs. lottery 15 1.766 0.049
* 
bisection task 
MinusYES vs. MinusNO 15 -1.546 0.072 
lottery choice task 
MinusYES vs. MinusNO 15 -1.507 0.077 
bisection task 
PlusYES vs. PlusNO 15 1.646 0.061 
lottery choice task 




C12: Original instruction (German) as used for both EEG sessions 
Instruktion 
In dieser Untersuchung werden Sie Antworten unter zwei Bedingungen geben, der 
Mittenabfrage und der Lotteriebedingung. Diese beiden Bedingungen werden in der 
Instruktion als erstes beschrieben. Welche Bedingung ausgeführt wird, entscheidet 
eine Farbcodierung, diese wird am Ende der Instruktion beschrieben. 
Bedingung „Mittenabfrage“ 
Es werden Ihnen drei Zahlen gezeigt. Bitte stellen Sie sich zu jeder Zahl die Freude 
vor, die Sie erleben würden, wenn Sie diesen Geldbetrag in € bekämen. Betrachten 
Sie den Abstand zwischen der erlebten Freude bei der linken Zahl und der erlebten 
Freude bei der mittleren Zahl. Vergleichen Sie diesen mit dem Abstand zwischen der 
erlebten Freude bei der mittleren Zahl und der erlebten Freude bei der rechten 
Zahl. Ist dieser erste Abstand größer als der zweite oder gleich groß, so antworten 
Sie mit „JA“. Ist der erste Abstand kleiner, antworten Sie bitte mit „NEIN“. 
 





   Abstand       Abstand 
   0       C    1000 
 
„Freude“   „Freude“   „Freude“ 
0 330 820 
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Wenn Sie hier mit „JA“ antworten, ist für Sie der Abstand zwischen der erlebten 
Freude bei einer Auszahlung von 0 € und der erlebten Freude bei einer Auszahlung 
von 330 € größer oder gleich groß als der Abstand zwischen der erlebten Freude bei 
einer Auszahlung von 330 € und der erlebten Freude bei einer Auszahlung von 820 
€. 
Würden Sie mit „NEIN“ antworten, ist für Sie der Abstand der erlebten Freude bei 
den Auszahlungen von 0 € und 330 € kleiner als der Abstand der erlebten Freude 
bei den Auszahlungen von 330 € und 820 €. 
Bedingung „Lotterie“ 
Im Falle der Lotteriebedingung müssen Sie sich vorstellen, dass Sie entweder eine 
Lotterie spielen könnten oder stattdessen einen festen Geldbetrag erhalten 
würden. Bei der Lotterie könnten Sie mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50% 0 € 
gewinnen und mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50% einen Geldbetrag, der größer 
ist als der feste Geldbetrag. Sie müssen nun die Entscheidung treffen, ob Sie den 
festen Geldbetrag bekommen möchten oder nicht. Wenn Sie mit „JA“ antworten, 
würden Sie den festen Geldbetrag wählen, wenn Sie mit „NEIN“ antworten, 
bedeutet es, dass Sie lieber die Lotterie spielen. Bei den gezeigten drei Zahlen wird 
die linke Zahl immer eine Null sein. In der Mitte zeigen wir Ihnen den Betrag, den 
Sie als festen Geldbetrag erhalten würden, auf der rechten Seite immer den Betrag, 
um den in der Lotterie gespielt wird. 




Wenn Sie jetzt die Taste für „JA“ drücken, bedeutet es, dass Sie lieber 230 € sofort 
nehmen würden als eine Lotterie zu spielen, bei der Sie mit einer 
Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50% 0 € gewinnen und mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 
50% 950 € gewinnen würden. Wenn Sie stattdessen die Taste für „NEIN“ drücken, 
würden Sie lieber die Lotterie spielen, als den festen Gewinn garantiert zu 
bekommen. 
Farbcodierung und Ablauf im Experiment 
Wir werden Ihnen zuerst nur zwei Zahlen zeigen. Die linke und die rechte Zahl, 
wobei die linke Zahl immer eine Null sein wird. Daraufhin wird ein Rahmen um die 
0 230 950 
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beiden Zahlen kurz erscheinen, welcher entweder rosa oder hellblau ist. Diese 
Farbe sagt Ihnen, ob im Folgenden eine Lotterie gespielt wird oder es sich um eine 
Mittenabfrage handelt. Dabei steht rosa für die Lotterie und hellblau für die 
Mittenabfrage.  
Im Laufe des Experiments erscheint der Rahmen stets zufällig rosa oder hellblau. 
Nachdem dieser wieder verschwunden ist, erscheint die mittlere Zahl und Sie 
müssen entsprechend der Bedingung, Mittenabfrage oder Lotteriebedingung, 
antworten. 




Die Antworten geben Sie mit den beiden Computermäusen, welche links und rechts 
vor Ihnen liegen. Hierbei steht ein Tastendruck bei der linken Maus für die Antwort 
„JA“ und ein Tastendruck bei der rechten Maus für die Antwort „NEIN“. 
Die Abfolge der Zahlen wird die ganze Zeit relativ rasch erfolgen, lassen Sie sich 
davon nicht beeindrucken. Es wird vor dem eigentlichen Experiment 2 
Probedurchgänge geben, in welchen Sie sich an die Bedingungen gewöhnen 
können. 
Falls Sie noch Fragen haben, dann stellen Sie sie bitte jetzt. Vergewissern Sie sich, 
dass Sie die Instruktion verstanden haben. 
 
Noch ein Hinweis: Bitte versuchen Sie während der Untersuchung nicht zu blinzeln 
und die Augen so wenig wie möglich zu bewegen. Sie haben in mehreren Pausen 





Ihr Untersuchungsteam  
0  950 0  810 
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Appendix D: Data from the analysis of indifference intervals 
Table D1: Relative choice frequency of the hypothetical treatment 
























































1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.88 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 0.96 0.96 1.00 0.96 0.96 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.79 0.29 0.17 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.96 0.92 0.63 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.21 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 0.96 0.92 0.96 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.83 0.96 0.88 0.92 0.38 0.25 0.17 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 
7 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.96 0.30 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 0.96 1.00 0.92 0.58 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11 1.00 0.96 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.91 0.33 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.04 0.00 
12 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.83 0.38 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 
13 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.67 0.13 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.08 
15 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 1.00 0.88 0.75 0.21 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
16 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.70 0.46 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17 1.00 0.96 0.79 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.90 1.00 0.59 0.51 0.22 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 
19 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.67 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.71 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
21 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.74 0.67 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 
mean 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.87 0.79 0.76 0.53 0.47 0.25 0.18 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
SE 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Table D2: Relative choice frequency of the real treatment 
























































1 1.00 0.96 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.63 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.77 0.17 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.92 0.56 0.46 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.46 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 0.96 0.92 0.96 0.42 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.79 0.29 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.58 0.21 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 0.96 0.96 0.88 0.54 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 
10 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11 0.92 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12 1.00 0.91 0.96 0.67 0.35 0.39 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
13 1.00 0.92 0.92 0.96 0.79 0.63 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 
14 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.87 0.21 0.13 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.96 0.79 0.83 0.67 0.50 0.21 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
16 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.21 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17 0.83 0.88 0.25 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.75 0.25 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.04 
19 0.96 1.00 0.70 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
20 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.75 0.54 0.27 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 
21 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.85 0.63 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 
mean 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.83 0.73 0.65 0.45 0.37 0.19 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SE 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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(according to sure 
payoff value) 
total width of 
indifference interval 
(according to sure 
payoff value) 
normalized width of 
indifference interval 
(according to sure 
payoff value) 
No. Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real 
1 40 40 47 52 8 13 8 11 
2 53 51 63 61 11 11 9 9 
3 33 30 41 41 9 12 7 10 
4 50 50 55 57 6 8 6 8 
5 25 23 26 33 2 11 2 9 
6 47 47 60 53 14 7 10 5 
7 40 30 47 37 8 8 8 8 
8 22 24 30 32 9 9 7 7 
9 40 40 40 40 1 1 1 1 
10 31 35 37 40 7 6 7 4 
11 50 50 56 52 7 3 7 3 
12 50 26 57 40 8 15 8 11 
13 40 30 40 43 1 14 1 12 
14 52 43 61 51 10 9 8 7 
15 44 30 52 56 9 27 7 23 
16 41 40 50 42 10 3 8 3 
17 20 17 26 27 7 11 7 9 
18 50 50 65 67 16 18 14 16 
19 21 20 30 26 10 7 8 7 
20 53 34 60 47 8 14 6 12 
21 40 41 51 55 12 15 10 13 
mean 40.10 35.76 47.33 45.33 8.24 10.57 7.10 8.95 
SD 10.93 10.57 12.45 11.11 3.74 5.78 2.96 4.89 
Table D4: Data of ambiguous choices 
subject 
total amount of 
ambiguous choices 
among all sure payoff 
categories 









choices exclusive of 
indifferent interval 
No. Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real Hypo Real 
1 11 14 8 11 0.153 0.194 0.042 0.042 
2 23 11 9 9 0.319 0.153 0.194 0.028 
3 12 14 7 10 0.167 0.194 0.069 0.056 
4 16 10 6 8 0.222 0.139 0.139 0.028 
5 5 13 2 9 0.069 0.181 0.042 0.056 
6 32 10 10 5 0.444 0.139 0.306 0.069 
7 13 8 8 8 0.181 0.111 0.069 0.000 
8 12 11 7 7 0.167 0.153 0.069 0.056 
9 3 3 1 1 0.042 0.042 0.028 0.028 
10 7 5 7 4 0.097 0.069 0.000 0.014 
11 22 10 7 3 0.306 0.139 0.208 0.097 
12 17 14 8 11 0.236 0.194 0.125 0.042 
13 2 19 1 12 0.028 0.264 0.014 0.097 
14 15 14 8 7 0.208 0.194 0.097 0.097 
15 13 28 7 23 0.181 0.389 0.083 0.069 
16 14 7 8 3 0.194 0.097 0.083 0.056 
17 9 12 7 9 0.125 0.167 0.028 0.042 
18 22 22 14 16 0.306 0.306 0.111 0.083 
19 14 9 8 7 0.194 0.125 0.083 0.028 
20 10 15 6 12 0.139 0.208 0.056 0.042 
21 19 15 10 13 0.264 0.208 0.125 0.028 
mean 13.857 12.571 7.095 8.952 0.192 0.175 0.094 0.050 
SD 7.164 5.600 2.965 4.894 0.100 0.078 0.073 0.028 
 
